USAID Managing for Results
Working Paper No.

USAID Humanitarian Assistance Workshop on Performance Measurement

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

PN-ABS-538

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WORKSHOP

ON

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

June 15 - 16, 1995
Washington, D.C.

Co-sponsored by USAID's:

Bureau for Policy and
Program Coordination and
Center for Development
Information and
Evaluation (PPC/CDIE)

Bureau for Humanitarian
Response

FOREWORD

This report is part of a series of working papers that CDIE will be issuing periodically as we handle, as an Agency, some new needs in "managing for results." These needs include:

- improving our ability to focus foreign aid on significant and measurable results;
- coaching and supporting a result-oriented, strategic management process; and
- using more comprehensive information about program performance and results to learn, to change, to educate, and to account for the effective use of foreign aid.

In the interest of reducing the processing time for papers in this series, no copy editing is performed on the original working documents.

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A. Workshop Overview

I. Workshop Objectives

The first objective was to review the **state-of-the art** of performance measurement in humanitarian assistance. This included briefly surveying the methods currently being used by USAID and other organizations to measure and track the performance of their humanitarian assistance programs, as well as discussing the strengths and weaknesses of those approaches.

The second objective was to **exchange ideas and experiences** on assessing the results of humanitarian assistance programs. This included sharing the experiences of Missions, other donors, partners, and academics, as well as discussing lessons learned, best practices, and emerging assessment methodologies.

The third objective was to identify a **minimum core data set** of performance indicators that can be used throughout the Agency to measure, track, analyze, and assess the performance of its humanitarian assistance programs. These measures would complement program-level indicators and serve as a basis for reporting on overall Agency performance and results to both the U.S. Congress and public.

II. Workshop Purpose and Background

From June 15-16, 1995, USAID held a two-day Humanitarian Assistance Performance Measurement Workshop at One Washington Circle Hotel, Washington, D.C. The workshop was co-sponsored by the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination's (PPC) Senior Policy Adviser in Humanitarian Assistance, the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) and the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE).

Purpose. The intention of the workshop was to enhance USAID's ability to analyze and report on the status of its humanitarian assistance programs. To that end, common ways of measuring and tracking the performance of the Agency's humanitarian assistance programs will be used to report on the accomplishments of those endeavors to both the public and Congress. To date, USAID has conducted performance measurement workshops in four of the five sectors or program areas that comprise the Agency's strategy for sustainable development—Democracy, Economic Growth, Environment, and Humanitarian Assistance. As performance measurement in the Population/Health/Nutrition sector is substantially advanced, it was not deemed necessary to hold a similar workshop on that subject.

Background. The mandate to plan, measure, and manage programs for better results is a U.S. Governmentwide initiative. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires that all Federal agencies develop strategic plans by 1997, have operational plans and performance indicators by 1998, and begin reporting on results to the President and Congress by 2000. In addition, the National Performance Review (1993) shifted the focus of all Federal Government programs "from red tape to results," largely through an emphasis on performance measurement, customer focus, and strategic management. Finally, the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) recently conducted the first of what will be annual reviews of Agency program objectives and performance.

USAID is dedicated to assessing its performance, and this commitment is a major guiding force in the Agency's reinvention, reengineering, and managing for results initiatives. Much has already been accomplished. Since 1991, CDIE's Program Performance Information for Strategic Management System project (PRISM) has assisted many USAID operating units in articulating clear strategies and objectives, identifying useful and practical indicators for measuring performance against those objectives, collecting and analyzing performance data, and using those data in program and budget decisions. In addition, PRISM has supported broader CDIE-coordinated efforts to provide summaries of Agencywide performance information both to senior management and to use for external reporting purposes, such as the submission of an Annual Program Performance Report to the Administrator.

The Administrator wants to build on PRISM's efforts to develop an improved and expanded USAID performance measurement system—one that will complement Mission and other operating-level measurement and reporting systems. In support of this effort, the Performance Measurement Workshops are a vehicle for developing key "common" indicators that can be used Agencywide to measure and report on program results.

III. Program Performance Measurement in USAID

To orient workshop participants to the task they would be assigned at the Humanitarian Assistance Workshop, Graham Kerr gave them an overview of USAID performance measurement. He explained that performance measurement in USAID consists of a results tracking system. This system is used as a tool to aid managers in measuring, tracking, and assessing the performance of their programs. Through such means, managers can better determine what changes are necessary to improve the results of their programs. This system requires a clearly defined hierarchy of objectives based on 1) needs assessments of customers and stakeholders, 2) the contribution that can be made by a USAID Mission, 3) development theory and practical experience, and 4) the probability of achieving those objectives. This system requires a minimum number of indicators that are clearly linked to the stated objectives. It gives managers the essential information required to manage for results and to know whether results are being achieved on schedule.

When a USAID Mission, or other operating unit, utilizes performance measurement, it not only fulfills its own needs, but also meets the Agency's goals, objectives, and program strategies. USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood has committed the Agency to a results orientation in five sectors:

1. *Economic Growth:* Encouraging broad-based economic growth

2. *Democracy and Governance:* Building democracies

3. *Population/Health/Nutrition:* Stabilizing populations and protecting human health

4. *Environment:* Protecting the environment

5. *Humanitarian Assistance:* Saving lives and property

As stipulated by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the Agency must track and report annually on the progress each country is making toward the achievement of USAID goals and objectives in the five sectors. Mr. Kerr added that, in this workshop, the focus would be to determine how to improve USAID's Performance Measurement System as it relates to Humanitarian Assistance.

IV. The Humanitarian Assistance Framework

Ideally, the development of indicators to measure Agency-level humanitarian assistance program performance would be conducted within a clearly articulated Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework, which would include the Agency goal(s), Agency objectives, and Agency program approaches. However, as Humanitarian Assistance has only recently been treated as a distinct USAID program sector, the Agency as a whole did not at the time have an approved Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework. Therefore, workshop organizers, comprising representatives of all regional and central bureaus, reviewed the following documents and information:

- USAID's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Paper
- The Humanitarian Assistance Implementation Guidelines
- The BHR strategic plan
- Mission strategic objectives and program outcomes

These materials were then used to develop a Workshop Framework for Developing Agency Performance Indicators.

The Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Paper. The Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Paper identifies a number of broad "strategic goals" for the Agency's humanitarian assistance program:

- Disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness
- Timely delivery of relief

- Preservation of civil governance during crisis and transition
- Support for democratic institutions
- Building of local capacity to prevent, act, and recover from disaster

The BHR Strategic Plan. BHR has leadership responsibility for managing the Agency's humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, the broad goal statements of the Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategy Paper are reflected, among other things, in BHR's Strategic Plan.

BHR has established two Bureau goals and five strategic objectives derived from and in support of Agency strategies (see the chart on the next page).

BHR Mission Statement
The Mission of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response is to Protect Vulnerable Groups and Accelerate the Transition from Relief into Development

GOAL

Lives and Property Saved and Suffering Reduced

GOAL

Increased Food Security and Participation by Vulnerable Population in Sustainable Development

Strategic Objective #1

Critical Needs Met of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations

Strategic Objective #2

Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies

Strategic Objective #3

Strengthened Capability of PVO & NGO Community and Int. Orgs. to Deliver Emergency & Development Services

Strategic Objectives #4

Sustained Improvement in Household Nutrition and Ag. Productivity for Vulnerable Groups Served by USAID Food Programs

Strategic Objectives #5

Agency More Effectively Integrates Food Security, Disaster Relief; and PVO/NGO Collaboration in Strategic Planning for Country Programs

BHR's first goal is central to the Agency's humanitarian assistance strategic goals.[1] The first goal is, in turn, supported by Strategic Objective # 1 and Strategic Objective # 2 (see following chart).



The Workshop Framework for Developing Agency Performance Indicators. BHR's first goal and Strategic Objectives #1 and #2 (see above) provided a useful basis for workshop efforts to develop Agency indicators. BHR's Strategic Objectives #1 was considered to be "Assistance provided during emergencies." BHR's Strategic Objective #2 was judged a compound objective, both conceptually and practically, and consequently, performance indicators may quite likely be different for these two objectives. Accordingly, the workshop organizers divided BHR's Strategic Objective #2 into two objectives: 1) Protect Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies and 2) Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies. These two objectives were considered to be classified as "Pre-emergency assistance" (disaster prevention) and "Post-emergency assistance" (disaster recovery).

[1]BHR adopted its second goal because of the legislative mandate that food aid programs should contribute to food security. Thus, it was judged not to be directly relevant to humanitarian assistance and was therefore not covered by this workshop.

The Workshop Framework is presented below.



V. Humanitarian Assistance Measurement in USAID

Strategic Objectives and Performance Indicators

To inform participants of current USAID humanitarian assistance performance measures and to serve as a guide for the types of indicators they would be expected to develop, an inventory list of objectives and indicators, grouped by workshop category (Pre-emergency, During emergency, and Post-emergency) for natural and complex disasters, was prepared and included in participants' folders. (See Appendix II.) Sources of this information included USAID's Mission/regional program performance information database (PRISM), the ENI Bureau Strategic Framework and the BHR Strategic Plan.

Chart 1, on the next page, summarizes this information. Countries that are reporting performance indicators are in bold.

Chart 1: COUNTRIES/OPERATING UNITS REPORTING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

	SO #1 Protect Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies (Pre-Emergency Assistance)	SO #2 Critical Needs Met of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations (Assistance During Emergency)	SO #3 Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies (Post Emergency Assistance)
Natural Disasters	**BHR** **Bangladesh** **Chad** **Niger** **REDSO/EA** **Sahel Reg. Prgm.**	**BHR** **Bangladesh** **Chad** **Ethiopia** **Niger** **REDSO/EA** **Somalia**	**BHR** **Bangladesh** **REDSO/EA** **Somalia**
Complex Disasters	**BHR**	**BHR** **Armenia** **Azerbaijan** **Bosnia** **Burundi** **Ethiopia** **Georgia** **Kenya** **Russia** **Somalia** **Tajikistan**	**BHR** **Angola** **Armenia** **Bosnia** **Burundi** **Croatia** **Rwanda** *Cambodia *El Salvador *Ethiopia *Eritrea *Haiti *Mozambique *South Africa

*Countries Receiving Humanitarian Assistance Funding in FY 1994 and Reporting More "Development-Oriented" Results

Programs in bold are those reporting indicators

Further analysis of programs reporting objectives and indicators shows:

Pre-Emergency Assistance:

Natural Disasters

- 6 programs reporting on objectives and indicators
- 2 programs had data for their indicators
- More than half the indicators came from regional programs
- Africa Missions did the most reporting
- More than half the indicators are about getting *systems in place*

Complex Disasters

- 1 program reported objectives and indicators

Assistance During Emergencies:

Natural Disasters

- 7 programs reporting objectives, 5 with indicators
- 2 programs had data for their indicators
- Africa Missions did the most reporting
- The majority of indicators are for *response time*
- Many indicators were about *target/vulnerable groups*, or high-level impact such as *mortality* and *malnutrition*

Complex Disasters

- 11 programs were reporting objectives, 8 with indicators
- 7 programs had data for their indicators
- The European/New Independent States Mission did the most reporting
- Most of these indicators are for *response time*
- Many of these indicators were for *products delivered* such as the blankets distributed, tools provided, and volume of seeds provided.
- Other often-used indicators concentrated on broader needs such as *primary health care provision*, and *schooling*, or high-level impact, such as *malnutrition* and *disease prevalence*

Post-Emergency Assistance:

Natural Disasters

- 4 programs reporting objectives, 3 with indicators
- 1 had data for its indicators
- BHR and regional bureaus did the most reporting

Complex Disasters

- 7 programs reporting post-emergency assistance objectives, 5 with indicators
- 4 had data for their indicators
- Many indicators on higher-level impact such as *mortality rates*, and *human rights abuses*
- 7 post-crisis programs reporting on sustainable development plans, 6 with indicators
- 4 had data for their indicators

VI. Break-out Group Deliberations: Arriving at Candidate Indicators

In terms of how to arrive at candidate indicators for measuring Agency performance in humanitarian assistance, participants were informed that discussions would take place in three break-out groups corresponding to the three strategic objectives:

> *Pre-emergency assistance activities.* These include early warning systems, preventive actions, as well as preparedness and mitigation activities. Many experts include "traditional" development activities as part of such "before" efforts focused on emergency/disaster prevention (These would fall under S.O. 1.)
>
> *Assistance during an emergency activities.* These include program activity and policy directives focused on disaster relief assistance and aid that takes place while the emergency or disaster is ongoing. Typically, these program activities include the provision of logistical support (medical/health, food, water/sanitation, and shelter), repatriation, security, etc. (These would fall under S.O. 2.)
>
> *Post-emergency assistance activities.* These include program activity and policy directives that occur during a transition phase when an emergency or disaster has reached or is reaching closure. Typically, these programs include reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation, repatriation, defining, demobilization, reintegration, and improved preparedness planning for future emergencies/disasters. (These would fall under S.O. 3.)

Participants were encouraged to join the break-out discussion group that they felt they could make the greatest contribution to in the overall team effort to come up with a core set of humanitarian assistance performance indicators. They were informed that Day 1 break-out group discussions would focus on *natural* disasters and would be based on the three categories of emergency assistance (Pre-emergency, During emergency, and Post-emergency); and that Day 2 would build upon the results of Day 1, but that discussions of the same three categories should concentrate on *complex* disasters instead. This division was considered necessary because complex disasters, unlike natural disasters, involve intense levels of political considerations and therefore have added political and security risk dimensions. In some cases, for example, for assistance provided during emergencies, it was mentioned that the same indicators could be used for both natural and complex disasters.

Session-by-session goals

Day 1: First Session (Natural Disasters)

Establish working definitions
Identify outstanding issues
Review indicator sources
Propose Candidate Indicators for Natural Disasters

Day 2: Second/Third Sessions (Complex Disasters)

Establish new working definitions
Re-examine natural disaster indicators
Review all available indicators
Propose Candidate Indicators for Complex Disasters

The following are brief accounts of how the groups arrived at the preliminary core set of indicators they developed over the two days. The information is culled from notes taken by several break-out group members and from transcripts of the group report-out sessions.

Pre-Emergency Assistance
Jinx (Jean) Parker, J. Parker & Associates, and Ollie Davidson, PPC/DP

This type of assistance includes efforts to prevent man-made and natural events from becoming emergencies or to help intended beneficiaries to be better prepared in the event of such crises. To develop performance indicators for this phase, the group cursorily assessed the list of USAID indicators, but concluded that those indicators were unsatisfactory, because they did not uniformly focus on results.[1] Instead, the list seemed to be a mixture of indicators at the purpose, process; and impact-level categories. Next, the group reflected on USAID's four core values—managing for results, empowerment/accountability, customer focus, and teamwork—while trying to determine which indicators were the most useful for measuring the performance of pre-emergency assistance.

The group decided that vulnerability analyses are critical—in order to enhance understanding of disaster prevention and help determine if humanitarian assistance efforts reduced vulnerability. Therefore, the group created an overall objective, which could also be an indicator: Improved capacity of public and private sectors and regional organizations to conduct and apply vulnerability assessments (in disaster-prone areas). Indicators in support of that objective could then be created to measure and track how well prevention, mitigation, and preparedness planning protect vulnerable entities, such as people, facilities, and the environment.

The group's aim was to create general performance measures that could be used by a USAID Mission, country, or any operating unit involved in providing pre-emergency humanitarian assistance to determine if vulnerability had been reduced.

Indicators might differ depending on whether the disaster is natural or man-made. However, since natural and complex disasters are inextricably linked, some natural disaster criteria also apply to complex disasters.

The vulnerability assessments could be used to collect critical baseline data and set performance targets. Information sharing is crucial; therefore, performance indicators should

[1]Participants reported that, due to time constraints, they were unable to conduct a careful review and assessment of the inventory and suggested that this review should be undertaken in a more thoughtful way after the workshop.

measure cooperation and exchange of information at local levels and from headquarters to the field, and vice-versa. Bilateral and multilateral donors, the PVO/NGO community, and other stakeholder communities need to collaborate to improve data collection and program implementation, and to minimize costs.

Local initiatives should be supported as much as possible and performance indicators should measure that.

Political will is crucial to disaster prevention efforts. For instance, disaster may result from political inaction once a problem is detected.

Good development presumably leads to fewer disasters so development aid is inherently a form of pre-emergency assistance. For this reason, the same or similar performance indicators might be used for emergency activities as for development endeavors.

During-Emergency Assistance
Steve Gale, PPC/CDIE/PME

Pre-emergency and during-emergency assistance overlap because if a disaster cannot be prevented, mechanisms must be in place to help people in vulnerable areas either mitigate or respond to it. Such interventions reduce loss of lives and property and minimize suffering. They also help disaster victims cope with and recover from an emergency and regain some semblance of normalcy.

The group began by discussing the qualifications for a natural or man-made event to be considered a disaster and listing the different types of such crises. For the most part, group members agreed with the definitions in the glossary prepared for the workshop.

Group members described the criteria for emergencies, including scale and size, impact, urgency, priorities, local capacity to respond, need for foreign humanitarian assistance, types of intervention and the speed with which they should be conducted, as well as vulnerability assessments to identify affected populations.

They also debated the difference between natural and complex disasters. Although they found some differences, the group felt the same indicators could be used for both types of crises. Some argued that complex emergencies include a security issue that natural emergencies do not. Others disagreed, saying that looting and some violence also accompanies natural disasters. Many opined that it is harder to identify the victims in complex emergencies than in natural emergencies. They acknowledged that both types of calamities can create refugees, but agreed that complex disasters generate a more widespread and longer-term refugee crisis.

The group considered whether they should try to come up with process or impact indicators. Some said it is important to weigh inputs against outputs and determine whether disaster response efforts have a positive impact. Others agreed that impact is the ultimate measurement, but argued that it is not always feasible to ascertain whether outcomes are attributable directly to foreign assistance. Those group members believed that process

indicators are more useful in providing information that is easily attainable and can be used to assess progress. Such differences of opinion were unresolved at the end of the discussion.

On the inventory list, the majority of indicators measure the quantity and delivery of commodities and services, as well as the speed with which relief is provided after a disaster is declared and a vulnerability assessment is completed.

Group members wanted to select performance measures of equity and coverage of assistance, but disagreed as to how to incorporate those issues into indicators. They were not sure if they should be disaggregating measures by gender, income-level, or other criteria. However, members agreed that performance indicators should show whether humanitarian assistance reduced vulnerability.

Post-Emergency Assistance
Clarence Zuvekas LAC/DPB-EA, and Lynn Sheldon, ENI

There is also some overlap between during emergency and post-emergency assistance. Once action has been taken to minimize suffering and loss of lives and property, some transition assistance is needed to rehabilitate and reconstruct affected areas. Efforts are made to help victims resume their normal way of life and preferably to rectify the causes of the disaster, be they natural or man-made. Such post-emergency efforts in support of sustainable development and also are a form of pre-emergency assistance, because better development is assumed to result in fewer disasters.

The group first tried to agree on what was meant by "transition." In the case of a civil war, that could mean the establishment of peace and a resurgence of democracy. In the case of the countries of the former Soviet Union, it could mean a change from a centrally controlled economy to free-market enterprise and capitalism. However, in terms of natural disasters, the group was unclear as to what a transition would entail. Some members felt that there is another kind of transition that moves along a relief-to-sustainable development continuum.

A related debate ensued about what is meant by stabilizing a situation after an emergency. Some defined it as returning to a "normal pattern of life." The term "normal" was also problematic. Many said returning disaster victims to their previous state of misery is insufficient. They expressed the hope that by addressing the causes of the disaster, conditions could be improved.

The group also determined that no clear dividing lines separate a crisis and the humanitarian assistance provided into pre-, during-, and post-emergency phases. All phases are part of a recurring cycle. Many of the indicators on the inventory list could apply to any or all of the phases, the group found.

For those reasons, the group found it unclear when relief is to end and development is to begin. Some participants wanted to discuss exit criteria that would define when donors like USAID should stop providing relief services and the host country should begin to take care of its own disaster response needs. Some thought exit criteria should include reducing political violence to the minimum level and ensuring that it remains low. Others did not think it was

donors' responsibility to guarantee security. Some members thought the relief-to-development continuum should be addressed, while others thought it would be more appropriate to discuss that issue at CDIE workshops that dealt specifically with the strategic objectives for sustainable development.

Finally, the group discussed which and how many communities USAID should collect data on if the focus is on resumption of a stable life. Regardless of the focus group, needs assessment is complicated because of a dearth of good baseline data at the community level. Some believed that a stable life should comprise functioning family units; resumed community activities; markets in operation, mainly for agricultural products; and people earning a livelihood. Others thought it should also include the restoration of lifeline infrastructure to transport agricultural produce to markets or provide food supplies to the community. While some participants concurred that these characteristics are important, they did not believe it is in USAID's manageable interests to be held accountable for bringing about all of those changes.

VII. Candidate Indicators Proposed by Participants

Pre-emergency assistance

Natural Disasters (eight indicators)

1. Improved capacity of targeted public and private sector entities and regional organizations to conduct vulnerability assessments

2. Percentage of targeted population covered by vulnerability assessments

3. Number of governments adopting recommended mitigation and preparedness practices

4. Number of private organizations, investors, and insurers adopting recommended mitigation and preparedness practices

5. Number of communities showing increased investment in vulnerability reduction/protection activities

6. Level of public-private collaboration to achieve vulnerability reduction

7. Continuity of service of targeted facilities before, during, and after a natural disaster

8. Percentage of food allocated according to pre-emergency vulnerability assessments

Complex Disasters (four indicators)

1. Percentage of Early Warning Alerts that resulted in mitigation actions.[1]

2. Increased involvement of targeted groups in design, planning, and implementation of Prevention/Mitigation/Preparedness (PMP) activities, including conflict resolution.

3. Reduction in percentage of targeted populations affected by disasters.[2]

4. Percentage vulnerability of targeted groups declines.[3]

During emergency assistance

Natural Disasters

Indicators for natural and complex disasters are the same because the types of assistance provided are similar. The only difference is that complex disasters often carry a greater security problem for relief workers and recipients of emergency assistance.

Complex Disasters (8 indicators)

1. Percentage of target population served (disaggregated by gender, age, and "vulnerable groups.")[4]

2. Response time (hours? days?) from (declared, initiated, needs assessed) delivery to target beneficiary or target site.

3. Rate of change or percentage decrease in crude mortality, infant mortality

4. Percentage decrease in acute and severe malnutrition

5. Percentage reduction in case fatality rates

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[1]These include social, political, and economic factors collected, analyzed, and broadly disseminated. (The word *system* was not used because it connotes planned, organized, and routine arrangements to collect and analyze. The group wanted to connote a less technical, less structured use of early warning.)

[2]At present, there is insufficient ability to evaluate, compare data; no standardized method or definition of universe for data collection. Need to recommend systematizing baseline data collection and verification and to define *targeted populations* and *affected.*

[3]All agency programs should be involved. Highlight links to ongoing development.

[4]Issues to consider are coverage of and equity in distribution of humanitarian assistance and sensitivity to ethnic differences.

6. Percentage, number, or rate of return to pre-disaster acceptable condition

7. Morbidity/mortality disease-specific rates (with health diagnostic orientation)

8. Efficiency and effectiveness—sound budget? needs assessment?

Post-emergency assistance

Natural Disasters (13 indicators)

End of emergency - critical needs met

1. Acceptable mortality rate

2. Acceptable nutritional status

3. Acceptable disease incidence

4. Minimum shelter needs met

Recovery—return to stable pattern of life

5. Functioning families

6. Restored community activities

7. Return to livelihoods

8. Functioning markets

9. Developed local resources developed

10. Restoration of "lifeline" infrastructure

11. Demand for and provision of credit

12. Reduced child mortality

13. Reasonable market prices

Complex Disasters (10 indicators)

Return to stable pattern of life

1. Existence of an accepted governing group

2. Reduction in displaced persons

3. Measure of local-level general economic activity

4. Rehabilitation of basic services

5. Perception of personal security

6. Reduction in political violence

7. Functioning self-sufficient civic community organizations

End/post emergency - planning and preparation

8. Existence of prevention/mitigation/preparedness-type plans

9. Fulfillment of exit strategy criteria

10. Implementation of conflict resolution actions

VIII. Proposed Workshop Follow-up

1. Create a standing "Humanitarian Assistance Sector Working Group," comprising Agencywide representation. Each of the other Agency sectors (Democratic Initiatives, Economic Growth, Environment, and Population/Health/Nutrition) has a standing Sector Working Group that addresses policy, program, and performance measurement issues.

2. Refine the Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework. Several versions of an Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework have been proposed. These alternatives need to be reviewed and a consensus reached regarding a "working" framework.

3. Work with the Humanitarian Assistance Sector Working Group to revise and refine the performance indicators proposed at the workshop.

4. Build an Agency humanitarian assistance performance data base.

IX. Afterword

USAID has continued to work on the Humanitarian Assistance Strategy and Indicators subsequent to the workshop. Significant advances should continue to be made over the next year and substantial changes in the Framework and Indicators will be shown.

The Agency Humanitarian Assistance Framework, August 1995

Following the June 1995 Humanitarian Assistance Workshop on Performance Measurement, the ad hoc Humanitarian Assistance Working Group convened several times to reach consensus on an Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework. This framework was approved by the Administrator in August 1995.

This new framework, a graphic presentation of the Agency's strategy in humanitarian assistance, builds on the framework used for the workshop. However, because tracking Humanitarian Assistance as a distinct program sector is very new to the Agency, this new framework is a more preliminary formulation than the frameworks developed in other Agency strategic sectors. It will require considerable discussion, testing and reformulation over the coming year in order to fully depict the Agency's programs in humanitarian assistance.

1995-96 Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework



Indicators for the Agency Humanitarian Assistance Framework, October 1995

The ad hoc Humanitarian Assistance Working Group met several times in September and October 1995 to develop a short list of indicators to track progress at the country level in achieving agency goals and objectives. The group first reviewed the indicators proposed by the workshop. Appendix II provides a table representing the Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework as of August 1995, and indicators from the Humanitarian Assistance Workshop held in June 1995. The two exercises are blended to permit assessing the applicability and feasibility of workshop indicators for the Agency strategy. The ad hoc Working Group also reviewed a separate set of indicators proposed by the Bureau for Humanitarian Response for some of their programs.

The indicators ultimately agreed upon for the Agency Humanitarian Assistance Goals and Strategic Objectives are presented below, followed by a brief discussion of the "Issues Warranting Further Discussion."

Agency Goal 5: Lives Saved, Suffering Reduced, and Development Potential Reinforced

Indicators:
a) deaths averted
b) property loss avoided
c) increased indigenous capacity to deal with crises

Source: case specific, using only credible sources; range of sources: UN/multilateral reports, contractor/grantee reports, research studies, newspaper clippings

Parameters: No expectation of full coverage or aggregation.

Comments:
1. On a selective basis, support research and evaluation on impact of crisis preparedness and mitigation strategies.

2. Incorporate data collection on beneficiaries of food/emergency assistance as a basis for assessing/calculating deaths averted and property loss avoided in contractors' and grantees' scopes of work, where appropriate.

Agency Objective 5.1: Potential Impact of Humanitarian Crises Reduced

Indicator: Significant actions/investments in crisis prevention/mitigation in crisis prone countries

Parameters:
1. List of crisis prone countries is identified by USAID.

2. Includes actions and investments made in designated areas and countries, regardless of source of the action or investment (e.g., USAID, host country, other donors, other host country groups).

3. Use of an ordinal scale to measure the significance of actions/investments, i.e., the ranking of investments as "high," "medium," or "low."

4. Includes actions associated with preventative diplomacy and aversion/mitigation of complex emergencies as well as actions and investments associated with prevention or mitigation of natural disasters.

Agency Objective 5.2: Urgent Needs Met in Crisis Situations

Indicator: Percent of vulnerable population with emergency needs met.

Parameters:
1. Emergency needs are - food, medical, shelter, water/sanitation, energy and physical security.

2. Includes only countries where USAID resources are committed.

3. Vulnerable population is defined by USAID (utilizing data from UN/multilateral organizations, PVOs, etc.).

4. To be tracked country by country.

Agency Objective 5.3: Security Established and Basic Institutions Functioning to Meet Critical Needs and Protect Basic Rights

Indicator: Progress toward pre-determined, crisis-specific, exit criteria.

Parameters:
1. Covers predominately complex emergencies.

2. For each country emerging from crisis that is included under this objective, specific exit criteria will be determined.
- Worldwide exit criteria are NOT envisioned.
- The exit criteria for each country will be determined at (or before) entrance.
- Criteria will relate principally to re-establishment of security and functioning of basic institutions, e.g. repatriation and resettlement occurring, existence of governing group(s) enjoying confidence of people.

3. Limited to countries where USAID resources are committed.

Issues Warranting Further Discussion

The above indicators proposed for tracking and reporting on Agency performance in the Humanitarian Assistance area reflect the ad hoc Humanitarian Assistance Indicator Working Group's best judgment of the kinds of indicators that would be meaningful and feasible, given the current state of the art. Tracking Humanitarian Assistance as a distinct program sector is very new to USAID. The PPC Humanitarian Assistance Unit was

established only a few months ago, signaling both a commitment to, and development of, a capacity to make this transition from humanitarian assistance activities and programs to an Humanitarian Assistance program sector. The creation of a standing Agency-wide "Humanitarian Assistance Sector Working Group" is now under consideration. Substantial analysis and research are needed in this area before Agency Humanitarian Assistance professionals will feel confident in proposing a relatively unambiguous Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Framework and associated performance indicators. In several cases, the ad hoc Humanitarian Assistance Indicator Working Group identified specific issues warranting additional attention over the coming months in order to establish a basis for more comprehensive and consistent measurement in future years. Among these issues are the following:

1. Agency Objective 5.1: Potential impact of humanitarian crises reduced
- "Actions/investments" in avoidance/prevention/preparedness/mitigation may not be a good measure of impact, and should be identified as an "interim indicator" pending further analysis (i.e., it is accepted now as a reasonably practical indirect measure of reduced vulnerability to humanitarian crises).
- Should a "vulnerability index" be developed, perhaps based on "expert judgments" of selected "vulnerability factors," to track countries becoming less vulnerable to crises as a direct measure? - Is there a way to track increases in indigenous capacity and its utilization to prevent/mitigate crises?

2. Agency Objective 5.2: Urgent needs met in crisis situations
- Should the information be aggregated into a single index or presented on each of the needs covered. (For example, should it be presented on the percent of the vulnerable population with its food needs met, percent of the vulnerable population with its shelter needs met, and so forth, or should these be aggregated to give data on percent of the population with emergency needs met.)

3. Agency Objective 5.3: Security established and basic institutions functioning to meet critical needs and basic rights - Exit criteria are extremely difficult to define and measure in this arena, vis a vis the "acute crisis" arena. Exit criteria will vary by country and crisis.
- Are there generic exit criteria for specific types of crises, or will Agency have to define on a case-by-case basis?
- Under what circumstances are countries recovering from natural disasters included under this objective?

B. Workshop Presentations

I. *Opening Remarks*
Janet Ballantyne, Director, PPC/CDIE

Janet Ballantyne, then director of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination's (PPC) Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) welcomed participants to the two-day Humanitarian Assistance Workshop on Performance Measurement, the third in a series. CDIE has sponsored four workshops in collaboration with PPC policy specialists and various regional bureaus on the environment, democracy, and economic growth. The workshops are designed as a forum for developing common ways to measure the performance of USAID's assistance programs. A set of common indicators will enable USAID to present both to the American public and to the U.S. Congress a more accurate reporting of what it is doing.

At the start of the workshops on the environment and democracy, many people thought it was impossible to devise a common set of indicators that could be universally applied. For example, at the environmental workshop, people questioned whether there could be a common indicator for air pollution since pollutants in Indonesia and Brazil are so different. However, as the CDIE director noted, people were able to identify not only a common way to determine air quality, but also common indicators in highly complex areas.

She acknowledged the complexity of humanitarian assistance and the difficulty of determining indicators that would assess whether a humanitarian assistance endeavor is successful, based on her firsthand experience with man-made and natural disasters and crises overseas.

Ms. Ballantyne told workshop participants that when she was considering the offer to serve as CDIE director and be a major architect in the overarching performance measurement exercise, she told USAID Administrator Brian Atwood that she thought performance measurement was far too complex. He concurred, and said that was precisely why he wanted her to head CDIE. Mr. Atwood believes performance measurement should be an understandable and doable exercise for USAID field operating units to conduct, whose findings could be easily understood by the American public and Congress.

"It will be a major accomplishment," she concluded, "when we can not only prove to ourselves that it is indeed possible to have common performance indicators, but also be able to report to the public and Congress that USAID programs do produce concrete measurable results that make a lasting and profound impact on the lives of people all over the world."

II. *Overview of Presidential Review Directive 50*
Toni Christiansen-Wagner, Assistant Administrator, PPC

The Assistant Administrator of PPC, Toni Christiansen-Wagner said USAID's humanitarian assistance efforts today are more long-term and expensive than when it first became involved in 1964. The result is less money and resources for long-term development.

USAID, along with 12 other U.S. Government agencies, was recently assigned under

Presidential Review Directive 50 (P.R.D. 50)to test the U.S. and international communities' ability to maintain stability, save lives, and reduce human suffering through humanitarian assistance. When attempting to assess overall humanitarian assistance, it is important to look beyond just what the United States is doing in this area, she said, and consider the work of others—nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), contractors, international organizations, other donor governments, and the international community.

The work includes writing several papers and a synthesis report. The agencies discussed U.S. Government efforts and raised several questions or problems.

- What is the probability that a large-scale human disaster will occur?

- How many of such crises will occur and where?

Regarding early warning, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution:

- What are the general causes of this disaster, and where are they likely to be?

- What are the patterns over the last decade?

The group looked at the international response system and international organizations to assess capabilities available in the field. Then it tried to determine how U.S. organizations can support or reinforce one another in emergency or disaster situations.

The group examined the effect of military interventions. It discussed when it is appropriate to enlist the military in providing humanitarian assistance, based on the degree of severity or type of emergency and disaster.

Finally, it looked at budgetary considerations, and asked

- How do we finance humanitarian assistance efforts?

- How often do we view these efforts in terms of what it is we and the international community can actually provide to the disaster-stricken?

She concluded that the workshop approach of looking at the three phases of emergency assistance would not only assist in deciding how USAID could be a partner and leader in this endeavor, but also in figuring out how the workshop participants representing various international organizations could work with USAID and contribute to the improvement of emergency assistance worldwide.

III. *Discussion of the Agency Humanitarian Assistance Strategy*
Leonard Rogers, Deputy Assistant Administrator, BHR

Leonard Rogers, deputy assistant administrator of the Bureau of Humanitarian Response, said complex politics have led USAID to its current point in terms of humanitarian assistance.

The new overall Agency strategy incorporates humanitarian assistance as one of five Agency goals, a recognition that it is essential to USAID's support of global sustainable development. When Brian Atwood became administrator of USAID, he said that although the Agency was responding well to natural disasters, it needed to improve its response to complex disasters. Mr. Atwood also wanted a more long-term, development-oriented focus to USAID's humanitarian assistance to replace the traditional quick response to and exit from disaster-stricken areas. While USAID needs to be more flexible to respond to complex emergencies, it has made progress by establishing the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to help countries emerging from a crisis make the transition to development. To that end, OTI has begun to set up programs in places like Haiti and Angola.

A perception that underpins the Agency humanitarian assistance strategy is that all countries periodically undergo shocks. They all have natural disasters and political crises, and suffer from economic setbacks. The degree to which each country is capable of addressing those shocks is contingent on the level of development it has attained. Consequently, humanitarian assistance should be integrated into USAID's overall sustainable development strategy. In support of that endeavor, the overall agency strategy on humanitarian assistance has five goals:

1. Disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness
2. Timely delivery of relief
3. Preservation of civil governance during crisis and transition
4. Support for democratic institutions in transition
5. Building of local capacity to prevent, act, and recover from disaster

The Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR) manages food aid and foreign disaster assistance, the two largest components of USAID's humanitarian assistance effort. Much of that assistance is provided through private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and multilateral organizations. To give participants a sense of the complexity of the bureau's work, the deputy assistant administrator gave a brief introduction to its strategic plan. The BHR Mission statement is to protect vulnerable groups and accelerate the transition from relief to development. It has two goals: lives and property saved and suffering reduced, and increased food security and participation by vulnerable populations in sustainable development. Under those two goals are five strategic objectives.

1. Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations

2. Protect and stabilize selected vulnerable and transitional societies

3. Strengthened capability of the PVO/NGO community and international organizations to deliver emergency and development services

4. Sustained improvements in household nutrition and agricultural productivity for vulnerable groups served by USAID food programs

5. Agency more effectively integrates food security, disaster relief, and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs

Mr. Rogers confined his address to the first two strategic objectives and their expected outcomes

Objective 1.

- timely, effective, and targeted emergency relief
- timely, effective rehabilitation

Objective 2.

- improved prevention, mitigation, and preparedness for complex emergencies and natural disasters
- enhanced security
- political and social institutions reconstituted, and basic services reestablished

The reason for measuring the performance of those areas of humanitarian assistance, Mr. Rogers said, is to be able to improve the quality of operations to help people in disaster-prone countries plan and prepare for the next disaster.

When considering humanitarian response measurements, traditional thinking focuses on provision of short-term food, water, sanitation, and emergency health care to the disaster-stricken, activities that fall under the first strategic objective. Rarely, in the past, was the long-term issue of security considered, which falls under strategic objective 2.

Now, with the increase in complex emergencies, security has become an overriding problem that severely limits the ability to provide rapid emergency aid to reduce suffering and save lives. The lack of security that permeates complex crises has also resulted in the exponential increase in refugees worldwide, to the point where refugees are becoming an indicator in their own right. Many countries have suffered from prolonged complex emergencies. For these nations to rebuild and successfully make the transition from relief to development, refugees must be able to safely return and resettle in their homelands. Therefore, addressing the security threat posed by such complex disasters is critical.

With development assistance, more time can be spent on setting benchmarks for performance measurement. With humanitarian response, however, the situation is constantly changing and the urgency of response is critical. Any performance measurement system designed for humanitarian assistance must have zero costs in terms of operational efficiency, because the safety, lives, and property of many disaster-stricken people are at stake. In other words, performance measurement requirements should not impede the speed and effectiveness of relief workers' delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need. However, such emergency operations are becoming larger in scope, more sophisticated, and occurring with increasing frequency. That means adjusting and improving operations is more important than ever to be better prepared for and more effective in responding to future crises so that development efforts in those countries can resume.

Mr. Rogers asked participants to try to come up with measurements to help guide USAID in the development of what P.R.D. 50 terms "exit strategies." These are needed particularly for complex disasters, which tend to last much longer than natural disasters. For instance, USAID has been providing humanitarian assistance to countries like Sudan and Liberia for extended periods of time, while its involvement in countries like Somalia has been relatively brief and without much of a plan about how and when to cease relief activities. An added dimension to consider in any exit strategy is whether there is sustainable institutional capacity in the country emerging from a crisis. An institutional mechanism or structure is needed to take over from USAID, whether it is the host government public sector, multilateral organizations, bilateral donor agencies, or international and domestic NGOs/PVOs.

IV. *Program Performance Measurement in USAID*
Graham Kerr, CDIE/PME

Graham Kerr discussed performance measurement, the difference between performance measurement and results tracking and evaluation, and the vocabulary of performance measurement methodology. He put the discussion in the context of USAID Strategic Planning, which is in compliance with the Government Performance Review Act (GPRA).

Performance Measurement

Performance measurement is a results tracking system managers use to improve program results. USAID's performance measurement system requires a clearly defined hierarchy of objectives based on a) needs assessments of customers and stakeholders; b) the contribution that can be made by a USAID Mission; c) development theory and practical experience; and d) the probability of achieving those objectives. It requires a minimum number of indicators that are clearly linked to the objectives to give managers the essential information required to manage for results and to assess whether results are being achieved on schedule. This methodology also allows managers to assess progress toward the long-term goal of sustainability.

Results Tracking and Evaluation

Evaluation tools go far beyond performance measurement. An evaluation is an impact assessment tool that tells *how* and *why* results are achieved. It incorporates intended and unintended results to show the full impact, assesses the sustainability of activities, and contributes to development theory. To manage programs and judge overall results of program activities management, we need both performance measurement and evaluation.

The Vocabulary Used in Performance Measurement Methodology

Strategic objective. A clear and precise objective statement of a single significant, sustainable development result toward which substantial progress can be made, typically in 5 to 8 years, for which a USAID Mission or operation unit is held accountable in a strategic plan. An objective must be consistent with Agency and bureau priorities and country needs, opportunities, and constraints. It must be also achievable, that is it must be within USAID's manageable interest.

Performance Indicator. A characteristic or dimension of an objective that can be measured to assess progress toward an intended change as stated in the strategic objective. It must be a reliable and valid measure that can be collected on a regular basis at a reasonable cost, is useful and informative to decisionmakers, and is widely applicable. Indicators, whether quantitative or qualitative, should, if possible, show a change in a human condition that helps ascertain if assistance is improving the quality of life of the Agency's intended beneficiaries.

When a USAID Mission utilizes performance measurement, it not only fulfills its own needs, but also meets the Agency's goals, objectives, and program strategies. Most importantly, by reporting information on the performance of its programs through strategic objectives and supporting indicators, a USAID Mission or operating unit contributes to four areas of U.S. national interests: 1) promotion of U.S. economic security; 2) protection of the United States against specific global dangers; 3) improvement of prospects for peace and enhancement of stability; and 4) prevention of humanitarian and other complex crises. Under those U.S. interests, USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood has committed the Agency to a results orientation in five sectors, each aimed at fulfilling Agency goals in the countries where USAID has Missions or operating units:

1. *Economic Growth*: Encouraging broad-based economic growth.

2. *Democracy and Governance*: Building democracies.

3. *Population/Health/Nutrition*: Stabilizing populations and protecting human health.

4. *Environment*: Protecting the environment.

5. *Humanitarian Assistance*: Saving lives and property.

The next step is to examine the needs and circumstances of each of the countries where USAID Missions or operating units are stationed and establish a link between U.S. interests and the Agency's sector goals. As stipulated by the Government Performance and Results Act, the Agency must track and report annually on the progress each of those countries is making toward USAID goals and objectives in the five sectors.

V. *Performance Measurement in USAID Humanitarian Assistance*

Binah Shupack, MSI/PRISM

Binah Shupack presented an inventory of indicators in use, primarily drawn from Mission and regional program performance information, the Bureau for Europe and Newly Independent States (ENI) database and the BHR Strategic Plan.[1] The objectives and indicators

[1] The mission/regional program performance information is already being used and reported on by the various USAID country and regional mission. The ENI database was recently created in April 1995 and the ENI mission have not yet begun to report data for those indicators. The indicators in the BHR plan are not country-specific and no data has been reported for these yet. As there was insufficient information on pre-emergency assistance for complex disasters from the aforementioned sources, the non country-specific indicators for that portion of the list were obtained from the University of Maryland's CIDCM (Center for International Development and Conflict Management's Journal of Ethno-Development)'s Journal of Ethno-Development: Early

in the inventory list were grouped by phase (before, during and after emergency assistance) for natural and complex disasters and cross-referenced with budget information.

Ms. Shupack analyzed the list by determining which Mission programs were reporting objectives, indicators, data and data sources, and which were receiving the most funding.

Fourteen countries, each receiving more than $30 million, account for 97 percent of U.S. Government humanitarian assistance expenditures.[2] From largest to smallest recipient, they are: Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Haiti, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Iraq, Eritrea, and Kenya. There were no objectives and indicators for Iraq, Liberia, and Sudan. Ten of the remaining countries, which receive 81 percent of humanitarian assistance funding, reported information with stated objectives. Only 6 of the 10 countries, accounting for 47 percent of emergency resources, actually had indicators to support their objectives.

Objectives and indicators were categorized by the phase of emergency assistance they fit into, not by where the country lies along the continuum. For instance, USAID/Bosnia's Strategic Plan includes objectives and indicators for post-emergency assistance, as it is planning post-crisis transition and development activities.

Classification by disaster type and phase of programs reporting objectives and indicators shows:

Pre-Emergency Assistance:

Natural Disasters[3]

- 6 programs reporting on objectives and indicators
- 2 programs had data[4] for their indicators
- More than half the indicators came from regional programs
- Africa Missions did the most reporting
- More than half the indicators are about getting *systems in place*

Complex Disasters[5]

- 1 program reported objectives and indicators

Warnings of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, as well as UNDHA's Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) List of Indicators. For post-emergency assistance, Some of information on exit criteria was culled from the Department of Defense's "Inter-Agency Checklist for the Restoration of Essential Services" in end-of-crisis countries

[2] Expenditures denoted here refer to humanitarian assistance efforts underwritten by BHR/OTI, BHR/OFDA, Regional Bureaus (AFR - Africa; ANE - Asia & Near East; ENI - Europe & Newly-Independent States; and LAC - Latin America and the Caribbean bureaus of USAID), and other U.S. Government entities.

[3] These indicators were for Bangladesh, BHR, Chad, Niger, REDSO/East Africa, and the Sahel Regional Program.

[4] "Data" connotes baselines, projected performance targets, and actual results.

[5] Only BHR, which is non country-specific had indicators for this. Also, see footnote # 1.

Assistance During Emergencies:

Natural Disasters[6]

- 7 programs reporting objectives, 5 with indicators
- 2 programs had data for their indicators
- Africa Missions did the most reporting
- The majority of indicators are for *response time*
- Many indicators were about *target/vulnerable groups*, or high-level impact such as *mortality* and *malnutrition*

Complex Disasters[7]

- 11 programs were reporting objectives, 8 with indicators
- 7 programs had data for their indicators
- The European/New Independent States Mission did the most reporting
- Most of these indicators are for *response time*
- Many of these indicators were for *products delivered* such as the blankets distributed, tools provided, and volume of seeds provided.
- Other often-used indicators concentrated on broader needs such as *primary health care provision*, and *schooling*, or high-level impact, such as *malnutrition* and *disease prevalence*

Post-Emergency Assistance:

Natural Disasters[8]

- 4 programs reporting objectives, 3 with indicators
- 1 had data for its indicators
- BHR and regional bureaus did the most reporting

Complex Disasters[9]

- 7 programs reporting post-emergency assistance objectives, 5 with indicators
- 4 had data for their indicators
- Many indicators on higher-level impact such as *mortality rates*, and *human rights abuses*
- 7 post-crisis programs reporting on sustainable development plans, 6 with indicators
- 4 had data for their indicators

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[6] These indicators were for Bangladesh, BHR, Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, REDSO/East Africa, and Somalia.

[7] These indicators were for Armenia, Azerbaijan, BHR, Bosnia, Burundi, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kenya, Russia, Somalia, and Tajikistan.

[8] These indicators were for Bangladesh, BHR, REDSO/East Africa, and Somalia.

[9] These indicators were for Angola, Armenia, BHR, Bosnia, Burundi, Croatia, Rwanda, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti, Mozambique, and South Africa.

VI. *Humanitarian Assistance Issues Based on the Multidonor Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*

Krishna Kumar, CDIE/POA

Krishna Kumar, CDIE senior evaluation methodologist, talked about his recent trip to Rwanda.

Background

Representatives from bilateral and multilateral international development assistance donor organizations, as well as those from the NGO/PVO community, decided last October in Paris, France to take a nontraditional approach to assessing humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, from the point of view of an international committee as a whole.

Their aims were a) to assess the quality of humanitarian assistance of all international agencies, b) to examine events as they unfolded rather than waiting until the crisis was over, c) to explore the different dimensions of the disaster, from pre-emergency to post-emergency assistance phase.

The multidonor evaluation consisted of three components:

- An assessment of early warning systems and preventive diplomacy for political issues, assigned to the Canadian and Norwegian donors.
- A review of overall emergency assistance, manner of intervention, types of assistance and ways they were provided, and cost effectiveness, to be conducted by the British Overseas Development Institute.
- An assessment of transition activities, including repatriation, rehabilitation, development, and overall human quality, for which USAID is responsible.

The evaluation teams found significant progress in all three areas, Dr. Kumar said. The evaluators were free to be more comprehensive, objective, reflective, and critical than they would have had the evaluation been funded by one organization. The evaluations are scheduled to be completed in September 1995. The adopting committee will synthesize those findings in one report. All documents will published in four languages and released by the end of 1995.

Dr. Kumar discussed the transition activities evaluation. A 14-member team with expertise in evaluation methodology, international development, disaster assistance, refugee issues, human rights, mediation and conflict resolution, as well as public health, spent 2 weeks traveling throughout Rwanda. The team met government officials, representatives from NGOs/PVOs, and other international agencies working in Rwanda to determine what had been accomplished. The team also visited almost every major region of Rwanda to confer with hundreds of intended beneficiaries of assistance, seeking firsthand opinions of villagers, farmers, and particularly women.

The evaluators found major confusion in the international donor community as to the real victims of the Rwanda tragedy. The victims of genocide had been overlooked. As much

as 60 to 70 percent of humanitarian assistance went to refugees, many of whom had perpetrated the genocide of their fellow Rwandans.

The plight of many survivors, especially women and children, had been seriously neglected. Approximately 60 percent of the households of the minority population were headed by women, because their fathers, brothers, and husbands were brutally murdered during the civil conflict. Some of the women who were raped by the men who killed their families are pregnant; others have been infected with HIV. Yet, surprisingly, not a single national-level program had been devised to address the special needs of these women.

In spite of all the expenditures of the international donor community, the security threat persists in Rwanda, a finding alluded to by BHR's Len Rogers. Within Rwanda's 2- to 5-mile border, the old army, the main perpetrator of violence, is intact and is building up its armaments. The cycle of violence is expected to resurge within a few months to a year.

Finally, the team found mixed results for interventions in support of human rights and the judicial system. On a positive note, the evaluators found that much of human caring assistance did make a difference in the provision health services, enhanced security, reviving agriculture, and building rudimentary infrastructure.

Natural and Complex Disasters

The term complex emergency was coined in 1980 when the international donor community was searching for a word to describe the situation in Mozambique, Dr. Kumar said. Because belligerent rebel factions were involved, it could not be termed a natural disaster. But, Dr. Kumar said, the term complex emergency is a misnomer, because although the disaster is complex, the underlying cause is manmade. Many so-called "natural disasters" are also attributable to human factors, such as flawed economic policies, limited administrative capabilities, lack of social concern, and inability to stabilize population growth. The assumption that some disasters are "simple" while others are "more complex" is too simplistic and often misleading, he said.

Complex emergencies are essentially political crises, he said. These volatile situations emerge from war-torn societies when the political authority of the government of a country or parts of it has been undermined and the social and political structures have eroded. The framework for intervention in political emergencies must be different from what is used in natural disasters.

An estimated 26 complex disasters are ongoing in Africa, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Political emergencies are rooted in human factors, such as artificial boundaries established by colonial regimes, government politics of exclusion, and lack of opportunities for segments of a population to express their ethnic concerns and identity.

Pre-Emergency Assistance

Early warning systems for complex political emergencies must be different, in terms of substance, data sources, and conceptual approaches, from those for natural disasters, Dr. Kumar contends. A year ago there were definite signals that Rwanda would erupt into civil unrest. Indicators that could have been tracked included rising ethnic tension, frequent speeches by political leaders exulting followers to slaughter political opponents and dissenters who sympathized with the rival ethnic group, extensive structural adjustments that imposed hardship on the general populace, rapid arms buildup in neighboring Burundi, and an increase in violent skirmishes in Kigali, the capital.

Assistance During Emergencies

Much of the assistance given during emergencies is the same regardless of the type of disaster we are responding, provision of food, shelter, elementary health services, and transportation services. But the similarities in interventions and approaches ends there. Referring to Dr. Rogers' presentation, Dr. Kumar addressed the additional concern of security in two aspects:

- *Public and private.* Warring factions not only want to secure humanitarian assistance for themselves, but also want to deprive rival groups.

- *Humanitarian assistance providers.* Ironically, international relief workers trying to deliver aid and provide some safety to victims often have to be driven in bullet-proof vehicles and escorted by security guards while they perform their work.

Natural disasters tend to be easier to predict and do not usually last as long as complex emergencies. Floods tend to be cyclical, and droughts on average last 1 to 2 years, while earthquakes erupt only once in a while in specific parts of the world. But the Afghanistan war has been going on for years and does not seem to be getting any closer to an end. It took nearly 20 years before a state of peace was resumed in Cambodia, and about that long in Angola and Mozambique. The Bosnian conflict may continue for some time. That means the time frame that international donors have for responding to natural disasters is irrelevant for complex disasters. To insist on the traditional short time frame devised for long-term complex disasters is not only inappropriate, Dr. Kumar said, but it also imposes constraints on relief workers' ability to deliver aid effectively and efficiently.

Complex emergencies force many people to leave their homes and flee for their lives. These conflicts have generated 26 to 40 million refugees and internally displaced people in the world today. Unlike victims of natural disasters, refugees and displaced people face longer-term crises and greater security threats. It is difficult if not impossible for them to return to their homes and resume a normal life.

Post-Emergency Assistance

There are no clear lines delineating when emergencies stop, relief starts, and reconstruction begins, except in the budget allocation of donor agencies, Dr. Kumar said. So

he prefers to call this the post-acute crisis phase. In political emergencies, the following factors should be considered:

1) Political emergencies tend to bring about the destruction of all or large parts of the institutional political infrastructure. As a result, international donors trying to provide humanitarian assistance have to work in a power vacuum where there is neither an administrative structure or government with authority nor political leaders who can negotiate. One of the primary tasks for the international donor community during the post-crisis phase, then, is to establish some form of political structure that can provide at least some semblance of normalcy.

2) The devastation wrought by complex political emergencies is not only physical but also social, political, and cultural. That means that more than physical resources need to be rebuilt after a political crisis. Rwanda, for instance, lost 80 percent of its health workers, all its senior college and university professors and teachers, and 15 to 20 percent of its civil servants, who have now been replaced by representatives from international donor agencies. Those who were not slaughtered fled the country. Institution building will be a major task.

The hardest-hit victims of natural emergencies are more easily identified than those of complex disasters, Dr. Kumar said. That explains, in part, why donors in Rwanda erroneously targeted refugees to receive the most humanitarian assistance. His team found that in addition to women, unwanted orphaned children were the most vulnerable. The civil war orphaned nearly 94 percent of all minors, many of whom witnessed the death of at least one of their parents. Another vulnerable group created by that crisis are those who became incapacitated during the war or lost their status. Natural and complex disasters wreak havoc on people's lives, but the magnitude of terror and psychological trauma that survivors of complex disasters have to endure is far greater, he said.

Conclusions

- International donor agencies need to recognize the importance of enforcing human rights and establishing a judicial system to protect the innocent, providing physical and psychological security to those affected, and promoting inclusion rather than exclusion in politics. Humanitarian assistance can never be a substitute for addressing these complex issues, Dr. Kumar said.

- Since complex emergencies are essentially political events, humanitarian assistance can only alleviate some of the suffering, it cannot solve the crises. Acknowledging those limitations is important in setting objectives. Supporting indicators will be meaningless, Dr. Kumar said, if the objectives are not achievable.

- People working in humanitarian assistance and development need to be aware that rehabilitation after political emergencies will necessitate long-term investments, much more concerted and patient interventions than most donors are accustomed with year-to-year budget allocations.

- Interventions and performance indicators need to be flexible enough to respond to ever-changing variables in populations devastated by political crises. Rather than aiming to build five houses the first year and more the following year, indicators need to be more generic and created with a long-term perspective in mind to accommodate tentative failures or temporary setbacks.

Appendix includes a more detailed paper on this presentation.

VII. *Pre-Emergency Assistance*
Grace Scarborough, Evidence Based Research (EBR), Incorporated

The purpose of pre-emergency assistance is the same as for Strategic Objective #2: to protect and stabilize selected vulnerable and transitional societies, Grace Scarborough told participants. Ms. Scarborough has been working on two projects that could assume pre- and post-crisis roles: development of indicator systems for identifying vulnerable countries, and a study of transitional societies by monitoring political and economic trends.

EBR has developed three indicator systems, she said. The first two focus on identification of vulnerable countries. They are designed to forecast traditional political instability, such as conspiracy, turmoil, internal wars, insurgencies, and terrorism. They also look at political change that comes about through legitimate, established political processes, as well as that which occurs in response to instability. The frame of reference for both systems is the grievances in a country. Ms. Scarborough believes that international assistance can help address the grievances directly and help the government mitigate them. How grievances are dealt with will result in either peaceful political change or political instability.

The first system is a "pre-pre-crisis" long-range forecasting tool that observes 140 indicators to identify types of grievances and conflicts (economic, military, social, intellectual,) and to assess the government's ability to rectify them. The government's coping capacity is assessed using the four traditional elements: monopoly, legitimacy, resources, and institutional strength. International assistance can help forestall crises by reenforcing those four elements.

The indicators were derived from data compiled by experienced government analysts. The model develops indices to predict what will happen in a 5-year period in a given country. That forecast informs decisionmakers looking to determine when and how to intervene.

The second system uses 20 indicators to generate immediate and short-term 3- to 6-month forecasts. It is used when a country is entering a powder keg stage and long-term assistance is no longer an option. This model uses the same framework as the first, but analysts look at dissatisfied groups. They try to determine why they are discontent and to what degree, and to assess their support and organization. Then they look at the government's ability and response to the grievances.

If the government has lost its legitimacy and dissidents have assumed control, it is more likely those groups will be able to bring about change. However, recent complex disasters have resulted in a power vacuum, where no entity has the political capacity to take control.

The third system assesses reform in transitional societies. Ms. Scarborough developed a set of economic and political indicators for this system. She collected data from newsletters, newspapers, and other media. The economic indicators look at subsidies, economic policies, investments, and privatization, while the political indicators cover political freedoms, crimes, and punishments. Both sets of indicators are weighted on a scale of 1 (least reform) to 4 (most reform). The model enables decisionmakers to observe progress in these areas and assess whether there is give–and–take with the reforms being implemented.

The three information systems could be useful in the pre- and post-emergency assistance phases. The first two can be used to monitor the state of pre-crisis events and shed light on the cause of complex emergencies. The last can help donors determine whether their assistance has helped build up government infrastructure and create more democratic institutions.

Appendix includes a more detailed paper prepared by Grace Scarborough.

VIII. *Assistance During Emergencies*
Tim Frankenberger, CARE

Tim Frankenberger, senior food security adviser to CARE, formerly with the Office of Arid Land Studies at the University of Arizona, has more than 15 years' experience with food security. He described a model CARE is considering using to assess its emergency assistance programs. CARE believes timely and effective humanitarian relief is integral to sustainable development. Consequently, it does not differentiate between emergency assistance and development assistance.

Mr. Frankenberger said CARE looks at the resource base and livelihood strategies and vulnerabilities of targeted households before it develops an emergency assistance program. CARE uses Richard Longhurst's definition of household vulnerability: the capacity of households to manage shocks. All households are exposed to shocks, but some have greater coping capacity than others.

Some shocks derive from natural events, such as floods, droughts, and hurricanes. Others are attributable to state policy. Extensive research has been done on the effects of structural adjustments and declining public expenditures for basic services. Market shocks are caused by such occurrences as unemployment, price changes, or currency devaluations, which can be detrimental to households. When the traditional buffers that help people get through the bad times, such as sharing networks, begin to collapse each household must fend for itself. Conflicts between communities can erupt into war. Each of these shocks has different repercussions on households, and each household reacts differently. Not all households can weather them.

To understand the emergency a community faces, it is necessary to know the resource base, the livelihood system, and the context in which the community exists, and to identify the shock. Mr. Frankenberger listed four kinds of emergencies:

Rapid-onset emergencies: Short-term natural events, such as floods, earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and epidemics.

Slow-onset emergencies: Droughts and pest infestations, such as locust and grasshopper, which occur throughout Africa.

Permanent emergencies: Termed "silent emergencies" by UNICEF, these are situations of perpetual dependency on international assistance caused, for example, by structural poverty. Slow-onset disasters can further entrench vulnerable countries in chronic poverty.

Complex political emergencies: The simultaneous occurrence of a natural shock such as a drought or famine and a man-made shock, such as political conflict or civil war.

These emergencies can occur without dislocating the affected population. The result is transitory food insecurity. People have not lost all their productive assets but are experiencing a food deficit that threatens their ability to cope. Chronic food insecurity can develop if the population's capacity to cope is diminished and residents must sell their productive assets for food. The population then becomes dependent on external food relief on a long-term basis.

When conditions deteriorate to the point where people are driven out, there is large-scale displacement of human populations. Africa has been particularly prone to such shocks. Mr. Frankenberger distinguished between displaced persons, who are living in camps and refugees, who are moving to other villages. Confusing the two, or neglecting refugees who are living in other villages complicates the development and assessment of emergency programs, he said.

CARE seeks to strike a balance between the immediate needs of the afflicted population and the longer-term development requirements. The magnitude of the repercussions of an emergency depend on the capacity of the population to cope. To promote sustainable development in vulnerable areas, the root causes of vulnerability must be addressed. In addition to saving lives and responding to basic needs, such as food, water, health care, and shelter, assistance is needed to help communities become self-reliant.

Donors need not furnish all services for communities in target areas, since the consequences of disasters vary. The type of long-term assistance a country requires also depends on the circumstances of the emergency. Victims may have access to income, basic services, and other resources. What donors should be doing is working to reestablish affected households' livelihood system, Mr. Frankenberger said. That will require flexibility to adjust to different situations. Recovery will be easier and faster, for example, for those who have access to land and just need seeds and tools, than for those who have no land.

An employment safety net should be a major part of preparedness and contingency plans, because it is critical to disaster prevention. In countries like Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Liberia, which are undergoing complex emergencies, and where people have moved out of their regions and are living in camps or villages, opportunities for long-term establishment of self-reliance are limited. In these situations, the emphasis should be on human capital development. Donors should provide training and education to equip the disaster-stricken with skills they can use once their situation improves, he said.

Institutions and community structures migrate with refugee groups and can be utilized to further development goals. Conflict mediation will not work unless community members are involved, he said. The potential for promoting self-reliance varies depending on the type

of emergency and its effect. And this has implications for evaluating the outcome of assistance.

CARE would like to have vulnerability maps in a number of countries. Information from those maps, including resource base and shocks experienced, would help CARE determine where to establish contingency plans and employment safety nets. By placing staff in target areas, CARE aims to act quickly in crises and support institutional capacity-building so that local governments can one day take over that role.

CARE has conducted several reviews for emergency responses to improve its logistical assistance and procedures. CARE has found its impact evaluations of dispersed rural populations easy to carry out because it had an ongoing, productive relationship with people before the emergency. Donors working in an area for several years are more likely to know the characteristics of the population and to have a baseline from which to assess the effect of the emergency and the assistance provided. Where donors lack long-term experience and a baseline, they have to incorporate impact evaluation into all program implementation plans, Mr.Frankenberger said.

Mr. Frankenberger posed the following questions for the workshop to consider:

- Are donors willing to provide resources such as staff, finances, and equipment, to set up monitoring evaluation systems for emergency programs?
- How would decisions regarding resource allocation and programming changes use performance indicators if data are not rigorously collected across areas? In other words, what standards must be met in indicator collection before they can be used it decide on resource allocation?
- How are emergency effects and performance indicators to be aggregated to determine the impact of USAID Missions? When diverse populations face dissimilar events and have different types and levels of vulnerability, how can those factors be aggregated at the Mission level to report Mission performance?

Appendix includes a more detailed paper prepared by Tim Frankenberger and Charles Plaank.

IX. *Post-Emergency Assistance*

Barry Stein, Michigan State University's Department of Political Science

Barry Stein has more than 20 years' experience teaching university courses on refugees, displaced persons, and exiles. Since 1986, he and Fred Cuny have been involved in refugee activities such as repatriation during conflicts and post-return assistance. He has also conducted extensive solution-oriented research on refugee aid and development.

Addressing complex and political emergencies, Mr. Stein said it is difficult to distinguish between "assistance during emergencies" and "post-emergency assistance," because there is no clear dividing line between the two. In most instances a complex event generates a protracted and repeated state of emergency. What looks like the end of a crisis is usually just

a "false-post period." Progress is followed by frequent setbacks that eventually cause a premature close to the post-emergency stage. Like Dr. Kumar, Mr. Stein referred to this nebulous phase as "post-acute emergency."

An American political axiom states "All politics is local." That is equally true of aid, he said. The ability of international donors to perform emergency assistance varies within a country, because the effect of disasters varies from one location to the next.

In countries undergoing complex emergencies, the government has often lost control over large areas. Most complex emergencies involve internal conflict with large-scale destruction of infrastructure and institutions, and the death or flight of many political leaders and civic officials. The power vacuum is exacerbated by intermittent conflict. Many humanitarian assistance activities, therefore, cannot be conducted at the national level because there is no "national level" to deal with. In these cases, foreign aid must be handled through local governments, indigenous NGOs, resident populations, local warlords, or whatever entity international donors can work with.

Complex emergencies tend to flourish in regions where weak states, ineffective governments, and recurring conflicts are endemic. That may make it difficult to separate disaster victims from the people in surrounding areas. Barbara Harrell-Bond, director of the Refugees Studies Program at Oxford University worked with Ethiopian refugees in Sudan in the mid 1980s. She was accompanying a new Sudanese refugee minister on a visit to the camps near the border when they encountered a large group of poor, bedraggled people. Aghast, the refugee minister expressed great sympathy at their wretched existence, exclaiming that he had not realized how deplorable conditions were for the refugees. He was chagrined to learn these people were not refugees, but his fellow Sudanese. Identifying target populations for assistance can be confusing when they are in the midst of neighboring populations who are often just as bad off.

The absence of peace is another characteristic of the post-emergency phase. International donors often mark the transition from relief to post-emergency by the existence of some type of peace agreement. That illustrates that assistance has allowed the country to progress toward conflict resolution. Peace accords have been successful in places such as Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, where it was possible to begin returning refugees to their home countries, make plans to elect a new government, and create some stability.

In many cases, such as Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka, however, multiple peace agreements have been signed but the signatories did not or could not deliver peace. This is an extremely critical factor to consider when discussing institutional and governmental capacity. For instance, in Rwanda, the president was returning from a follow-on peace conference, but the whole peace process fell apart because factions within the government chose to destroy the agreement. Another crucial issue to look at is the case where there is a lack of peace because the actors are so weak that they are unable to follow through on their commitments to bring about peace. For example, in Liberia, three parties signed a peace accord, but the next week nine new factions emerged who had not been part of the group that had originally signed the peace agreement and thus did not feel bound by it. This is yet another major difficulty that we must face in the business of providing post-emergency assistance.

Mr. Stein stressed that when looking at the post-emergency phase, it is imperative that the international aid community not consider peace as the first requirement for taking action. Based on his experience working with Fred Cuny on the "Repatriation During Conflict Project", he emphasized that refugees and other affected populations feel that the peace process is extremely slow to come about, and they do not want to wait for progress to that end to occur before they go back home to resume their normal way of life. This is evident from studies that show that since 1986, even without peace, large numbers of refugees choose to return home on their own. They leave places where they have access to free food aid, to return to regions where conflict to some degree still exist, so peace is not a precondition for post-emergency humanitarian assistance. Instead, one should be looking at local situations to determine if people can return to that particular part of the country where there is still some civil unrest. He stated that it is common for one set of people coming to be leaving certain areas of a country while another group is returning to an adjoining region of that country. This is proof that there is a support system that does not have to be at the national level but instead exists at the community level with whomever happens to be in control in that area. A response to a localized post-emergency requires a willingness not to be bound by sovereignty, but instead a willingness to assist whichever party to the conflict that controls the post-emergency area without being biased by who controls the seat at the United Nations.

Next, he discussed another aspect of the post-complex political crisis phase which he believes poses a real dilemma. A second signal that donors tend to utilize as a sign that a post-emergency phase has emerged, is when they start to impose a human rights conditionality on the aid that is being given. His experience has shown that often in such cases where this conditionality stipulation is made, it becomes an extremely effective tool in slowing down and cutting back assistance, which prevents further positive action from occurring. Mr. Stein is not convinced, for example, that donors' concerns for the protection of Rwandans returning home from Zaire, which ended up slowing down the repatriation of these people, has been beneficial. Instead of helping the situation, he believes that conditionality requirement was actually counterproductive to efforts to bring about a state of normalcy in Rwanda and to protect the vulnerable people in that country. Ironically, this tool which was devised with the good intentions, may actually exacerbate an already tenuous situation.

Barry Stein emphasized the crucial need for indicators developed for this phase of humanitarian assistance to reflect the actual state of affairs that exists by incorporating important factors such as those he had described. He said that donors need to realize that the post-acute crisis environment is extremely delicate and capricious with fragile states, unstable governments, weak political parties, no development plan, and lack of central control. The response to the problem should not be a complicated, gargantuan, and rigidly designed plan, but one that is simple, local, and reactive to that particular scenario.

Lastly, Mr. Stein concluded his presentation by mentioning three major findings of the research that he and Fred Cuny had conducted:

- Often, even without the existence of a peace accord, there is the spontaneous self-repatriation of people. By scouting out the area and assessing the current state of affairs, they decide whether it is safe for them to return to their villages. If they feel secure enough, people will start little by little to filter back to their homes. First there

is the return of internally-displaced populations which is then followed by that of refugees. The return of people to a given area is an important indicator that the level of security and economic prospects are improving in that locale. Rehabilitation activities, even outside of official channels, have the potential to promote peace and reconciliation.

- The ability to provide credit in the form of small loans to low-income farmers in conflict areas is another factor to take note of. This is because the fact that people will accept credit and make investments reflects their own evaluation that the risks are acceptable and that conditions will allow them to repay that loan. Thus, this is not only an indicator for security but also one for the revival of economic development in a nation in the post-crisis phase.

- Lastly, as Dr. Kumar stated earlier, international aid agencies need to be cognizant of the fact that they dealing with a protracted and chronic emergency. It may be a post-acute crisis, but it is not really the stage after the emergency. In addition, we must consider how to approach the task of promoting the transition from relief to development assistance through bilateral and multilateral donor organizations and NGOs/PVOs. Too often, there is a gap between these two types of foreign aid, and there is in many cases no indigenous party to hand over this responsibility. In such a situation, where we decide it is time to cut off relief and we pull out of that country without any transition plan and without identifying some entity to hand the ball to, it is guaranteed that the aid phase out is going to reach an impasse. In addition, in cases where a sanctions regime has been imposed to enforce human rights conditionality, all foreign assistance to the affected country is ceased causing the already tenuous situation to further deteriorate. In instances such as this, where we have clearly made up our minds to exit, and no authority exists to assume authority, we should at least make sure that some development-oriented NGOs/PVOs are in the area to fill the leadership gap and facilitate that country's transition from relief to development.

Appendix includes a more detailed paper prepared by Barry Stein.

X. Field Presentations

Rwanda

Jeremy Shoham, Nutritionist/Evaluator, British Overseas Development Institute

A nutritionist at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Mr. Shoham has participated in several evaluations of emergency aid through the British Overseas Development Institute. He is one of the 17 team members assessing the second component—humanitarian response—of the multi-donor project in Rwanda and Burundi that Dr. Kumar discussed. ODI completed half of its evaluation at the end of 1994, and is working on the second half.

The team divided the regional emergency evaluation into 10 case studies covering the Rwandan refugee populations in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi, and the three stages of the emergency in Rwanda-in the north, in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 7, in Kigali, as the RPF came down; and in the southwest.

The team is examining areas such as coordination and humanitarian space—the level of security necessary for the delivery of humanitarian relief. It is also examining performance indicators in three areas: 1) appropriateness and cost effectiveness; 2) coverage and coherence; and 3) interconnectedness and impact.

1) *Appropriateness and cost effectiveness of humanitarian response.* The team reviewed needs assessments conducted by international donors working in Rwanda and found them to be sporadic, uncoordinated, and often late. The group also examined the accuracy of assessments, recommended improvements and tried to ascertain whether agencies shared information.

In most cases the opinions of the aid recipient populations had not been considered and were thus not a part of those needs assessments. Retrospective questionnaires of beneficiaries often show that targeted populations rated the aid they received as inappropriate and of no benefit. One example was the food given to Rwandan refugees. Although the refugees' staple food consists of roots and they are unaccustomed to eating grains, donors primarily gave them maize. Had donors had the foresight and sensitivity to consult with their beneficiaries about their diet, the problem could have been avoided.

The evaluators also assessed time lags in the delivery of relief. In many case studies services such as water, therapeutic feeding, and mills for whole grains were often tardy.

Despite the controversy of putting a cost on saving lives, the team thought it a valid consideration. For example, ODI estimated that supplying a general ration to most of the refugees would cost 40 cents per person per day. It turned out, however, that the cost of supplementary feeding, which only accounts for 10 percent of the food in a general ration, cost approximately $2 per person per day. The evaluators considered the possibility of making a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable costs.

2) *Coverage and coherence of humanitarian response.* The evaluators looked at indicators of coverage: selective feeding, vaccination rates, quantities of water produced and provided per day, and liters of water given per day to beneficiaries. Next, they studied gaps between groups who received benefits and those who were excluded. For instance, the Batwa tribe seemed to be discriminated against in the refugee population in Zaire, they found.

ODI also evaluated the process of selecting beneficiaries. Often, in the early stages of an emergency, donors tend to supply commune leaders with general rations, assuming that is a fast means of distributing food to the needy. The inevitable result, however, was that much of the food aid did not reach those in the refugee communes who needed it the most. His group found that female-headed households were discriminated against when it came to food distribution. The issue of equity of distribution requires greater attention, he said.

The team looked at coordination among the 167 international NGOs involved in simultaneous relief efforts in Rwanda. Some of the problems included: all the skilled and professional refugees were lured from other jobs to work for PVOs; the international organizations took up too much space; interagency meetings were too large; and NGOs used drug regimes that created resistance to certain kinds drugs like penicillin, or gave incorrect cholera treatments. ODI is exploring ways to improve coordination of relief efforts.

The evaluators also looked at security problems during the registration of targeted groups and the extent to which international communities could protect beneficiaries enough to allow for registration for food distribution, particularly when food was in short supply.

3) *Interconnectedness and impact of humanitarian response.* ODI questioned whether indicators such as mortality and morbidity reduction, malnutrition, and incidence of disease that leads to epidemics like cholera and meningitis were the correct ones to use. While those measures showed dramatic short-term improvements, the team found the indicators difficult to interpret, and could not definitely attribute the improvements to humanitarian assistance.

Mr. Shoham said malnutrition rates were high in Goma during the first two months, but then as the emergency escalated, the data became too complicated to interpret and to attribute to assistance. Although levels of wasting seemed to decrease in Goma and remained fairly stable in Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda, the information proved contradictory and inconclusive. For instance, data from selective feeding programs' records showed extremely high malnutrition rates for a period that far exceeded the duration of malnutrition in assisted areas. Mr. Shoham said donors must decide on an acceptable level of malnutrition for people in an emergency area, and then judge whether assistance is reducing malnutrition for the affected population.

Security, or humanitarian space, influences effectiveness of response. If security threats prevent delivery of food aid, targets for reducing malnutrition should be flexible. Those setting targets should know the baseline level of malnutrition for the emergency-affected population. Flexibility is also called for in determining cut-offs for traditional impact indicators. With commodities like water, everyone assesses needs differently. For example, the World Health Organization recommends 20 liters of water per day per person, yet during the emergency in Tanzania, refugees fared well with 6 liters a day. Since needs vary by country, international organizations must reflect local perceptions of the types and quantities of aid required.

Interpretation of some indicators can also present a problem. For instance, in some of the surveys, particularly in Goma, levels of wasting were dramatically reduced. It is not clear whether this was attributable to better food aid or the death of most of the under–5 population. As no age permits were issued, evaluators could not analyze the effect the programs had on wasting levels. Also, surveys had not been carried out rigorously.

Because some indicators are easier to collect than others, comparative accuracies should be taken into consideration. For example, data on crude mortality rates are often inaccurate because donors don't usually have population data specific to the disaster site. They rely on grave counting, which tends to underreport deaths. With a proper survey, however, immunization rates are easy to determine. Nutritional surveys are carried out more frequently and are also more likely to provide accurate data about wasting levels. Donors know what rations they are providing, but refugees may have access to other resources unknown to the donor. That makes it difficult to accurately assess groups' coping strategies.

The evaluation drew five conclusions:

1) It is important for agencies implementing emergency programs to set realistic program objectives and indicators. Too often, agencies set themselves up to fail because their

targets are either unattainable or beyond their manageable interests.

2) Program objectives should be flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen problems and changes or additions to services. For example, if WFP is not providing general rations, another agency that had not initially planned to become involved in food aid may have to start operating selective feeding programs.

3) Beneficiaries' views must be solicited when conducting needs assessments and collecting qualitative information.

4) International organizations need to be flexible and realistic in setting their targets and recognizing their limitations. They should also try to account for variables like humanitarian space, logistics, infrastructural difficulties, and the speed and scale of an emergency.

5) Although impact indicators are useful, there are so many problems inherent in data collection and interpretation that it might be necessary to focus instead on process indicators.

Bosnia/Croatia
Tom Yates, Humanitarian Assistance Advisor, ENI Bureau

Tom Yates is a humanitarian assistance advisor for USAID's ENI (Europe and Newly Independent States) Bureau's office for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. ENI is concerned with post-emergency aid for people traumatized by the horrors of war, primarily women and children. Through grants and with the help of U.S. NGOs, ENI provides mental health care, counseling, telephone hotlines, and reunification services for children separated from their parents.

The Bureau concentrates on building local institutional capacity, such as the development of indigenous NGOs, because the treatment of victims of trauma requires long-lasting, locally sustainable effort. Institution building will also empower affected populations to elect the leadership of these community-based institutions. Related activities include training local mental health providers through grants with entities such as Harvard University and Catholic Relief Services, and providing health programs and emergency medical supplies to Sarajevo through Project Hope. ENI has begun to support longer-term cooperative efforts such as hospital partnership programs by pairing U.S. and Croatian hospitals.

ENI also aims to establish 700 community pre-schools, train teachers, provide school supplies, and offer vocational training in bee-keeping and reforestation. It helps indigenous NGOs understand and deal with legal matters, protection of minority rights, and human rights abuses, so they will be better equipped to defend their communities.

Lastly, ENI promotes the U.S. policy of building the federation in Bosnia between Croats and Muslims by providing funds to municipal governments that had once fought along ethnic lines but are now trying to form a government. As part of this effort, ENI is supporting city managers by offering technical assistance and utilities, especially gas, for Sarajevo.

From his experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia Mr Yates said he learned:

Most of the efforts in those countries were solicited. ENI has responded by issuing requests for other applications for assistance. As the activities address the post-emergency phase rather than the conflict itself, the USAID office is better able to set and meet objectives. This has facilitated the establishment of benchmarks and performance indicators, and has helped the Missions realize their limitations.

Most of the deaths in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are not due to malnutrition or lack of medical care, but to war, which is beyond the manageable interest of USAID. In this case, as with many other complex emergency situations, impact indicators for mortality are not useful.

The Missions are dealing with an educated population, since the emergency is in Europe instead of a developing nation. In-country expertise obviates the need for much of the technical assistance that would normally be needed.

Better coordination of aid is needed, as Mr. Shoham found. ENI interacts frequently with the organizations that provide assistance, including NGOs and contractors implementing ENI projects, United Nations organizations, U.N. peacekeeping forces, BHR's Offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace, the State Department's Office of Refugee Programs, and the Department of Defense.

The food program for Bosnia is one of the largest in the world. Donor activities ought to be properly coordinated to avoid duplication of effort, to minimize the risk of conflict among donor activities, and to ensure effective and efficient use of aid resources.

Haiti

John Currelly, Chief of the Monitoring Unit, LAC Bureau

USAID/Haiti's Food Security Information System (FSIS) is being established in collaboration with three PVOs: the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA), Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), and CRS (Catholic Relief Services) and should be up and running by March 1996. For 35 years, Haiti was the recipient of a massive food program, yet there was no reliable way to judge if the funds and commodities provided were utilized efficiently and if they had a positive impact on intended beneficiaries, Mr. Currelly said. Crop surveys have never been conducted in Haiti, so the food gap is unknown. However, international donors kept inundating the country with hundreds of thousands of tons of food, which may have hurt the market for locally produced food products.

In response to the need to ascertain whether food aid programs were effective, and if not, what changes were needed, an information system was initiated by the four major U.S. parties conducting food aid in Haiti, USAID/Haiti and the three U.S. PVOs, which are known as the Cooperating Sponsors (CS).

Recently, the CS and USAID have concerned themselves with two areas of humanitarian assistance, vulnerability and mitigation.

Vulnerability. The susceptibility of households to negative events determines whether they are better or worse off than others. As Mr. Frankenberger said, all households use coping strategies to get through difficult times and preserve their assets. Some have better coping mechanisms or "buffers" than others, and are relatively less vulnerable in times of stress.

Mitigation. The goal is to identify those in a community (or entire populations) who have a median coping capacity, and to help them maintain their asset base until the crisis passes. Disaster mitigation is not aimed at those who can withstand emergencies. They would be better served with development aid. Nor is it aimed at those who have few or no assets. Relief assistance would be more appropriate in that case.

The CS and USAID are becoming philosophically and organizationally oriented toward implementing mitigation activities based on the relative vulnerability of targeted populations. The donors are familiar with the beneficiaries' coping mechanisms. They have begun to conduct extensive surveys, to establish baselines, and collect data for indicators that measure the target population's assets. When the data are analyzed, they will identify groups with sufficient asset levels to recuperate from a disaster, and those in danger of losing their assets.

When a disaster occurs that would deplete assets, a rapid assessment team determines the impact on the population. Then a committee of donors and relief workers meets to decide if and how it can respond with flexible, time-limited, pre-approved and pre-funded interventions, with built-in monitoring and evaluation provisions. Lastly, the committee assesses whether the interventions taken were effective, and if not, how assistance might be improved. This cyclical process forms the foundation of USAID/Haiti's Food Security Information System.

The system is to be a tool to provide warnings for USAID and the CS, evaluate the results of assistance, and improve the quality of interventions. FSIS developers expect to be able to determine if target beneficiaries are becoming more or less vulnerable to emergencies by monitoring vulnerability indicators over time and comparing data with baselines for those performance measures. FSIS uses three types of indicators that look at geographic areas where populations are in the greatest danger of losing productive assets:

Current indicators concentrate on microcosms of the target population that stand to benefit the most from mitigation programs. Examples of current indicators are: average rainfall, rapid fluctuations in the price of crops and livestock, and the proportion of school children that are girls.

Near-term indicators focus on problem areas of the country. Examples of near-term indicators are crop yield estimates, and the level of child malnutrition in targeted geographical areas of Haiti.

Longer-term indicators include information on environmental degradation and natural emergencies such as the El Niño weather disruptions, which can begin to alert people to potential problems. For example, these indicators might reveal a higher-than-normal probability of drought in Haiti over the following year. Or, increased levels of sediment in a given river, indicating that the river valley will not be able to produce as much plantain next season due to accelerating soil erosion.

A confluence of sufficient data and adequate funds would launch the first FSIS-based intervention in early 1996. However, frequent cutbacks in foreign assistance mean the CS will not be able to conduct all of the fieldwork, analysis, presentation, and evaluation associated with FSIS. FSIS must hire talent for some of the planning and analysis and take advantage of existing and effective resources of members and local institutions that stand to benefit from it. Once FSIS is running, it will probably be expanded to include others who want to benefit from the food security monitoring methodologies. For example, personnel from the Government of Haiti have been involved from the beginning. Opportunities to work with Haitian ministries should be actively pursued and expanded for the system to be effective and locally sustainable. The government is to assume ownership of USAID's Enhancing Food Security Project Version 2.0 by the year 2000. FSIS should become *the* planning tool for rural development in Haiti then.

El Salvador

Lynn Sheldon, former coordinator for the Peace and National Recovery Project, USAID/El Salvador, now Deputy Division Chief for Humanitarian Assistance, Human Resources Section, ENI Bureau

Lynn Sheldon discussed his experience as coordinator for the Peace and National Recovery Project in El Salvador. Mr. Sheldon said that although some mistakes were made, he feels that the transition program in that country has been basically successful. He explained that in El Salvador, in January of 1992, under the aegis of the United Nations, a peace accord was reached between the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front[1]) guerilla faction and the Government of El Salvador. This marked the end of the 12-year war where 75,000 people out of a total population of 5 million were killed, and where half of that country, whose total land area is equivalent to that of Massachusetts, was under siege. In support of this pacification process, the government requested pledges of $1.4 billion in program funds from the international community. Donors responded with a pledges totalling $860 million dollars worth of aid. The U.S. Government's contribution of $300 million was applied towards assistance programs to be implemented over the course of five years. The United States also played a major role as a mediator during El Salvador's peace process.

Mr. Sheldon shared these lessons learned from the USAID experience in El Salvador:

1) There should be a commitment on both sides to try to settle the dispute. He stated that usually in such situations, when the fighting is over, an initial, very awkward, "getting-to-know-you phase" ensues. This is probably the most sensitive and critical period for the formerly-belligerent parties to get through, once they have agreed to make peace. In the case of El Salvador, however, both sides were committed to peace.

2) Even when a peace accord is signed, there will still be an occasional incidence of violence and discord, while the formerly-belligerent parties are trying to settle long-term grudges they have held against each other. To minimize the potential for conflict, the peace accord called

[1] La Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional is the Spanish version of the acronym FMLN.

for the GOES' 60,000-strong army troops to be cut back to around 30,000 soldiers, and for the 11,000 police to be replaced by a new Civilian National Police force of approximately 8,000. The FMLN was to reciprocate by agreeing to have its 9,000 guerrillas disbanded and disarmed, on the condition that this group would be allowed to form an opposition political party.

3) As a follow-on to the second lesson of reducing the probability of a resurgence of societal unrest, mechanisms should be put in place to assist ex-combatant groups to be reintegrated into and to become productive members of the mainstream society. USAID played a major role in facilitating such efforts, by supporting the demobilization of the national police, which was an unusual endeavor for the Agency to take part in. Mr. Sheldon said he believes that was a very important activity for USAID to be involved in because the police and the other previously warring parties had to be rehabilitated and retrained to be civilians. The dangerous alternative would have been to let loose people who knew how to use and had possession of firearms, and who also understood the local systems, to become bandits that would terrorize the countryside.

4) The U.S. also played an important role as a mediator and helped to keep the peace process on track.

5) Donors should also help the host government in post-crisis situations. USAID was the only donor on the scene to support the GOES. This was significant, as within days of the signing of the peace accord USAID was able to have local currency funds in hand ready to disburse as needed, while waiting for the actual assistance budget to be approved and finalized. In such situations, it is critical to have funds available immediately so as not to slow down the peace process. It is also useful for the intervening donor to be familiar with the geographical areas of the country that it is to work in.

6) Even if a formal conflict resolution agreement does not exist, conflict resolution can be pursued through an informal and daily process. In the case of El Salvador, there was commitment to the peace process on both the GOES and the FMLN sides, and both parties were willing to engage in whatever means were necessary, no matter how often they had to do so.

7) As Tom Yates had said, long-term investments need to be made to heal the psychological wounds caused by war. In El Salvador, trauma is being addressed through humanitarian assistance provided by USAID and several other donors. This is because until the current generations who experienced the horrors of war die, the effects of war will not be forgotten in that country.

8) International aid agencies must understand and make it clear what they are and are not capable of accomplishing with their assistance.

9) As Barry Stein said, local politics determine whether or not there will be long-lasting positive change following foreign assistance efforts. In the case of El Salvador, for example, local elections, which followed after the war, allowed people to vote, either for or against the topic of the day The fact that no poll predicted with certainty the outcome of such elections was symbolic of the positive changes that were being brought about during the post-conflict stage.

10) Also as Barry Stein had stated, assistance program performance indicators should be simple, local-level, and reactive.

11) It is also important when reintegrating former belligerents into society to give those people access to land and credit to insure that they will have other ways of earning a living besides fighting.

El Salvador

Marc Scott, Director of the Office of Infrastructure and Regional Development in El Salvador, which is responsible for the Peace and National Recovery Project

Marc Scott, USAID/El Salvador's director of infrastructure and development, discussed the Peace and National Recovery (NRP) Project in El Salvador. Mr. Scott said nine months before the peace accords were signed, he and others at the USAID Mission began to design a war–to–peace transition endeavor with myriad activities. They studied the components and results of other post-complex emergency assistance programs implemented in the region (Nicaragua and Colombia) and in other parts of the world (Zimbabwe). The USAID team also went to Colombia and Nicaragua to meet ex-combatants on both sides of the conflicts.

In El Salvador, the team performed an extensive infrastructure assessment in the former conflict areas, 115 of 262 municipalities. (The municipalities or municipios in El Salvador are more akin to the U.S. county system than to towns.) The purpose was to promote the economic and social reactivation of the conflictive zones by restoring infrastructure and access to basic services, and to assist in the democratic reintegration of their populations. Based on the findings of the trips to Nicaragua and Colombia and a review of the literature on war-to-peace transitions, USAID able devised an ex-combatant assistant strategy for El Salvador.

Through INCAE (Instituto Nacional de Centro-America para Empresas, or Central American Institute for Enterprise), a local institute linked with Harvard University's Business School, USAID helped provide career seminars for government employees, members of the private sector, church members, and staff of indigenous NGOs. Although the U.S. Government did not initially allow USAID/El Salvador to deal directly with the FMLN, the Mission worked closely with the Government of El Salvador in preparing the country's $1.5 billion national reconstruction plan. USAID pledged $300 million, $191 million in fresh funds and $48 million disbursed for assistance in local currency. The Mission in El Salvador reprogrammed to orient $61 million in existing projects' funds to the post-war environment. Pre-positioned available aid money and experienced staff were factors in the success of USAID's efforts.

The NRP project was divided into three phases with six components, including 93 activities. The Mission initially planned to work on mine awareness and de-mining, but UNICEF assumed full responsibility for underwriting and implementing those interventions. USAID staff are primarily helping ex-combatants and others in the former conflict zones. For example, some 9,000 FMLN ex-guerrillas were held in bolsones or camps throughout the country where they were demobilized, disarmed, and required to remain for up to four months. The USAID Mission and the United Nations collaborated to provide the former

guerrillas with housing, food, health care, documentation, and counseling about available benefits.

Ex-combatants (the FMLN, and government military and police) received agricultural and microenterprise credit, long-term academic instruction, and vocational training from various agencies. They also received land transfers. Land distribution and agrarian reform continues to be a controversial issue in El Salvador and other parts of the region. By June 1995, when USAID/El Salvador took its latest tally, land had been provided to slightly more than 22,000 of 35-38,000 ex-combatants. The tally includes "tenedores" or squatters, associated with the FMLN. Ex-combatants received money through a local PVO to buy building materials and build 3,000 shelters in a self-help effort. Beneficiaries also received 20,000 demobilization packages, which consisted of 9,000 basic household starter kits and 11,000 agricultural starter kits. A household starter kit includes pots and pans, cooking utensils, cutlery, a table, chairs, beds, plates, a butane gas tank, a small cooking stove, and bed linen. An agricultural starter kit includes seeds, farming tools, and sprayers.

Aid to former conflict areas has included medical treatment for almost 8,000 people, ex-combatants and civilians, injured during the civil war. Medical assistance ranges from reconstructive surgery to prosthetics, orthotics, physical and mental therapy, and occupational rehabilitation.

USAID/El Salvador has underwritten the construction of almost 1,700 kilometers of rural roads and the installation of more than 1,000 kilometers of electricity transmission and distribution lines for the 115 municipalities. It has constructed or rehabilitated more than 123 health clinics, 274 municipal buildings, and 520 classrooms. The classrooms have been fully equipped with textbooks and other school supplies. In addition, the Mission has supplied potable water and sanitation facilities to more than 200,000 people.

To date, 57,173 people (19,331 ex-combatants and 37,842 civilians) have received or are receiving vocational-technical training or high school and university academic education. Microenterprise or agricultural production credit has been extended to more than 49,000 beneficiaries.

The latest project data from surveys and other sources show broad coverage for assistance: more than 900,000 of 1.4 million people in the former conflict zones have received some form of aid. The CID (Interdisciplinary Development Consulting, or Consultora Interdisciplinaria en Desarollo) Gallup polls, conducted periodically for Mission program managers to assess effectiveness of aid to the FMLN ex-guerrillas, found more than 90 percent of ex-combatants rate their access to benefits and opportunities equal to that of the rest of the Salvadorean society.

A more detailed paper on these presentations is in the appendix .

Bolivia

Luis Fernando Moreno, coordinator of P.L. 480 Programs with LAC Bureau

Luis Fernando Moreno, USAID/Bolivia's coordinator of P.L. 480 programs, said his Mission has a $56 million annual budget. The Mission's Title II program annually handles 45,000 metric tons of food valued at $20 million. It is supported by four PVOs: CARITAS (an indigenous organization), Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA), Food for the Hungry (FHI), and Project Concern International (PCI). To prevent a duplication of effort, the Mission coordinates the Title II work of these PVOs by assigning each to certain geographic locations to perform distinct activities.

USAID/Bolivia's program operates under a new popular participation law, whereby the Government of Bolivia invests in the development of municipalities. (Bolivia's municipalities, like those in El Salvador, function as U.S. counties do.) After decades of waiting, people in these municipalities now have a water system. The Mission's P.L. 480 program supports the law by engaging residents in Food-for-Work self-help projects to construct facilities and infrastructure.

Bolivia is not as vulnerable to disasters as other countries. It only experiences occasional droughts, floods, frosts, landslides, and hailstorms, and they are not usually damaging enough to warrant humanitarian assistance. Mr. Moreno recalled only three occasions when USAID/Bolivia was asked to provide the minimum $25,000 in emergency funds. In most cases distribution of Title II food and donations from other donors, such as Canada, Germany, and Spain, are all that is needed. Damage was not extensive even when Lake Titicaca, the world's highest lake, overflowed. Through Food-for-Work projects, several international donors supplied the necessary building materials for Bolivians to rebuild the 3,000 homes and buildings destroyed by the floods, he said.

Appendix I

Glossary

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
BHR	Bureau of Humanitarian Response
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation
CIDCM	Center for International Development and Conflict Management
CID	Interdisciplinary Development Consulting
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
EBR	Evidence Based Research Incorporated
ENI	Europe and the Newly Independent States
FHI	Food for Hunger
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FSIS	Food Security Information System
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System
INCAE	Central American Institute for Enterprise
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NRP	National Recovery Project
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (Britian)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives

PCI	Project Concern International
PMP	prevention/mitigation/preparedness
POA	Program and Operations Assessment
PPC	Bureau for Policy, Program, and Coordination
PRISM	Program Performance Information For Strategic Management System
PVO	private voluntary organization
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

Appendix II

USAID Humanitarian Assistance Indicator Inventory

INDICATORS INVENTORY

	Pre-Emergency Assistance (SO#2: Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies)
Natural Disasters	Bangladesh BHR Chad Niger REDSO/East Africa Sahel Regional Program

- 6 programs reporting objectives
- 6 programs reporting indicators
- 2 programs reporting data
- Over half the indicators are from the regional programs
- Majority of reporting in Africa
- Over half the indicators are focused on getting **systems in place**

INDICATORS INVENTORY

	Pre-Emergency Assistance (SO#2: Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies)
Complex Disasters	BHR **

- 1 program reporting data

- No USAID country or regional objectives/indicators focused on this area are reported

- ** "Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises"
- ** "Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS)"
- ** "Working Draft of Indicators for the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project"

INDICATORS INVENTORY

	Assistance During Emergencies (SO#1: Critical Needs Met of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations)
Natural Disasters	Bangladesh BHR Chad Ethiopia Niger REDSO/East Africa Somalia

- 7 programs reporting objectives
- 5 programs reporting indicators
- 2 programs reporting data
- Majority of reporting in Africa
- Majority indicators: **response time**
- Indicators: **target/vulnerable groups**
- Indicators: high-level impact such as **mortality, malnutrition**

INDICATORS INVENTORY

	Assistance During Emergencies (SO#1: Critical Needs Met of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations)
Complex Disasters	Armenia Azerbaijan BHR Bosnia Burundi Ethiopia Georgia Kenya Russia Somalia Tajikstan

- 11 programs reporting objectives
- 8 programs reporting indicators
- 7 programs reporting data
- Indicators: **response time**
- Indicators: products delivered such as **# of blankets distributed, # of tools provided, volume of seeds provided**
- Indicators: broader needs attended to such as **primary health care services, schooling services**
- Indicators: high-level impact such as **malnutrition, disease prevalence**

INDICATORS INVENTORY

	Post-Emergency Assistance (SO#2: Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies)
Natural Disasters	Bangladesh BHR REDSO/East Africa Somalia

- 4 programs reporting objectives
- 3 programs reporting indicators
- 1 program reporting data
- Majority of the indicators are BHR & Regional

INDICATORS INVENTORY

	Post-Emergency Assistance (SO#2: Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies)	
Complex Disasters	Angola Armenia BHR Bosnia Burundi Croatia Rwanda ***	Cambodia El Salvador Ethiopia Eritrea Haiti Mozambique South Africa

- 7 programs reporting objectives in "post-emergency assistance"
- 5 programs reporting indicators
- 4 programs reporting data
- Indicators: higher level impact such as **mortality rates, human rights abuses**

- 7 post crisis programs reporting "sustainable development plans"
- 6 programs reporting indicators
- 4 programs reporting data

- ***End of Crisis, "Interagency Checklist" DOD



*Includes indicators for regional programs, bilateral programs, and the BHR strategic plan.
**Does not include indicators for development-oriented objectives.

Percent of Indicators for Which Data are Reported*



*Includes indicators for regional programs, bilateral programs, and the BHR strategic plan.
**Does not include indicators for development-oriented objectives.

PROGRAMS REPORTING OBJECTIVES BY WORKSHOP FRAMEWORK

	SO#2: Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies (Pre-Emergency Assistance)	SO#1: Critical Needs Met of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations (Assistance During Emergencies)	SO #2: Protect and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies (Post-Emergency Assistance)
Natural Disasters	**BHR** **Bangladesh** **Chad** **Niger** **REDSO/EA** **Sahel Reg. Prgm.** **	**BHR** **Bangladesh** **Chad** Ethiopia **Niger** **REDSO/EA** Somalia	**BHR** **Bangladesh** **REDSO/EA** Somalia
Complex Disasters	**BHR** **	**BHR** **Armenia** **Azerbaijan** **Bosnia** **Burundi** Ethiopia **Georgia** Kenya **Russia** Somalia **Tajikistan**	**BHR** Angola **Armenia** **Bosnia** **Burundi** **Croatia** Rwanda ***Cambodia** ***El Salvador** *** Ethiopia** *Eritrea ***Haiti** ***Mozambique** ***South Africa** ***

* Countries Receiving Humanitarian Assistance Funding in FY 1994 And Reporting More "Development-Oriented" Results
BOLDED programs are those reporting indicators

** Additional information included: "Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises" The Journal of Ethno-Development; "Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS)" UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs; and "Working Draft of Indicators for the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project".

*** Additional information included: "Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services" US Department of Defense.

RESOURCES COVERED BY STRATEGIC PLANS*

* Fourteen countries account for 97% of Humanitarian Assistance Funding

* 10 of the 14 countries, accounting for 81% of funding, have reported objectives

* 6 of the 14 countries, accounting for 47% of funding, have reported indicators

*Funding here defined as OTI, OFDA, Regional Bureau and Other USG resources for humanitarian assistance efforts

Appendix III

Selected Workshop Papers

MULTI-DONOR EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA:

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE ISSUES OF REPATRIATION, REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Hotel des Mille Collines
Kigali, Rwanda
May 21, 1995 (Revised)

NOT FOR QUOTATION

Purpose and Scope

1. This aide memoire summarizes major findings of the multi-donor evaluation team that visited Rwanda during May, 1995 to examine the effectiveness and impacts of international assistance in the aftermath of the recent civil war. The focus of the evaluation was on the repatriation of refugees and other displaced persons, and rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the country. During its stay, the team met with officials of the new Government of Rwanda (GOR), representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies and a large number of reflective individuals familiar with the situation. Team members also talked with farmers, refugees, returnees and the survivors of the genocide. In addition, while part of the team visited camps for refugees, the other toured the different parts of the country.

2. The findings summarized here are both preliminary and tentative. At the time of the preparation of this document, the fieldwork was not completed. Moreover, the teams did not have time to fully explore the implications of these findings for the present situation in Rwanda and to draw appropriate policy lessons for future complex emergencies.

Overview of Current and Pledged Assistance

3. During the ten weeks of war, very few international agencies remained inside Rwanda to provide assistance. However, when huge numbers of people sought refuge in camps both inside and outside the country, and the fighting subsided, the more traditional emergency relief began to flow. During this phase, international agencies were consumed with reducing the death rates and stabilizing the situation in the camps. Gradually, attention turned to the issues of recovery and reconstruction.

4. International response to the crisis in Rwanda was largely characterized by ignorance, initial paralysis and finally, action in response to mounting public pressure. The international action taken, however, overemphasized the plight of refugees at the expense of the victims of the genocide and war. More than 1 billion US dollars worth of goods and services have been spent in the immediate aftermath of the Rwanda conflict. Much of that has been spent maintaining refugee populations in neighboring countries. An analysis of US grants for relief and rehabilitation during fiscal year 1994 shows that more than two-thirds of all assistance went outside of Rwanda. The humanitarian arm of the European Union, ECHO, estimates that 400,000 US dollars worth of EU resources alone are being used daily to maintain the refugee camps. Virtually all donors agree that such a level of expenditure is unsustainable. Many also agree that the juxtaposition of large expenditures in the refugee camps against relatively little for the reconstruction of Rwanda and the rehabilitation of the livelihoods of the survivors of genocide has discredited the international

community in the eyes of the new government and the survivors.

5. Acutely aware of this disproportionality, the international donors responded favorably to the Rwanda Round Table Pledging Conference held in Geneva, January 1995. Donors pledged $630.3 million US against Rwanda government requests for $764.1 million. The differences between pledge amounts and funds requested reflects primarily differences in priorities: Specifically, the donor community emphasized rehabilitation and development (55%) over reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (7%). The government placed roughly equal emphasis on the two programs, 39% versus 36%. By April, only 1/3 of funds pledged during the January Round Table conference had been committed, and only 9 percent had been disbursed.

Economic Management and Rebuilding of Administration

6. Immediately following the assassination of President Habyarimana, public administration and economic management ground to a halt. The central bank closed, as did commercial banks, and the technical ministries ceased to operate. As the interim government fled the fighting in and around Kigali, it took with it large stocks of foreign exchange and a large part of the Rwandese franc supply. It swept up many of the civil servants and encouraged the killings of others. The new government found itself completely lacking in the apparatus of public management. Furthermore a larger part of the national money supply ended up outside of the country than inside. At 24 billion, the amount of Rwanda francs taken out of the country was double the amount that had previously been in circulation. Only since the third quarter of 1994 has the government been operational in even a limited way. All ministries have been reconstituted, the economic management apparatus put into place, and some measures have been taken to regain control of the economy.

7. With some technical assistance from the UNDP, the government drew up a rehabilitation and reconstruction program including an important component for the rehabilitation of administrative capacity throughout the government and especially for economic management.

8. The role of the international community in strengthening the capacity of public administration as well as in assisting the new government gain control of the economy has to date been primarily advisory and consultative. Whereas a sizeable proportion of the funds pledged in the January 1995 Geneva Round Table Conference for Rwanda's reconstruction is for re-building of administrative capacity and economic management, few of those funds have yet been disbursed. Much of the assistance to the new government has been ad-hoc assistance by UN agencies, NGOs and donors. The UN Trust Fund and the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan have included proposals for rebuilding administrative capacity, largely in Kigali. World Food Program, through the Consolidated Appeals (CA) process has spearheaded food-for-work type of arrangements with the government as salary supplements to civil servants.

9. In January, after consultation with the Bretton Woods Institutions, the government de-monetized 5,000 and 1,000 franc bills in an attempt to regain control over the money supply and to limit the de-stabilizing potential of large amounts of francs being held outside of the country. The United Nations Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) provided logistical support in order to ensure that new bills were distributed around the country to improve access outside of the capital. As part of an overall liberalization of the market and a shift to indirect management of the economy, the government shifted from a system of fixed exchange rates to a flexible one determined largely by market forces. Money changing businesses, "bureau de change" were legalized. Since that decision the value of the Rwanda franc to the dollar has depreciated by roughly 25%, from 190 to 240 francs, where it has remained relatively stable. Most of the macroeconomic measures taken by the government have been made with relatively few resources or assistance from the international community.

10. Food-for-work (FFW) salary supplements were instrumental in getting key civil servants back to work. At one point FFW aid represented the greater part of many civil servants' salaries. That most primary schools were able to open as early as they did is largely attributable to FFW salary supplements for teachers.

11. The unintended effect of large numbers of NGOs (and UN agencies) operating under conditions of resource scarcity has been to outbid the cash-strapped government for human resources. This equation is especially pertinent and damaging for trained personnel, potential recruits to the civil service or actual government employees. There is much anecdotal evidence of civil servants being hired away from the government by international agencies. This is destructive of administrative capacity in two ways: It constrains the ability of the government to perform its normal functions, and it strengthens parallel structures often put into place by international agencies.

Rehabilitation of Rural Economy for Food Security

12. The rural economy was devastated by the war because of the mass killings and large movements of people away from their farms. Recovery has been rendered difficult because of continued insecurity for individuals and their property as well as for the loss of productive capital and inputs. By July 1994, large tracts of land were left uncultivated, the majority of the livestock herd was decimated, and equipment and material for household-based enterprises had been destroyed or looted. Without some assistance, rural people faced deprivation and, in some regions, even starvation.

13. Food and agriculture programs were designed to restore a minimum level of food security. They included the distribution of seeds and tools, food aid, and seeds multiplication programs such as "Seeds of Hope". The latter was aimed at the multiplication and distribution of seeds adapted to farmers needs, and maintenance of the agriculture gene pool. Income generating programs, of secondary urgency, are still being designed. By any standards the rehabilitation of food agriculture in Rwanda was a success.

- By some estimates, 50 to 80 percent, respectively, of farmers were reached in the first two seasons of seeds and tools distributions. Over 10,000 metric tons of bean and maize seeds, 1,000,000 hoes, vegetable and other seeds were distributed to 690,000 households. Its success is as much attributable to the joint coordination of NGOs by FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture as to the experience in Rwanda of many of the key NGO partners--ICRC, CARE, CRS and World Vision--who alongside more than 20 other organizations played a critical role.

- Seed protection programs, mostly terminated, were specialized versions of food aid, aimed specifically at ensuring that selected seed was not consumed. They were usually provided to farmers at the same time as seeds and tool packages, and were followed with more general food aid, originally to all households, but more recently targeted to the most needy.

- About 26,000 metric tons of cereals, 10,000 tons of pulses, and 21,000 tons of oil have been distributed by WFP alone since the beginning of the crisis. Nutritional assessments suggest that the level of malnutrition is not much different than it was previous to the war. Food aid helped keep malnutrition levels lower than they might have been.

- The rehabilitation of rudimentary seed multiplication and testing fields at the principal agriculture research stations has helped ensure the replenishment of Rwanda's original agricultural genetic stock.

14. The first season of seeds and tools distribution was plagued by delays in funding and by poor quality, and poorly adapted seeds. The former resulted in late planting, and both led to sub-optimal yields. With greater local purchase of seed, and with the benefit of the first season's experience, the second season was more successful. While the coordination of food and agriculture interventions appears to have been a model of efficiency, there was some confusion when it came to allocating regions of responsibility. In one zone, at least, an entire commune, one that had substantial devastation from the war, was completely by-passed, simply missed, by seeds and tools distribution.

15. Food-for-work programs were strongly objected to by one of the food aid donors out of concern for the market effects such programs might have. There was also concern about the reduced incentive effect of such programs when done in a context of general distribution. Food-for-work as salary supplements to government workers was especially disliked by some donors, and has to a large extent been discontinued. Rwandese officials question the premise that seed multiplication should occur outside the country. Although the rationale for the Seeds of Hope approach is good enough and understandable--maintain the Rwandese agriculture gene pool where it is relatively safe-- it is based on the premise of continued conflict, which is naturally resented by the new government.

16. It is important to recognize that programs for the distribution of seeds and tools as well as of food aid might become the prisoners of their own success, thereby contributing to a sense of dependency on the part of recipients. There is little rationale to continue general distribution of seeds and tools or food aid into the third season, yet it is likely that there will be great pressure to do so. There is a real risk that the Ministry of Agriculture will fall into the trap of paternalism while farmers slip into a state of dependency.

Health Sector

17. The health sector in Rwanda was completely shattered during the crisis. The government lost 80 to 85 percent of its skilled staff, who were either killed or fled to neighboring countries. Although the destruction of durable structures was surprisingly minimal, medicine stocks and equipments were looted and vandalized. Initial international emergency assistance in the health sector played a crucial role in saving lives and preventing disease outbreak. Since then, medical assistance has played a crucial role in rehabilitating medical centers, supporting and training health personnel, supplying medicines and equipments, reviving national health programs, and assisting the government in assessing needs and formulating a coherent national policy.

18. UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, MSF (France, Belgian, Holland, Switzerland and Spain), the Belgian Red Cross and CARITAS Internationalis are among the larger international actors operating in the health sector, while numerous smaller NGOs, about 55 altogether, are working with the government to restore rural health care services throughout the country. Although not without problems and friction, a reasonably good working relationship has developed between GOR and most NGOs, which augurs well for future collaborative partnerships. Nevertheless, the government is almost totally dependent on international support for rehabilitation and recurrent costs. In addition, UN agencies and NGOs support programmatic activities and continue to cover a high percentage of salary costs.

19. As a result of the international assistance and emerging partnership between GOR and NGOs, significant progress has been made in the health sector. Examples are:

- 350 dispensaries and other health centers country-wide have been reactivated. Eighty-five percent of the facilities are now considered functional and about 50% of the established health posts have been filled.

- 30 out of 31 district hospitals are now open and operating, of which about one-half are administered under direct control or sponsorship of NGOs.

- STD/HIV prevention programs are resuming operations through the USAID-supported AIDSCAP project, WHO and UNICEF AIDS prevention programs and support to the National AIDS Program. These are facilitated by the assurance of a safe blood supply with assistance from the Belgian Red Cross.

- UNFPA, WHO and UNICEF are contributing to National Maternal and Child Health\ Family Planning programs through the rehabilitation of health facilities, provision of equipment and medical supplies and technical assistance.

- The GOR with support from UNICEF and numerous NGOs have re-established the National Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) and assured the cold chain throughout the country.

20. A degree of normalcy has been restored in the health sector. Most of the population now has access to basic and referral health services through the NGO-supported health care network. It is difficult to ascertain the number of the people who have actually used these facilities, but their number must run into hundreds of thousands. Moreover, outbreaks of epidemics after the civil war have been prevented as a result of timely interventions. The institutional capacity of the Ministry of Health is slowly being rehabilitated. All this would not have been accomplished but for the international assistance.

21. International relief interventions in the health sector were not without their shortcomings. From the onset, the crisis in Rwanda was seen as a medical emergency. Therefore, in the absence of adequate coordination or control, Rwanda was flooded with health and medical NGOs which brought with them a wide range of skills, ability and experience. While some of the more established NGOs performed well in addressing emergency and rehabilitation needs, others were inappropriate, inexperienced and unprofessional. Poor NGO performance was a disservice to Rwandese, hurt the relief coordination effort and reflected poorly on the NGO community image across the board. Another weakness in relief interventions was the lack of adequate needs assessments of the targeted beneficiaries, which resulted in NGOs implementing programs according to their own objectives, agendas and standards, without proper consultation or involvement of Rwandese authorities, professionals or communities. There was widespread duplication of efforts among the providers with often more than one NGO providing the same services to the same population. Not surprisingly, while some geographical areas were saturated others were left in dire need. Finally, as was the case with many sectors, international assistance was largely channelled through NGOs without adequately accounting for the need to simultaneously develop and reinforce the government's own institutional capacities.

Vulnerable Groups

Unaccompanied Children

22. Children have been probably the worst victims of genocide. It is estimated that among the survivors of the genocide almost all (91%) have experienced a death in the immediate family, half of whom (42%) have lost both parents (42%). 65% of children surveyed witnessed killings or massacres while 48% were themselves threatened with death. Moreover, there are more than 95,000 separated or orphaned Rwandese children.

23. International agencies have been successful in registering only about half of the children in official unaccompanied centers.

- There are currently some 22,000 children living in 93 unaccompanied children centers, 12,000 of whom are in Rwanda and rest in refugee camp centers. As of April 10, 1995 a total of 8,500 kids inside and outside Rwanda have been reunited with their families through joint efforts of international agencies.

- Children throughout Rwanda have been severely traumatized. UNICEF and international NGOs have begun to address the problem through education, mass media, and training of social workers (1,649 community-based social agents trained in trauma identification and alleviation techniques).

- International agencies, particularly UNICEF, UNHCR and SCF (U.K. and US.) are now struggling with extremely complicated, multi-layered, long-term issues of foster care, adoption and institutional capacity building in the communities involved. Donors and funding agencies have been unacceptably slow in releasing long-term funding for this sector.

24. International emergency physical and psychological interventions in the unaccompanied children sector were critical in saving the lives and health (physical and emotional) of thousands of victimized children and by extension their communities. However, two shortcomings of international interventions cannot be ignored. First, coordination in the unaccompanied children activities has been extremely poor, lacking both a strong lead agency to act as the coordinating body and acceptable levels of NGO administration and management skills. One year into the intervention and basic management tools such as unaccompanied children center and foster care criteria, standardization of practices, monitoring and follow-up and policing polices are weak and unclear or simply non-existent. Second, international NGOs have failed to adequately support the capacity-building of local NGOs in order to begin the transfer of technical, management and operational authority to indigenous institutions. Such actions should have instituted immediately after emerging from the initial emergency phase to ensure a smooth hand-over of responsibility.

25. The creation of unaccompanied children centers was a short-term, emergency intervention not a long-term solution and the transition from emergency to rehabilitation in this sector has been particularly painful and difficult. Relief interventions that address the needs of unaccompanied children are by far the most socially problematic, logistically difficult and resource intensive and Rwanda is a striking example of the best and the worst.

Assistance to Women Victims

26. Rwanda is a nation of widows, separated and orphaned children, and young single parents. The country's population is now estimated to be at least 60% female of which 30% are widowed. Thousands of women who were brutally raped during the genocide are trying

to cope with the unwanted births of the children of their family's killers and torturers. In many cases, they are also HIV positive. In addition to losing their spouses and children, most of the survivors of genocide have lost their belongings and homes. The plight of the women survivors is unimaginable.

27. Despite the magnitude of the problem, no major national programs have been launched by international relief agencies or the GOR, which specifically address the unique emotional and physical needs of women victims of the genocide. However, women victims are covered by numerous initiatives that are designed to provide social services and economic support to all vulnerable groups in the community.

28. Under existing Rwanda law, property passes through male members of household, consequently widows and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to brothers-in-law or the deceased husband's relatives. There is an urgent need to revise and reinterpret the judicial guidelines and interpretations of laws pertaining to property of women. The Ministries of Family and Rehabilitation support advocacy efforts on behalf of women, and SCF/UK, SCF/US, UNHCR and UNICEF are providing funds for legal assistance so that affected women could uphold their rights.

Education System

29. The infrastructure for education was heavily damaged during the civil war and the system's human resources were decimated through massacres and exodus. Unfortunately, international aid for rehabilitation has been quite modest, partly because educational activities are usually not considered life-saving emergency needs. Even then, the over-all contribution of international assistance to primary education has not been insignificant.

- The most useful relief assistance in the education sector was the WFP Food Support Program which was basically a food-for-work program that targeted teachers. Implemented in partnership with NGOs (CRS, ICRC, ADRA, CARITAS, CARE), WFP provided food as in-kind payment to some 19,000 primary school teachers across the country. The program is currently being phased-out and is expected to end in June 1995 as the government resumes salary payments through the civil service budget.

- The UNICEF-UNESCO initiated the "Teacher Emergency Package" (TEP) program in August 1994. By December 1994 the program had distributed 9,000 TEPs, or "School in a Box" kits throughout the country, reaching an estimated 7,00,000 school children and training over 3,000 teachers in the use of TEPs. The Rwanda TEP program was designed to serve as a 4 to 5 month bridging program that provided teachers and school children immediate psychological and social support until more formal education activities could be organized.

- A joint UNICEF-UNESCO program is addressing rehabilitation of the education sector through school repairs, provision of education equipment, materials and the replacement of textbooks, support of a national teacher training center (CNRE), and technical assistance to MINIPRISEC, but progress in developing and funding activities is very slow. UNICEF-UNESCO are also working with the Ministries of Family, Labor and Youth to set up a variety of non-formal education and literacy programs.

- Other donors and NGOs have also provided limited assistance and inputs in the education sector: The EU and Belgian Government have helped finance salary payments for the period November 1994 - February 1995 through release of old counterpart funds. UNHCR is concentrating on small-scale school structure repairs. Numerous international NGOs have assisted in small-scale rehabilitation and repair to schools in localized areas as part of broader community rehabilitation efforts, but few have any large-scale programs in primary education.

30. There is a general agreement among teachers, administrators and government officials in Rwanda that WFP program had a significant effect on restoring primary education system in the country. It enabled the resource-starved GOR to re-open the primary schools as early as September 1994. However, no such consensus exists about the impact of the TEP program. Many Rwandese educators question the program's substance and coverage. They suggest the package is neither appropriate nor useful for primary school students. Most primary schools re-opened with an extremely high enrollment in the first and second grade age group (about 50% of the total pupil population registered in these two grades), consequently TEP distribution was concentrated in these first two grades only. Despite these shortcomings, the TEP program has provided to communities basic tools with which they could begin to re-establish a degree of normalcy in their shattered lives.

31. Rehabilitation of Rwanda's education sector is essential for promoting a stable transition from emergency to recovery. Through "intelligent" assistance the current window of opportunity can be exploited to push curriculum reform and widen school accessibility. Despite the critical and widely recognized need to develop human resource capacity in the education sector, practically no international assistance has been given for basic needs assessments, intensive short-term teacher training, civic education, or human rights curriculum development and implementation.

32. Special educational programs are needed for the children who survived genocide and experienced severe trauma and loss. Such children, for the most part, live in isolated rural areas. They are extremely vulnerable and are at risk of being further marginalized by recently returned "old refugees" who tend to be economically more advantaged and live primarily in urban centers where the school systems are undoubtedly better.

Human Rights and the Administration of Justice

33. To promote human rights and to restore people's faith in the judicial system, the

international community has supported three major initiatives: the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the persons responsible for the genocide, the stationing of human rights monitors in the country, and the re-building of the damaged judicial system.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

34. The ICTR was established by the UN Security Council on 8 November 1994. It is to consist of 11 judges, including 6 trial judges and 5 appeals judges. The ICTR and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will share an appeals chamber, located at The Hague. The same prosecutor will serve both Tribunals. The ICTR has its seat in Arusha, Tanzania, however, it is authorized to conduct proceedings at other locations.

35. The ICTR will focus its prosecutions on those persons responsible for planning and organizing the massacres of April-July 1994. Tribunal prosecutors expect that as many as 400 persons might fall into this category. Many of the persons sought by the Tribunal will likely be located in countries outside of Rwanda. Thus, it is important that the Tribunal receives the cooperation of states in which a suspect is located. The Tribunal's success will, in large measure, depend on the willingness of states to surrender and transfer to the Tribunal persons who have been indicted.

36. Although six months have passed since the establishment of the Tribunal, its presence in Rwanda has been almost imperceptible. In mid-May 1995, the prosecutor's office was staffed by six persons, including the chief prosecutor for both the ICTR and the ICTFY. Reports indicate, however, that the prosecutor's office in Kigali is rarely occupied. Moreover, the Security Council has not yet named the Tribunal's judges.

37. Delay in commencing the Tribunal's operations has seriously eroded confidence in the international community's commitment to pursuing those who are believed to have committed violations of international humanitarian law. The practical effects of delay may also be substantial. Physical evidence may be lost or destroyed, for example, and witnesses more difficult to locate. In addition, those who committed crimes and fled have had further opportunity to conceal assets that might eventually be used to compensate victims.

38. Remembering that the ICTR is meant to be an integral part of an overall effort to bring justice to, and eliminate impunity in Rwanda, the international community must keep in mind the possibility that the trials might be seen by many of the Hutu majority, specifically those in refugee camps, as little more than the organized revenge of the victors. This outcome is especially likely if perpetrators of crimes against humanity by the Burundi army and power elite go unpunished. If the war crimes tribunal proceeds without adequate understanding of regional Hutu sensibilities it might contribute to a worsening of relations, the exact opposite of the intended outcome.

The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation-Rwanda (HRFOR)

39. The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation is the first such undertaking under the auspices of the newly established office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The operation consists of three units: the Monitoring Unit, the Technical Cooperation Unit, and the Legal Analysis and Cooperation Unit. Only the first two, however, appear to be fully functional. Donor support of the operation has so far totaled approximately $ U.S.4 million. The operation's mandate is fourfold: (1) to investigate violations of human rights in support of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission of Experts; (2) to monitor the ongoing human rights situation; (3) to cooperate with international agencies in facilitating the return of the refugees; and (4) to implement human rights programs, particularly in the area of the administration of justice .

40. By all accounts, the field operation has been a failure. It suffered lengthy delays in deploying the field officers and problems in making logistical arrangements. Field officers initially received no training, and little or no apparent effort was made to match the persons who were recruited with needed skills. Field officers have been accused of ignoring the plight of victims of genocide. Instead, it is alleged, their efforts have focused on refugees, many of whom participated in the massacre. On the other hand, field officers have been also criticized for dealing ineffectively with abuses by the current government. Interviews with Rwandese indicate that the field operation has been largely irrelevant to their perceived needs. It has satisfied almost no one.

41. The problems experienced by the field operation are due to its broad and somewhat ambiguous mandate, as well as to its leadership, which lacks experience in human rights and in other relevant substantive areas, such as criminal justice administration. While some improvements have been made in the programs' operations in recent weeks (for example, a new training program was initiated and attempts are being made to reorient the field operation) substantial harm was done to the program's credibility because of the early criticisms. It is doubtful that the field operation can regain sufficient credibility to be effective in the near future.

Re-Building the Judicial System

42. During the civil war last year, Rwanda's judicial system, like much of the country's governmental infrastructure, virtually collapsed. A lack of prosecutors, judges, skilled investigative personnel and defense counsel, as well as a dearth of equipment and transport, not to mention fear of the consequences of action, has paralyzed the system. There is widespread recognition that rebuilding the country's judicial system is essential to national reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. It is needed to ensure that the perpetuators of genocide are prosecuted, the survivors of genocide regain a sense of justice, and 40,000 detainees accused of participating in genocide receive a fair trial. Above all, a fair and effective judicial system is required to prevent human rights abuses that have afflicted Rwandese society.

43. International agencies have supported modest projects to assess justice system needs, to provide equipment and supplies, and to undertake training programs for judicial system personnel. Some examples are:

- Citizen's Network, a Belguim-based NGO, for example, trained 150 IPJ's (inspectors de police judiciaire) between January and March 1995. Another 120 IPJ's and 30 army personnel entered a training program in April designed to increase skills relating to crime scene investigation, interviewing witnesses, and similar investigative techniques.

- The United States Government has provided approximately $1.4 million in supplies and equipment, and has earmarked over $ 2 million more for justice system needs.

- The European Union and the Belguim and Canadian governments have provided salary support to the Ministry of Justice, and several nations have provided short-term technical assistance to the Ministry. Furthermore, the governments of Switzerland and Norway are providing assistance in the repair of court facilities.

44. Most observers agree that the international assistance has been too little and too late. While these projects have resulted in some benefits, they have not appreciably improved the capability of the Rwandese judicial system to function effectively. Much more concerted international assistance is necessary to build its institutional capacity.

45. The delay in the trial of the people accused of genocide is causing some concern among the international community. The failure to move forward, however, is not entirely the result of a logistical quagmire. The judicial process is stalled partly because the Government of Rwanda has not yet resolved several threshold issues. These issues include: 1.) Will foreign judges be authorized to participate, and if so, in what capacity? 2.) What law-- international or domestic-- is to be applied ? In order to gather evidence to prove the elements of a crime, the investigator must know what crime is being investigated; the elements of the crime of murder, for example, are different than those for genocide; 3.) Will foreign lawyers be permitted to represent defendants, and if so, under what rules of procedure? In addition , before judicial vacancies can be filled the Government of Rwanda must constitute the Supreme Court and the Conseil National de la Magistrature. The latter has the responsibility for appointing judges to all levels of the judicial system.

46. There is also a growing recognition that prosecutors are unlikely to go forward until they receive clear instructions from higher-ranking officials. In addition, the role that the military is performing within the criminal justice system has caused concern. Prosecutors in some prefects, for example, have been required to obtain the RPA's (Rwanda Patriotic Army's) permission before dismissing cases. The recent departure of the chief prosecutor of Kigali, who alledged interference by the RPA, also raises concerns over the direction, or lack of direction, of prosecutorial policies.

47. Previous assistance has largely focused on Rwanda's judicial system needs, as well as on administrative and logistical obstacles to "restarting" it. However, a new donor strategy is needed to address obstacles that are political, rather than administrative or organizational, in nature.

Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)

48. The civil war that began on April 7, 1994 precipitated the flood of over 2 million Rwandese into neighboring countries. Between April 28 and 29 alone, an estimated 250,000 people sought asylum in Tanzania in the then-largest refugee flow in UNHCR history. By the end of April, more than 1.3 million people had fled their homes. In the three months that followed, even these figures were surpassed by an "exodus of biblical proportions:" At the height of the movement, 1.2 million people crossed the Zaire border into North Kivu in four days, another one million fled toward the French Zone in southwest Rwanda, 200,000 crossed into Bukavu, Zaire and 140,000 into Burundi. By July 18 when the war officially ended, an estimated 30 percent of the Rwandese population had either died or fled the country.

49. Two general observations can be made about the singularity of the Rwandese situation, besides its enormity. First, the refugee caseload is unconventional in that despite the sweep of RPF across the country, the exodus was not the result of persecution, but was orchestrated by the same leadership that planned and implemented the genocide. As a result, many of the refugees were involved in killing - directly or indirectly. Second, the camp structure reflected those of the communes. Although generally considered the most desirable means for meeting the camp population's needs, working with the camp leaders in this case meant empowering hardline elements from the former government and military. In an effort to be as efficient as possible under the extreme circumstances, relief organizations merely reinforced the leaders' hold on the population by using the local leadership in the traditional participatory method of distribution. As a result, intimidation became a powerful weapon in retaining refugees in camps.

50. The first phase of repatriation, from August to early September typified a ricochet return, enhanced by the high refugee camp mortality rates and the absence of acute conflict inside Rwanda. Phase two, September to November, was characterized by high levels of suspicion of GOR intentions, tremendous intimidation in both refugee and IDP camps and stabilization of camp operations. Return during this phase was haphazard, risky and minimal. Phase three, November to February, was consequently marked by higher rates of repatriation from all the neighboring countries and reduction in violence in the Zaire camps. The fourth and current phase began after several thousand newly returned IDPs found high levels of insecurity in their home communes and subsequently went back to the camps. This corresponded with increased arrests, growing animosity between UNAMIR and the RPA, uncertain human rights information, and indefinite delays in prosecuting war criminals. The abrupt closure of the IDP camps and the ensuing April massacre at Kibeho virtually demolished any hope of refugee repatriation, solidifying the leadership's hold in Zaire and

Tanzania.

51. During phase one, relief agencies provided waystations, transportation, and food baskets to returning refugees, while others offered assistance in the home communes. Information campaigns were virtually non-existent in the Zaire camps and minimal in the IDP camps. UNHCR's response to the Gersony Report was to halt all repatriation assistance during phase two, although IOM continued to provide transportation between Gisenyi and Kigali, and was inordinately preoccupied with the transport of old case load returnees. The waystations remained largely in place, though hardly utilized. Donor assistance to camps on both sides of the border was profound. Throughout this period, however, relief agencies inside the country rehabilitated health centers, reconstructed water systems and distributed seeds and tools prior to the planting season to encourage return. During phase three, the international community renewed efforts to promote repatriation, including launching Operation Retour for the IDP camps in southwest Rwanda. It entailed offering assistance via Open Relief Centers in the home communes, information campaigns in the camps, and transportation. Initially quite successful, it quickly petered out, partly as a result of inadequate human rights monitoring in the communes and ineffective coordination between the GOR and the relief community.

52. Donor action during phase four was split between the agencies who insisted on humanitarian support of internally displaced persons, and those trying to work closely with the GOR in closing the camps. Ultimately, collective inaction resulted in the GOR forcing the closures, concluding in the Kibeho incident. It also propelled the international community to confront the political realities of post-genocide Rwanda, and the primacy of national security interests in the calculus of the government. In the mean time, donors continue to provide one million dollars a day of assistance to the refugee camps. A stalemate has ensued, in which continued international support and political inertia will likely result in renewed war.

53. Several limitations of the international efforts for repatriation are quite obvious. First, the international community ignored the political and contextual realities of Rwanda, focusing instead on standard operational issues in refugee assistance. The refugee-centered approach led to the creation of disincentives to repatriation and the perception within the GOR that the international community is not politically neutral in the conflict. Second, the international community has failed to comprehend the enormity of the psycho-social effects of genocide on the psyche of the minority community. Genocide has re-defined its worldview. Third, the human rights programs have failed to give a sense of security to the refugees and IDPs who have returned or were planning to return. Fourth, the international community has yet to come to terms with the necessity to address the political and economic sustainability of the camps. Regional insecurity, donor fatigue and the arming of the camps make their continuation both unrealistic and undesirable. Finally, international agencies have failed to examine the question whether repatriation is the most durable solution given the political and economic realities of Rwanda.

Psycho-Social Healing

54. The destruction of the cultural and social foundations of organized life in Rwanda was swift, extensive and profound during the politically-motivated massacres, genocide and ensuing civil war. Nearly forty percent of its population was uprooted, hundreds of thousands families lost one of their adults, and over two hundred thousand children were separated from their parents. Communities were devastated and the very fabric of social life was destroyed. The fact that neighbors indiscriminately killed each other destroyed essential trust among the people. Undoubtedly, these events have affected the psyche of the whole population. Some groups such as unaccompanied children are relatively visible as "victims of violence," whereas others such as women, who make up the majority of survivors, are less apparent. The term 'victim,' however, can apply as well to those who were forced to kill, as to those who survived. It should also be applied to those who, at great risk to their own lives protected the primary targets of the massacres.

55. Because of the urgent needs of economic and political reconstruction, relatively little attention has been given to the problem of psycho-social healing. However, several agencies have begun to address the issues. The examples include:

- UNICEF and several NGOs provide training for primary care givers of the 4 million Rwandese children, including foster parents, social workers, unaccompanied children center staff, teachers, health care workers, religious educators and widows' associations in the nature and causes of trauma, recognizing the signs, and various approaches to healing.

- UNICEF's "Education for Peace Programme" in the primary schools is promoting peace education by substituting stereotyping and biased messages in the curriculum for those promoting peaceful coexistence and tolerance. In collaboration with the Ministry of Education, they are training teachers in conducting cooperative classrooms, dealing with traumatized children, and integrating discussions on peace and human rights across the disciplines.

- Several NGOs, mostly religious organizations, have attempted to bring together various elements of the community in workshops and dialogues. Religious organizations have held discussions and conferences among themselves, in efforts to heal the deep divide that splits the churches and crosses ecumenical lines.

56. Beyond the introduction of psychological techniques for recognizing and treating trauma, the donor community's efforts to help diminish the personal and collective anguish of war have been largely ineffective. The church's role in the genocide is very much a contentious point that serves to impede its traditional function in helping to reconcile opponents. The depth of the wounds are themselves formidable, the understanding of the roots and pathology of genocide nearly nonexistent, and the ability of expatriates to

comprehend the events that took place here between April and July incomplete. It is therefore extremely difficult for donors to help in the healing process. What is most needed, understanding and empathy, is what is least likely to be given.

57. Furthermore, as long as the threat of repeat violence remains in the form of over two million people living outside Rwanda's borders, the healing process can not significantly penetrate the fear. There is evidence of rising anger among many members of the population aimed at each other, specific organizations and the international community in general. Some of the latter comes from a sense of abandonment during their time of need, and a resulting mistrust in the intentions of the donors.

Outstanding Issues

58. A number of outstanding issues, which cut across all sectors of international assistance, are briefly mentioned below. These are essentially complex issues which involve major policy choices on the part of the international community.

Allocation of International Resources

59. The first outstanding issue, which often overshadows others, concerns how the international community should allocate its resources between the needs of the country and of the refugee populations. As indicated earlier, a greater part of international assistance has been expended on refugee camps than on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. Many observers believe that the disproportionate allocation is having many adverse consequences. It has given an impression to GOR that the international community is more concerned about the welfare of the refugees, who include the perpetuators of genocide, than about the plight of survivors. This widely shared perception has undermined donor's influence on the policies and programs of GOR. Moreover, in the zero-sum game of international assistance, any expenditure on the refugees often means that the corresponding amount is not available for the pressing needs of the majority of the population.

60. Above all, these observers contend that a drastic diversion of resources from refugees camps to development will facilitate the return of refugees in two ways. First, improvements in the economic and security situation in the country-side could induce a relatively high proportion of the refugees who are innocent and want to return to their homes. Second, a corresponding decline in the availability of resources to the camps could erode the influence of the present leadership in the camps, which has terrorized camp populations and often prevented people from returning to their communities. Although given the complexities of repatriation the last argument may sound simplistic, it is not without foundation.

61. In sharp contrast, many relief agencies argue that any drastic cuts in assistance to refugee camps is not politically and morally justifiable saying that it would bring unimaginable suffering to the old, women, children and other vulnerable groups. Moreover, sheer desperation may further lead camp leaders to engage into military adventures causing

massive destruction and political instability.

Relationships between GOR and NGOs

62. Within weeks after the collapse of the previous regime, hundreds of NGOs came to Rwanda and its neighboring countries to deliver humanitarian assistance. Despite many shortcomings, they have provided invaluable assistance in establishing and maintaining delivery of essential social services, caring for refugees and internally displaced persons and reaching out to vulnerable groups in the countryside. Some of the emergency organizations have been replaced with development NGOs, it is estimated that about 130 NGOs are still operating in the country. The unfortunate consequence, is an abundance of inexperienced but well-intentioned individuals without the knowledge or the skills to provide appropriate, well-placed and integrated assistance. An overwhelming majority of observers commented on the gravity of such a lack of regulationa and the ensuing damages.

63. While some tensions always existed between GOR and NGOs, they have become more visible and serious now. This is hardly surprising. During the acute crisis, NGOs enjoyed unprecedented freedom and access. They formulated their own strategies and activities based on their perceptions of the needs of beneficiaries and their capacities and mandates. The fragile GOR was hardly in a position to exercise any control. But as it began consolidating its position, it started asserting its authority over NGOs. It insisted that they work within the framework of its policies, priorities and procedures. GOR now requires that they register themselves with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and formulate their programs in consultation with the concerned ministries. While most NGOs have submitted their applications for registration (88 have been actually registered) and are working within the guidelines established by GOR, many are still resisting the new requirements.

64. The vast resources at the command of the NGO community are at the heart of the problem. NGOs, often funded by donor agencies, are able to design and implement their programs, while the GOR has no funds to pay salaries of its employees. On a more mundane plane, NGOs tend to enjoy excellent office and transport facilities. In contrast, many government officials are still struggling to have basic furniture, telephones, type-writers and in many cases, even paper. Obviously, some resent the presence of NGOs. The situation has been further aggravated by two additional factors. First, many NGOs have inadvertently lured experienced staff from the GOR by offering higher salaries and fringe benefits thereby further undermining institutional capabilities of line ministries. Unaware, some have even created parallel structures in the field. Second, because the senior staff of NGOs have generally come from Europe and North America, a relatively large expatriate community has emerged in Kigali, whose affluent life-style arouses understandable envy among the local elites.

65. There are some encouraging developments, however. In some ministries such as agriculture, a working partnership has emerged between the ministry and the concerned NGOs. Such partnership is also evolving in the case of health and education ministries.

Many NGOs are reducing their operations and expatriate staff, increasing training opportunities for indigenous staff and implementing capacity building measures. It appears that established NGOs with professional staff are earnestly trying to adjust to the new realities. GOR also seems more appreciative of the contributions of NGOs and the leverage they have with the donor agencies.

Relief to Development

66. Three critical issues arise about the relationship between relief and development assistance in Rwanda. The first concerns the time frame for mobilization of resources. During the emergency, international agencies followed rapid procedures for delivering their assistance. Their response was both instant and intense. Unfortunately, the case of development assistance is quite different. Under normal conditions, one to two years are needed to design, appraise and approve a project. Therefore, much of the pledged assistance, even if the pledges are honored by the donors, may take years before it materializes. This delay will undoubtedly create problems for the resource-starved GOR.

67. The sustainability of social welfare programs initiated during the crisis is yet another issue that needs to be examined. Such programs have been providing free essential services to the needy populations. For example, medical dispensaries in the country-side either do not charge patients any fee for consultation or medicines, or charge only a nominal fee. Obviously such programs cannot be sustained over time by GOR without developing cost sharing mechanisms. However, one doubts that users fees will be politically feasible in immediate future.

68. The last issue concerns the structural dependence of the country on external assistance. In the past, international donors have been quite generous to Rwanda. On an average, the country received about $200 million per annum, which enabled GOR to initiate and implement its development programs. The country needs are now more urgent and severe than in the past. But the prospects of long-term, massive development assistance look bleak given donor's fatigue. And because of its high population density, semi-subsistence agricultural economy and political instability, Rwanda is not likely to become economically self-sufficient in the near future.

Alternatives to the Existing Camp Sites

69. Most observers agree that the majority of the refugees who fled to neighboring countries are not likely to return, at least within the time span of five to seven years, if not more. There are obvious reasons. Because of the general perception, reinforced by the camp leadership, that the security situation in Rwanda is precarious and there is an imminent threat to the lives and properties of those who would return, most of the refugees are not eager to return. The hostile reaction to returnees in many communes, isolated cases of violence against them, large number of arrests, and the recent events in Kibeho have merely reinforced the sense of insecurity. Moreover, to the extent the community level structures of

Rwanda have been reproduced in the refugees camps, most of the refugees do not feel the kind of alienation which often characterizes refugees in host societies. In addition, the present camp leadership has followed a strategy of intimidation, including rape and killing, against those who had expressed a desire to return. And above all, there is the brutal fact that between 10 to 20 percent of the refugees had been active participants in genocide and might face punishment on their return.

70. The problem arises because the refugee camps cannot be long sustained for both economic and political reasons. The international community is spending between half to one million dollars every day to keep these camps. As mentioned elsewhere, both donor agencies and GOR concede that these resources be better spent on improving the economic and political situation in the country, which will have a more positive impact on the present crisis. Moreover, the camps, particularly in Goma, are acquiring armament from friendly quarters and are preparing for future military conflict. There is a real danger that without an aprupt halt to the support and continuation of the external military build-up, civil war may erupt again plunging the region into utter chaos and ruin.

71. The critical issue then is: What are the realistic alternatives to these camps which are located close to Rwandese borders? Many proposals have been made which range from moving the camp sites to distant areas in the host countries to the sudden closure of the camps. Issues of mandates, refugee law, moral responsibility, funding and political sovereignty are all serious considerations.

Perspectives on the Promotion of Human Rights

72. In responding to the human rights crisis in Rwanda, the international community has relied largely on the establishment and strengthening of formal legal mechanisms. The establishment of the International Tribunal and the development of an effective national administration of justice, for example, emphasize the protection of human rights through the enforcement of international and domestic criminal laws. The HRFOR has focused on the monitoring and reporting of violations of principles contained in various international agreements, such as the U.N. Charter and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. This approach stems from the definition of human rights law as dealing with the protection and of individuals and groups against violations of specific guaranteed rights by governments.

73. Another approach, which has been largely ignored, would focus on the need to incorporate human rights norms into the fabric of civil society. Such an approach, for example, would emphasize integrating respect for human rights into community rehabilitation efforts. Equal access to health care and human services, for instance, would become an integral component of projects designed to reconstruct the health care and social services sector. Respect for minority rights and tolerance of differing viewpoints, as well as non-violent dispute resolution, could be incorporated into educational curricula. The development of autonomous institutions and the establishment of systems of accountability, at the local and

national levels, are also means of promoting human rights.

74. The latter approach views human rights broadly, and emphasizes the need to establish the basis for the rule of law. It focuses on institutionalizing norms and developing a civic culture; activities that are seen by some observers as preconditions to establishing a polity that effectively protects human rights. In any case, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Both strategies can contribute to the promotion of human rights in the context of national reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. It is essentially a question of emphasis.

Need for a National Strategy for Women Victims of Genocide

75. As mentioned earlier, there are no national strategy and relief programs targeted to the specific emotional and economic needs of women victims of the genocide. They are usually treated just like other vulnerable women. Such an approach has been followed for two practical considerations. First, international relief agencies find it both difficult and time-consuming to identify women victims at the community level and to target assistance to them. Second, and perhaps more importantly, many relief agencies believe that to target the women victims could aggravate tensions between the two ethnic groups. Vulnerable women populations, who are not the victims of the genocide, might feel resentful against the victims, most of whom come from the minority ethnic group.

76. Many question the present approach on several grounds. First, the genocide victims have some unique emotional needs as they have undergone severe psychological trauma, in addition to sufferings from physical hardships. Moreover, many women were raped and became pregnant, and have to face the problem of unwanted children. Still others have lost their spouses and children. Consequently, they require special counselling and help to overcome their deep emotional distress. Second, there is a serious problem of property rights of widows and their daughters, as under the present law, they may be deprived of the properties of their husbands or fathers. Finally, the houses of many women victims were vandalized and even destroyed during the genocide, and therefore special assistance is needed.

77. Consequently, many relief experts have suggested the need for a coherent national strategy for addressing the problems of the women victims of genocide. Such anstrategy should focus on a range of issues from special counselling to property rights and housing.

Vision for the Future

78. The vast humanitarian assistance that has poured into Rwanda and neighboring countries has undoubtedly saved thousands of lives, provided essential services to millions of people and returned some confidence in the future. However, humanitarian assistance alone cannot solve the present crisis. It has provided only a temporary respite; it is up to the international community to use this time to search for a durable solution or to waste it in the fond hope that the problem will somehow be solved without concerted outside efforts.

79. In examining the question of long-term development of Rwanda, two considerations should be kept in mind. First, the success of Rwanda's march towards a politically stable and economically sustainable society will depend upon a complex set of conditions and circumstances. For example, it will be shaped by its distinctive social, cultural and economic institutions, the emerging regional alignments and interests, and the vision shown by its leadership. International donor community can influence such factors, but cannot control them. Second, the transition process is not likely to be a smooth one. Rather, as has been the case with many complex emergencies, the process is most likely to be characterized by periods of ups and downs, stagnation, and even regression. There is a need to take a long-term perspective.

80. Two broad approaches to the long-term solution of the problem are usually emphasized by the donor community. One focuses on Rwanda and the other on the whole region. A general consensus seems to be emerging that the country should give top priority to building an effective judicial system based on rule of law, ensuring physical security to refugees and survivors of genocide, and promoting rapid economic growth in agriculture and small business sectors. Both long-term development initiatives and short -term quick impact projects to generate employment and income are widely emphasized in the country.

81. However, many observers believe that the efforts at national interventions alone cannot contribute to the solution of the crisis. Because of the growing political and ethnic tensions in Burundi, the presence of two million Rwandese refugees in neighboring states, and the high population density of the country, a regional approach is imperative. Such an approach may require resettlement of the populations and greater regional political and economic integration.

ASSESSING VULNERABILITY TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: A DISCUSSION OF ANALYTIC TOOLS

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ASSESSING VULNERABILITY TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: A DISCUSSION OF ANALYTIC TOOLS

Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR) has developed three analytic tools for assessing the vulnerability of a country or region to complex emergencies in the form of political and economic instability. These three tools form a system that can be used to assess both long and short term vulnerability as well as monitor policy and institutional reform once the emergency subsides.

The kev elements of the approach:

- Defining the possible forms and levels of political instability so they are exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and organized consistently with community reporting,
- Identifying the causal factors that (1) are associated with different levels and forms of instability, (2) differentiate those forms and levels, and (3) can be known by the analysts in the field,
- Using a questionnaire format proven effective in assessing vulnerability to *coups d'etat* to elicit current information about the situation from analysts in the field, and
- Developing a rule-based system for converting analyst-generated data into assessments of vulnerability to the different forms and levels of instability.

Violent instability includes the use or threat of force beyond the bounds laid out by a nation's constitution or legal regime. Four different forms of violent instability are part of the system:

- Internal war: large-scale, organized, widespread political violence, in which the opposition is mounting a serious challenge for power, either regionally or nationally. Examples include large-scale terrorism, insurgencies or guerrilla wars, civil wars, and large scale revolts.
- Marginalized internal war: broad-based, organized political violence that occurs as the residual of an internal war as the opposition loses the capacity to mount a serious challenge for power, either regionally or nationally. This will always be characterized by the replacement of the internal war as the major focus of political activity and may be characterized by the removal of the active fighting to non-strategic regions.
- Conspiracy: the use or threat of violence by an intensively organized elite in an attempt to topple the government or any national level leaders.
- Turmoil: relatively spontaneous and unorganized mass political strife. This includes riots, small-scale terrorism, and small-scale ethnic violence.

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The level of political change is understood to be independent of its form. Seven different levels are recognized:

- No Change,
- Change in national level leaders below the Head of State,
- Change in national level policies,
- Change in Head of State,
- Political Autonomy within the state,
- Separation, and
- Revolution.

Political instability is conceptualized as the result of interaction between two different types of factors: (1) grievances and conflicts extant in the society and (2) the capacity of the political system to handle these grievances. Political instability is seen as unlikely if everyone in a society is happy and there are no internal conflicts. All societies, however, contain individuals and groups with some type of grievance, real or perceived. At the same time, all societies encompass some (not necessarily violent) conflicts: disagreements about the way goods, services and other values are distributed. The issue becomes not whether these are present, but their potency and the degree to which they have become politicized. Grievances and conflicts are understood to come from a wide range of arenas: economic, social, political, intellectual, or military. They may also be domestic, international, or both.

Managing political grievances and conflicts, whatever their origin, is the task of the political system. The capacity of the political system is determined by the interaction of four forces:

- legitimacy, or the degree to which there is consensus that the existing rules for governing the society and the current leaders are appropriate to the society,
- monopoly of coercive force *vis a vis* other elements of the society,
- resources in the form of material wealth that can be used to meet needs through investment, cooptation, corruption, or other distribution, and
- institutional strength, which encompasses responsiveness, flexibility, functional specialization, and other aspects of healthy organizational performance.

Political instability is seen as the product of interaction between grievances and conflicts and the capacity of the political system. When there is real pressure for change, the dissidents feel the political system is legitimate, and the system has the means to manage their problems, peaceful political change occurs. When elite elements are left with unresolved demands and perceive the existing system as lacking legitimacy, conspiracy occurs. If the dissidents are masses and their needs cannot be managed by the political system, turmoil erupts. Finally, if a well organized dissident group consisting of both elites and masses is unsatisfied and perceives the political system to be illegitimate, internal war occurs.

LONG RANGE FORECASTING TOOL

The first part of the system assesses vulnerability to instability over the long term; approximately three to five years. The 130-item questionnaire responses generate information organized around the sources of grievances and conflicts in the society and the capacity of the political system. Questions about grievances and conflicts elicit information not only about the presence and absence of the issue, but also the degree to which it has become politicized.

The individual items are used to construct indices that determine the focus and level of discontent in the society and the relative strength of the political system. The indices aggregate grievance and conflict information based on its relevance to more general issues in the society including, for example, personalist and communications issues. At the same time, indices are also constructed for each of the key arenas where grievances and conflicts arise (economic, political, social, intellectual, and military) and for each major component of political capacity (legitimacy, institutional strength, government resources, and monopoly of coercive force). These indices are the median values of the items relevant to the issue.

The rule-based system organizes the information captured in the indices into causal maps. Rules are used to assess the likely forms and levels of instability. The rules for form seek to identify both the degree of unhappiness and the nature of the groups that are unhappy in order to support inferences about the kinds of actions that may be taken. They also look at political capacity to determine whether the resulting conflicts are likely to be managed within the political system.

SHORT TERM FORECASTING TOOL

The underlying theory of the long range tool, which focuses primarily on structure (the types of grievances and conflicts and the capacity of the system to mediate them) is able to explain the progression of change over a long period, but unable to focus, at the level of precision desired, on short term instability assessments. The short term tool, which attempts three to six month forecasts, focuses on process, which, while encompassing the more abstract structural underpinnings, is able to handle the shorter-term predictions. Thus, while continuing to look at instability as the result of unhappiness in the society and the government's capacity to handle it, the short term model focuses on the specific groups that are unhappy and their ability to achieve their goals.

Form of Instability

Rather than asking a series of questions regarding the presence of certain types of grievances ~~and conflicts, this questionnaire simply asks analysts to identify each group that is unhappy,~~ what it is unhappy about, and what it is demanding from the government. From there, information about each group as well as the government can be used to identify whether instability will occur, what form it will take, and the level of change that will be achieved.

Once these initial questions are asked, four major variables are used to assess the form instability may take: the salience of the issue(s) to the group, the responsiveness of the government, the organizational characteristics of the group, and the group's perception of its clout on this issue in relation to that of the government.

The first and most important variable for differentiating the form of instability in the model is the salience of the issue(s) to the group. The answer can be "crucial" (the issues are perceived by the group as fundamental and people will take significant risk to bring about change, e.g., Islamic fundamentalists), "important" (the group considers them of national importance and will not likely give up on these issues to bring about change on others, e.g., desire of a group to have its language used in schools), or "politics as usual" (issues for which a group expects a certain degree of give and take). Depending on this distinction, the other three variables are played out differently in the model.

"Politics as Usual" Issues

When the issue falls into this category, the model does not forecast any forms of violent instability. The underlying assumption here is that a group will not be willing to assume the risks associated with becoming violent over issues at this level. Rather, it will be more likely to try to work within the system.

The differentiating variable in this network deals with how the group perceives the responsiveness of the government. Once this is determined, the organizational characteristics of the group are considered. This variable consists of two indicators: the mobilization capacity of the group and its organizational cohesion. Mobilization deals with whether the leadership of this group currently has the capacity to mobilize public support for its demands. This can range from the ability of a revolutionary group to mobilize peasants to a party's ability to mobilize legislative votes. Organizational cohesion is defined as unity of purpose, responsiveness, flexibility, institutional strength to use the assets of the group, and willingness to sacrifice individual or local interests for the group's objectives.

If the government is perceived by the group as responsive, there will be either no instability or peaceful political change, depending on the characteristics of the group. The same is true with an unresponsive government, although in some cases the group will assess its perceived "clout" on the issue relative to the government. By "clout" we mean the capabilities the group (and government) can muster on behalf of its position, discounted by its willingness to use those resources. For example, the group (or government) may be willing to make a "full court press," a strong, but not maximal effort, or only a limited effort on behalf of its desired outcome. A government therefore, may be much more powerful than a group if it were to use all its resources to fight. If, however, it is unwilling to expend any resources to fight on this issue, the group would be in the more powerful position. The group's clout includes also that of any other group (within the country) that it believes might join with it on behalf of these demands.

"Important" Issues

Where the group perceives the government as responsive, the model is very similar to the case of "politics as usual." There is one difference, however. Lacking both mobilization capacity and organizational cohesion, the group will look to support outside the country (this forms a third indicator of group characteristics). Should there be no external support, **no instability** will occur. If there is external support, however, the group will likely achieve **peaceful political change**. This will also occur if the group has either mobilization capacity or organizational cohesion.

When the group perceives the government as unresponsive, it will also look to external support if it lacks mobilization capacity and organizational cohesion. If there is support, rather than pressing its demands at this point as it would do with a responsive government, it will assess its clout relative to the government and the result will be either no instability or peaceful change.

If the group lacks mobilization capacity but does have organizational cohesion, that is, it is a tightly organized but small, probably elite group unable to amass general public support, the next indicator assessed is whether the government is coercive. By this we mean the group perceives the government has the capacity and will to use coercive force against dissidents. If the government is perceived to be coercive, the group will not take the risk of pressing its demands. If the government is not coercive, the group will again assess its clout relative to the government. Here, violence can enter into the model. If the group has organizational cohesion and perceives its clout as greater than that of the government, the model forecasts instability in the form of **conspiracy** (the use or threat of violence by an intensively organized elite in an attempt to topple the government or national level leaders). If the clout is perceived as less than that of the government, there will be **no instability**, and if clout is equal, there will be **either conspiracy or no instability**.

Where the government is unresponsive and the opposite is true, that is, the group is able to mobilize but has no organizational cohesion, it will again look to whether the government is coercive. Here, **turmoil** (relatively spontaneous and unorganized violent mass strife) will occur if the government is not coercive and the group believes it has more clout on the issue than the government.

If the group has both mobilization capacity and organizational cohesion, it will again refrain from pressing a coercive government, but will press a non-coercive government in the form of **turmoil and conspiracy** if it perceives it has more clout than the government.

"Crucial" Issues

It is where issues are perceived as crucial to the group that violent instability is most likely and internal war can occur. Where issues are crucial and the government is perceived as responsive, the theoretical network is identical to where issues are important. This is because in both cases a responsive government will give into these kinds of demands before violence

occurs. Where the government is not responsive, however, groups who perceive their issues as crucial are more likely to take risks and thus resort to violence.

Where mobilization and organizational cohesion are lacking, these groups will behave similarly to those whose issues are "important." One important difference, however, is where the group possesses either organizational cohesion or mobilization capacity, but not both. Unlike a group that considers its issue "important," it will not assess the capacity and will of the government to use force against dissidents; it will be willing to take that risk and move immediately to **conspiracy** or **turmoil** respectively.

Where the group has both organizational cohesion and mobilization capacity, it will assess whether it has external support. If not, it will look at its clout relative to the government. If it has less clout, **conspiracy and turmoil** will occur. If it has more clout, **internal war** will occur. If the clout is perceived as equal, **either conspiracy and turmoil or internal war** will occur. Where there is external support, **internal war** is forecast.

Issue Movement

It is possible for issues to move among these categories over the course of six months. Issues can become increasingly important to groups over time, and this is in itself, an important aspect of change. When data changes, including the placement of the issues in these categories, the emergence of a new group, or the occurrence of a major change (e.g., change in head of state), the initial data must be replaced and the model applied to the new data. The forecast will then be valid for the next six months.

Level of Instability

The level of change that will occur in a country over the next six months depends, in large part, on the interplay between the characteristics of the group and the government, rather than decisions by the group. There are six variables involved in forecasting the level of change:

- the nature of the demand (change in national level policies, change in national level leaders below head of state, change in head of state, revolution),
- the balance on legitimacy between the group and the government (does the majority of the population consider the government or the group to have legitimate political authority),
- the balance on coercive force (does the government or group hold the balance on coercive force in society, i.e., the government can defeat, if necessary, any and all dissident groups),
- the balance on resources (does the government control a majority of the politically relevant resources, e.g., media access, ability to tax),

- the balance on organizational strength (responsiveness, functional differentiation, etc.), and

- the government's perception of whether each of these balances is deteriorating to its disadvantage.

Assumptions

There is a set of assumptions embedded in the model explained above for forecasting instability.

First, the model assumes governments act in response to forces in society. That is, they do not make changes unless a demand for change has been articulated and groups do not articulate demands unless they believe it is in their best interest to do so.

Second, while all three categories of issues look at the same basic set of variables, the probabilities will likely be different in the three cases. For example, groups whose issues are regarded by them as "politics as usual" are less likely to have the capacity to mobilize broad support and are less likely to be cohesive than groups with issues they consider important or crucial. Further, groups with crucial issues are more likely than others to have external support for their cause.

Third, while the model uses the group's perception of its clout relative to that of the government, this perception does not occur in a vacuum. That is, the government has given some indication of its clout to the group. Thus a government is likely prepared to make some concession to the group thereby contributing to peaceful political change where the group has more perceived clout.

Fourth, we assume groups whose issues fall into the "politics as usual" category do not attempt to garner external support for their demands.

Finally, the willingness of groups to take risks increases with the salience of the issues. Consequently, only groups whose issues are crucial will engage in internal war.

MONITORING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM

The third part of the system monitors and analyzes the level of reform occurring in a country. It can be used both pre- and post-emergency. To measure economic reform, we identify three phases of the process: stabilization, liberalization, and structural adjustment. Stabilization policies include those policy changes intended to bring government spending and revenue under control, and include, for example, subsidies and price policy. Liberalization policies include direct foreign investment, trade regulation, and other policies intended to open up the domestic economy to trade and investment while working

with interest and exchange rates to aid reform. The third phase of economic reform, which may begin before the others are complete or simultaneously with the others, concerns the profound reorientation of economic activities: major adjustments to the structure of the economy. Issues here include privatization and deregulation.

Each of these phases is represented by a set of indicators of economic reform. There are thirty economic indicators in the system, each of which is linked to a scale representing a closed (unreformed) to open (reformed) system.

To conceptualize political reform, we determine the kinds of rights and liberties present in a free society. The eight categories of political reform include:

- basic freedoms,
- crime, punishment, and law,
- mobility,
- management of security organizations,
- discrimination (education),
- political power,
- elections and choice, and
- independent institutions.

These categories are composed of 22 indicators. As with the economic reform indicators, each political indicator is linked to a scale representing a closed (unreformed) to open (reformed) system.

The Policy Event as Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is a "policy event," defined as a guideline for action. The event can be a statement by officials of the government/regime indicating their policy or policy objective ("said"), a signed decree or piece of legislation that legally defines a policy or policy objective ("law"), or what actually occurs, which is seen as the implementation of a policy even if that policy has not been articulated or codified previously ("done").

Major Features of Each Event

For each policy event, five features are recorded: the date, the type of event ("said," "done," "law"), the data sources, a textual event summary, and the scale point of the relevant indicator. Events relating to more than one issue are coded as separate events.

As mentioned earlier, each political and economic reform indicator is linked to a scale representing a closed (unreformed) to an open (reformed) system. While these scales differ for each issue, they were developed based on underlying generic scales for the political and economic events. These generic scales are important because they make information on different policy indicators comparable. This means comparative analysis is possible and composite indicators can be created.

The generic scale for economic reform issues consists of four points, the first representing an open system or market economy and the fourth representing a closed system or centralized economy. A three on the scale indicates a loosening of the economy in selected areas, while a two indicates a moving towards a market economy, with state control being systematically eliminated.

The five-point generic scale for political reform issues moves from a one, representing an event where the government actively ensures and encourages individual rights and liberties, to a five, representing a closed system with no individual rights or liberties. A four represents a loosening of the system, with some rights and liberties permitted. A three on the scale is coded when an event indicates narrow exclusions to rights and liberties, and a two when an event signifies a politically open system where rights and liberties are clearly established.

The system permits a variety of focuses on the substance and process of political and economic reform. An analyst can look at a single policy area or multiple areas within a country, identify areas being ignored, and understand the interactive nature of the process.

Analysts focusing on the reform climate in any country can use the system to refine their understanding of political and economic reform issues. Using the system, an analyst can document the climate for reform within a particular country, within a particular issue area, across countries, and across issue areas. This would be particularly helpful to offices or agencies (such as USAID) tasked to help governments effect reform in these countries. The system could be used as a record of the reforms that transpired previous to intervention, as well as following intervention as a tool for evaluation of programs. Further, the system can help in targeting countries that would benefit from intervention programs and projects, as well as recognizing patterns such as resistance to reform.

Measuring the Impact of Emergency Programs

by

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I. Introduction

CARE considers timely and effective humanitarian relief to be integral to achieve sustainable development. As we have witnessed in Rwanda, a civil conflict can easily destroy social, political, and economic institutions and set the development process back immeasurably. Likewise, a natural disaster can eradicate years of development progress in a matter of minutes. Disaster preparedness measures and appropriate development policies can play a key role in protecting development progress by preventing disasters or mitigating their effects. Similarly, appropriate emergency relief measures, coupled where possible with development assistance programs, can help not only save lives and alleviate suffering, but also assist in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction and the return to the development process (CARE 1994).

An emergency falls within CARE's organizational mandate when indigenous institutions are unable to meet the needs of the victims, when the event has overwhelmed the local capacities, and relief activities cannot be effectively managed. The host country government must recognize the need for additional outside support and officially make a request for assistance.

Although CARE's primary objective in humanitarian assistance is to save lives and reduce suffering caused from disasters, it recognizes that programs aimed at disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness can sharply reduce the human impact and costs of disasters. Such programming can reduce the vulnerabilities of populations at risk from disasters and strengthen indigenous capacities of local organizations to better cope with future emergencies. Such programs include early warning systems, vulnerability mapping and monitoring, effective food targeting for food security programming, evacuation plans, local institutional strengthening, training in disaster response, establishment of effective monitoring systems, and coordination of emergency response planning (CARE 1994).

In terms of emergency programming, CARE provides responses to quick on-set natural

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In terms of emergency programming, CARE provides responses to quick on-set natural disasters, slow onset disasters, complex disasters, and permanent emergencies requiring the establishment of social safety nets. Although CARE seeks to restore local self-sufficiency in the recipient population as quickly as possible, each type of emergency may require a different set of objectives, mode of response and timeframe.

Where feasible, CARE's actions in an emergency will be consciously designed to progress from emergency response to rehabilitation to self-sustaining development through the active participation of the community. The objective of rehabilitation programming is to assist the affected population to move beyond the crisis; to establish sufficient stability to allow for sustainable development; and to build local capacity that will reduce future vulnerabilities.

Global trends indicate a continuing and increasing number of disasters affecting more and more countries. Many populations are somewhere in the cycle of experiencing, recovering from or awaiting a disaster. The rise in the number and duration of emergencies has led to a reallocation of limited resources to relief programs. Drought, war and civil strife, resulting in chronic food shortages have forced many governments and aid donors to mount massive food transfers for many years since 1970. For example, the net value of U.S. food aid to Africa from 1985 to 1990 averaged $1 billion a year (Maxwell 1993), about the same as the net transfers to the region by the World Bank and the International Development Association (World Bank/WFP 1991). During the 1980s, cereal food aid accounted for between 20 - 44 percent of annual cereal imports to sub-Saharan Africa. During the height of the food crisis of the mid-1980s and since the start of the present decade, more than half of the cereal food aid has been in the form of emergency relief assistance. These food transfers have been at the expense of development assistance and disaster mitigation programs. While providing vitally required life-sustaining food, they have not contributed to building self-reliant families and communities or to preventing the depreciation of capital stock.

There is a growing consensus on the need to strike a balance between the immediate needs of the afflicted population exposed to disasters and their longer term development requirements. This calls for policies and programs that support disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and rehabilitation. This view is justified when one takes into account the growing cost of emergency assistance and the negative impact it is having on governments in the developing world and on donor aid allocations.

Given this shift in resource allocation, many food donors want emergency assistance to address not only the basic needs of the recipients, but also the root causes of emergencies. Furthermore, the donors want implementing agencies to demonstrate that positive benefits have been derived from the allocation of resources in both the short-term (nutrition and health adequacy) and long-term (movement towards self-reliance).

Unfortunately, impact assessments of emergency programs have not been rigorously planned for or implemented in a regular fashion. Emphasis has been placed on measurements of project delivery rather than the program's effect on knowledge, attitudes, practices and

conditions of the beneficiaries. Such impact evaluations are viewed as difficult to carry out under emergency situations due to the short planning horizon, the flux and instability that often characterizes many emergency contexts, and the difficulty in obtaining reliable information.

Recognizing these difficulties, this discussion focuses on the factors that should be considered in designing emergency programs and evaluating impact. These factors include understanding the resource base and socio-economic characteristics of the affected population, the nature of the shock that has triggered the emergency, the type of emergency that has developed, and the consequences of the emergency. This information can be used for determining emergency program objectives, designing interventions that address basic needs in the short-term (livelihood provisioning) and self reliance in the long-term (livelihood promotion), and delineating indicators for measuring program impact. In addition, the information will feed into the design of pre-emergency measures that lesson the human impact and costs of disasters, such as early warning systems, vulnerability mapping and monitoring, emergency response planning, and pre-positioning of resources.

Before discussing the various types of information that will assist in designing and evaluating emergency programs, it is important to delineate the different kinds of emergencies that may arise.

II. Types of Emergencies

An emergency, as defined by the Oxford Dictionary, "is a situation, especially of danger or conflict, that arises unexpectedly and requires urgent action"(cited in Davis 1995). In this situation, the population typically loses access to normal livelihood and food resources and is in imminent danger of increased malnutrition and mortality as a result of the food shortage. It is usually caused by an event that results in human suffering and dislocation of a community or population, and the local authorities are unable to remedy the situation without external assistance (Songhvi 1995). Emergencies occur when effected people cross a threshold, where their behavior becomes different and often extremely desperate, and their ability to cope is overwhelmed. (families sell productive assets, communities and families disintegrate, epidemics are triggered etc.)(Longhurst 1995).

Where emergencies are massive and acute, the emphasis is on saving lives and the maintenance of the social structure at any cost in the short-term (Davis 1995). Unfortunately, many externally derived emergency responses do not work through indigenous institutions and can undermine local capacity to intervene. The form of intervention is often conceptually regarded as limited in time and as an interruption to development.

Recently, attempts have been made to change this mind set, and view relief and development not as separate domains, but as part of a continuum. However, combining relief and development efforts are made difficult because of administrative barriers, shortage of development funds to couple with relief resources, and differences in planning, management

and implementation. Emergency planning, management and implementation tends to be task oriented and centralized, while long-term food security work is often decentralized, participatory and process oriented (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). These differences can impede the transition to a development mode when the emergency has ended.

The type of emergency and context will determine the effect, priorities for assistance, scale, and urgency of response. It is important to distinguish the difference between an emergency event and an emergency effect (Davis 1995). Emergency effects may or may not follow from an emergency event, depending upon the capacity of the local population to cope with the event. Emergency responses are usually aimed at mitigating an emergency effect, and not in preventing emergency events.

We can identify 4 different types of emergencies (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994):

1) Rapid Onset Emergencies -- triggered by natural disasters (earthquakes, floods); the crisis is usually temporary.

2) Slow Onset Emergencies -- triggered by natural disasters, such as drought and pest attacks; the emergency develops more slowly as a result of crop failure or livestock losses. (Drought emergencies in Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe) The emergency does not normally last for more than a couple of years. Most techniques for vulnerability assessments have been developed in slow onset emergencies.

3) Permanent emergencies -- where there is a very large problem of structural poverty and a need for permanent welfare. Natural disasters like drought may, of course, exacerbate this kind of permanent crisis. Many parts of Ethiopia and Sudan fall into this category. Food relief is more or less provided on a constant basis. Duffield argues that permanent emergencies are a characteristic feature of marginalized areas in the post-cold war world order (Duffield 1994).

4) Complex Political Emergencies -- generally are the result of a combination of natural and conflict events. They are complex because delivery of relief supplies is impeded by political or military factors which frequently threaten the security of relief workers as well as the affected population. The fact that the affected population is often displaced and forced to exist without the benefit of viable economic and social structures adds to the complexity of the recovery effort. International political differences may also complicate the response. Complex disasters often persist due to the intransigence of local governing bodies which seek to disenfranchise the disaster victims. Examples of such emergencies can be found in southern Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda.

The nature of emergencies has changed dramatically since the 1980s. More so called emergencies now amount to a response to long-term and deep seated poverty rather than a

one-off shock; and many more are associated with violence or war. Under such circumstances, prevention and preparedness measures are much more difficult and complex, and rehabilitation to development often more protracted (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994).

III. Delineating Vulnerability

Household vulnerability is defined as the capacity to manage shocks (Longhurst 1994). Shocks can result from natural events (drought, floods, pests, epidemics), state policies (declining public expenditure), market changes (price shocks, currency devaluation, unemployment), community breakdown, and conflict (See figure 1). Some households may be unaffected by certain shocks, others may recover quickly, and some may be pushed into irreversible decline. The consequences of these shocks can lead to transitory food insecurity, chronic food security, or displacement. In many parts of Africa, vulnerability is rising, as coping strategies are overwhelmed by growing poverty (Davies 1993).

Livelihood systems in many areas of the world are likely to become more structurally vulnerable due to one or a combination of the following factors: 1) increasing population growth out-stripping the carrying capacity of local resources; 2) recurrent droughts; 3) loss of economic opportunities during transitional periods of market liberalization (e.g., structural adjustment measures); and 4) complex emergencies where political instability has increased. In addition, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has taken its toll on the productive members of poor households. A number of communities are experiencing a progressive erosion of their basis of subsistence, leading to the further degradation of their natural resource base to compensate for these shortfalls. Community level buffers against periodic income and food shortages are beginning to disappear. At the same time, the allocation of government resources to social services, food transfers and agricultural development have been significantly affected both by structural adjustment measures and by resource allocation to emergency or drought relief operations. As a result, livelihood systems in many parts of the world are becoming less sustainable through time (Frankenberger 1995).

Thus, to determine the effect of an emergency event, information is required on the resources available to households and communities within a region to cope with the event (See figure 2). An assessment of this baseline vulnerability will help predict the effect of an acute shock, and help target limited emergency resources. Vulnerability assessments and vunerability mapping will help determine where to set up decentralized food security monitoring systems, contingency plans consisting of employment based safety nets and supplemental feeding for vulnerable groups, and prepositioning of resources.

Since the mid-1980s, early warning systems have been established across Africa. Despite the fact that advanced warning of food shortages caused by drought and crop failure has been timely, action taken by governments and donors has often been late (Buchanan-Smith et. al. 1993). This is due to 1) the bureaucratic procedures followed by governments and donors which may be out of sync with the needs of recipients; 2) the criteria used by

donors to take action may be late outcome indicators that do not allow a preventive response; and 3) the political relations between donor and recipient governments may lead to a lack of response to early warning. Ways to improve the response time could include decentralizing relief planning and food stocks to reduce delivery time, pledging food assistance on the basis of leading indicators; and making multi-year pledges to areas that are chronically food insecure (Hobson and Barnard 1995).

Although disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness programs are aimed at protecting household livelihoods so that people can recover from shocks in a timely manner, development efforts should be aimed at reducing the frequency, intensity and impact of shocks (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). This involves making people less sensitive to shocks and more resilient. This could include diversifying crop and livestock production systems, diversifying income earning activities, improving storage facilities, and reducing the risk of illness through the development of health and water facilities. Many of these interventions could form part of the rehabilitation package.

To measure the effectiveness of these disaster preparedness and mitigation measures the following indicators might be considered: 1) % of households selling/pledging productive assets; 2) % of households migrating permanently; and 3) district or regional changes in consumption and malnutrition.

IV. Emergency Response

To link relief to development effectively, emergency responses must simultaneously address the short-term needs of the affected population and their long-term potential for self-reliance (See figure 3). The potential for promoting self-reliance will vary, depending on the type of emergency and its effect on the target group. The types of interventions that are required in refugee camps will be different than those appropriate to populations that have not moved from their home regions. Consequently, the types of impacts that are possible to achieve through relief efforts must be viewed from this perspective.

A. Short-Term Responses and Potential Impacts

1. Displaced Populations

Under emergency conditions, general food distribution for displaced populations aims to bring the nutritional value of the diet of the affected population up to a sufficient level to enable survival. Usually in emergencies, the magnitude of the food deficit is usually very large, requiring the program rations to fill the complete range of nutritional needs (Songhvi 1995). However, the nutritional composition of various Title II commodities will not meet all nutritional needs alone. Thus an emergency feeding program of extended duration must allow for the addition of other local or imported food sources to provide an adequate diet. In situations of grossly inadequate food supply, it may be necessary to provide blanket feeding for all members of vulnerable groups (e.g. children, lactating or pregnant women, elderly,

handicapped) for a short duration of time (MSF 1995). This would be followed by targeted feeding (for moderately malnourished) and therapeutic feeding (for the severely malnourished). In situations where food for work opportunities exist, general rations should be reduced.

Although providing food and shelter are usually seen as the first priorities in relief camps, overcrowding and poor sanitation provide ideal conditions for the spread of diseases such as cholera, measles, and gastroenteritis (Hobson and Barnard 1995). These resulting epidemics can wipe out large numbers of people in a short span of time, even when ample food supplies are available (e.g. Goma). To lessen these threats, relief assistance should ensure the provision of adequate clean water and good sanitation, the prevention of specific communicable diseases through immunization, establish and maintain standardized treatment protocols to treat diarrhea, respiratory infections malaria and measles, and establish health information systems to track nutritional status, illness and mortality (Songhvi 1995).

Collection of information for monitoring and evaluating the impact of short-term interventions can be done as part of the initial needs assessment. Information to be gathered would include anthropometric measures (H/W especially since it reflects the present situation and is sensitive to rapid changes), basic health information, mortality rates, water availability, access to latrines, shelter, amount and sources of food, market prices for staples and livestock, and sources of income (MSF 1995). In situations where food systems are controlled (e.g. camps), the population can be monitored regularly. Temporary changes in food access should not be confused with food security.

2. Stable Rural Populations

Provision of food and other basic services for dispersed rural populations is made complicated by the fact that such populations may have variable access to alternative food resources and services. In addition to saving lives, interventions should be tailored to enable people to remain in their home areas. Food-for-work can be used as an employment based safety net, producing outputs that directly address the causes and effects of the food crisis. Such interventions can also assist relief operations by improving access roads. In some areas, food-for-work will be coupled with supplemental feeding for vulnerable groups, provision of water supplies, sanitation facilities and health interventions.

In such situations, initial needs assessments to establish baselines for targeting interventions and measuring impact are difficult to carry out (MSF 1995). Nutritional surveys are difficult to perform adequately and results cannot be interpreted without other critical contextual data. Thus, an assessment of impact is extremely difficult.

B. Long-Term Responses and Potential Impacts

1. Displaced Populations

Although efforts to promote self-reliance in camps and among displaced populations are difficult, certain actions can be taken. These include skills training, reproductive health and HIV training, building social institutions and legitimate legal formations, and working to support psychological health and demilitarization (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). Populations settled in communities have better opportunities of supplementing their income than those in camps. Factors to take into account include access to assets, land and labor markets; host government policies of refugee mobility, access to land, and other income generating activities; availability of non-food inputs for income generation; the political situation; and the possibility for repatriation.

Depending on the intervention, changes in the knowledge, attitudes and practices will be measured before and after the program is implemented.

2. Stable Rural Populations

The major long-term interventions should be focused on restoring assets and sustainable livelihoods. This may involve the distribution of seeds and tools, other inputs and credit for livestock, or creating opportunities for alternative income generation. Food-for-work may be used to pay for the construction of roads, development of irrigation systems, or soil conservation work. These are intended to increase income and reduce vulnerability in the future. Interventions may also encompass capacity building for local government. Program impact would be measured through KAP surveys, as stated above.

V. Current Status

CARE has recently conducted a few operational reviews of its responses to emergencies in order to improve its logistical systems and processes. It has determined that impact evaluations for dispersed rural populations are easier to carry out where CARE has had an on-going relationship with the existing population that pre-dates the emergency event. In situations where CARE has not had pre-emergency relationships with the affected populations, impact assessments will be more difficult to implement. For displaced populations residing in camps, impact evaluations will be incorporated into program implementation plans.

VI. Issues

A number of issues will arise in future efforts to incorporate impact indicators into emergency programming. These include:

1) Will donors be willing to provide the needed resources (staff, financial

resources, equipment) required for monitoring and evaluating emergency programs?

2) How will decisions regarding the allocation of resources and programming changes use the indicators, especially if the indicators are not rigorously collected?

3) How are emergency impact indicators going to be aggregated in order to determine USAID Mission-Level impact?

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Figure 1.

Sources of Risk to Household Food Security

Sources of Entitlement	Types of Risk				
	Natural	State	Market	Community	Other
Productive capital(land, machinery, tools, animals, farm buildings, trees, wells, etc.)	Drought contamination (for example, of water supplies) Land degradation Fire Flooding	Land or other asset redistribution/ confiscation	Changes in costs of maintenance	Appropriation and loss of access to common property resources	Loss of land as a result of conflict
Non-productive capital (jewellery, dwellings, granaries,some animals, cash savings)	Pests Animal disease	Compulsory procurement Villageisation Wealth tax	Price shocks (for example, falls in value of jewellery and livestock) Rapid inflation	Breakdown of sharing mechanisms (for example, communal granaries).	Loss of assets as a result of war Theft
Human capital (labour power, education, health)	Disease epidemics (for example AIDS) Morbidity Mortality Disability	Declining public health expenditures and/or introduction of user charges Restrictions on labour migration	Unemployment Falling real wages	Breakdown of labour reciprocity	Forced labour Conscription Mobility restrictions Destruction of schools and clinics during war
Income (crops, livestock, non-farm and non-agricultural activity)	Pests Drought and other climatic events	Cessation of extension services, subsidies on inputs or price support schemes Tax increases	Commodity price falls Food price shocks		Marketing channels disrupted by war Embargoes
Claims (loans, gifts, social contracts, social security)		Reductions in nutrition programmes (for example school feeding, supplementary feeding)	Rises in interest rates Changes in borrowing capacity	Loan recall Breakdown of reciprocity	Communities disrupted/displaced by war

Source: Maxwell and Smith, 1992:16.

FIGURE 2

Proposed Model for Assessing Emergency Response Impact
(Information Needs)

Ability to Cope	**Resource Base/Context/Livelihood Strategies** (Household Vulnerability)				
Shocks	Natural Events	State Policy	Markets	Community	Conflict
Emergency Type	Rapid Onset	Slow Onset	Permanent	Complex	
Consequences	**Stable Rural Population** Transitory Food Insecure Chronic		**Displaced** Camps Host Village Integration		
Response	**Short-Term** Meeting Basic Needs *(Food, Water, Health, Shelter)*		**Short-Term** Meeting Basic Needs *(Food, Water, Health, Shelter)*		
	Long-Term Reestablishing Livelihood Systems Employment-Based Safety Nets		**Long-Term** Human Capital Development *(Training/Education)* Community Capacity Building Conflict Mediation		

Relief - Development Model

(Impact should be at 3 levels)



Activities

Factors to Consider

Short-Term (save lives)
Long-Term (save livelihoods)
Rethink Economies
Redefine Social Roles

Inventory of Shocks;
Their intensity and geographical concentration

Emergency Type: Extent

Ability to Manage Shocks
(livelihood security)

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USAID WORKSHOP HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT WORKSHOP
15-16 JUNE 1995, Washington, D.C.

Barry N. Stein - "POST-EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE"

Post-emergency assistance: For the purposes of this workshop, this term is used to indicate program activity and policy directives focused on post-emergency, or post-disaster assistance. Typically, these programs include: reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation, repatriation, demining, demobilization, reintegration, preparedness, etc.

"Post-Emergency Assistance"

1. I am dealing only with complex political emergencies rather than with natural disasters.

2. The list of complex emergencies provided for the workshop includes Bosnia, Croatia, Burundi, Rwanda, and Angola in the POST category. Have I missed some news reports? Actually, the complexity of these emergencies does not preclude some aspects of those emergencies being in the Post-emergency category.

3. Complex political emergencies are protracted emergencies, repeated emergencies. There may be "false-Posts" as progress is followed by setbacks which prematurely end a post-emergency period. The divide between During and Post is far from clear. Complex emergencies usually involve internal conflict with large scale destruction of infrastructure,

government and institutions. Many leaders and officials are killed or flee.

1- An American political axiom holds that "all politics is local." Parallel to that we may comment that "all aid is local."

1) complex emergencies are marked by an absence of central government control over large areas of the country. There is intermittent conflict, protracted conflict.

2) a major feature is that there may be peace in one valley and war in the next. Some locales and communities may be in the post-emergency while others are during the emergency. In effect the "post-emergency" can occur during the "during."

4. Many countries that are in the "post-emergency assistance" category may not be all that different from their "non-emergency" neighbors with weak states and governments, poor economies, etc. There are numerous groups who are needy including internally displaced persons, returnees, stayees, demobilized soldiers, and other conflict victims.

1- Barbara Harrell-Bond, director of the Oxford Refugee Studies Programme, tells a mid-eighties story regarding Ethiopian refugees in Sudan: a new refugee minister was going to visit refugee camps near the border. The minister's party passed a large group of poor, bedraggled people and the minister expressed great sympathy at how terrible was the plight of the refugees; only to be told "Sir, those were not refugees, they are our own people."

5: Peace agreements are frequently thought of as a signal that the "post-emergency" has begun. However, they are a poor indicator.

1- Peace agreements were successful implemented in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador. Progress has been possible without any peace agreements in Haiti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and South Africa.

2- But implementation of peace agreements failed in Liberia, Rwanda, Angola [at least the first time], Burundi, and Sri Lanka.

1) A major difficulty is the inability of some of the signatories to deliver on their commitments. With weak governments, factionalism, warlords, there is a real difficulty in identifying a party to deal with. In Rwanda, the president was assassinated by his own troops upon his return from a meeting that was part of the peace process. In Liberia, three factions signed an agreement and a few weeks later there were nine factions. The army repudiated Burundi's peace and democratic processes and in Angola and Sri Lanka the signatories changed their minds when events were not going their way.

3- "Peace first" is not a requirement to enter the "post-emergency" phase. It is too ambitious and too slow. The reality is fragile peace and

partial peace and rehabilitation amidst conflict.

1) If we remember that all aid is local, then it is possible to treat all sorts of more peaceful areas, regions, town, valleys, . . . as being in the "post-emergency" even though much of the country is still embroiled in conflict. A response to a localized post-emergency requires a willingness not to be bound by sovereignty, instead to have a willingness to assist whichever party to the conflict controls the post-emergency area without being biased by who controls the seat at the United Nations.

6. The next indicator is a dilemma: human rights and democracy conditionality is a sure sign that donors think the post-emergency has begun. Conditionality is also extremely effective in slowing, reducing and cutting economic assistance. There is a danger that human rights conditionality may be counterproductive in terms of stabilizing the society and protecting vulnerable groups.

7. The points that follow reflect my belief that the POST-emergency stage is very fragile, marked by weak states and governments and weak parties to the conflict. There is a lack of central control over the territory
and over many sectors of life. There is no national development plan and a lack of capacity to implement one if it existed. Thus assistance responses during the POST-emergency need to be local, simple, and reactive. They need to promote economic activity and rehabilitation and not overwhelm simple systems lacking resources. Simple reflects a belief that you cannot design and plan for the many choices open to the people and that coordination and complexity lead to failure. Reactive reflects a belief that it is better to assist the people in what they choose to do rather than to plan the wrong thing and then try to cajole them to fit your design.

8. My research with Fred Cuny was on spontaneous repatriation of refugees. Eventually we came to call it "Refugee Repatriation During Conflict." We found that the great majority of refugees returned on their own, self-repatriation or refugee-induced repatriation, outside of and often prior to a peace agreement, if any. Refugees, like most other war-victims, respond to security and a sense of control over their own lives. If through scouts or travellers or letters or other news they learn that their region, village, hillside is relatively safer, they will consider returning according to
their own criteria of better and safer.

1- Return of a population to a local area is an important indication of improved security and economic prospects, i.e., the "post-emergency." We think the process is that first the internally displaced return to the

area,
and when word reaches the refugee areas, the return of the internally displaced is followed by the refugees. [We were not looking at the internally displaced in our case studies and by the time we noticed the pattern of internally displaced returns followed by refugee repatriation, it was too late to study it carefully.] There are also stayees, spontaneously settled and demobilized in the community. Rehabilitation activities aimed at returnee communities have the potential to promote and support peace, reconciliation, improve the economy, make the people too busy with their own affairs to resume fighting. Returnee populations make demands for aid and services and will attempt to discourage resumed combat in their area.

1) Surveys of camp populations or feeding stations can indicate returns. Ration cards can be collected or bought from those who depart. Reductions in food aid without increases in malnutrition may indicate that returns are occurring.

2) Return movement is a surrogate for security, stability of society, reduced conflict, and political/humanitarian/economic space. People are concerned with security and control over their lives. They are likely to be impatient with a peace process and return program that is too detailed and too slow. They will move away from the security of functioning food aid programs and return to areas of recent conflict and little aid in order to have control over their lives.

9. Credit is also a surrogate for security and revived economic activity. A willingness to take credit and make investments reflects a willingness to take risks, a belief that conditions will allow you to repay. It is important to have credit programs that make small loans, to low-income farmers affected by the conflict, and in low-conflict areas.

10. Demobilization of combatants, collection of weapons, enrollment in training and assistance programs is a sign that leaders have control over their troops and that the soldiers are exhausted enough to stop fighting or have confidence in the peace agreement. Special problems of child soldiers who have been traumatized and desensitized and need counselling and resocialization.

11. The revival of market activity is another surrogate for security and a positive sign of economic recovery. Return to markets, their geographic reach and selection, transportation costs and rehabilitation of economic/transport infrastructure.

12. The functioning of local governments and local NGOs are critical to

the post-emergency period. Again, in the post-emergency period of a complex, protracted emergency the weak national authorities may have little control or legitimacy in many areas. However, in numerous relatively secure localities the potential for post-emergency activities will exist. Local actors will need resources and they will need simple plans that do not rely on the actions, promises, resources of any external parties.

13. Handover is the ability to transfer responsibility for a project or activity to another party--local government or NGOs, international organizations and NGOs. There is the danger that phase out of an activity without a handover will be equivalent to abandonment.

1- However, typically in the post-emergency phase there is no one there to receive the handover. In this phase there is usually a gap, a lack of funds and an absence of mandates. Human rights conditionality, mentioned earlier, may block funding. Many countries that qualify for relief aid, are on sanctions lists that prevent development assistance. Many countries will have to get very far into the post-emergency phase, to a new government after internationally sanctioned elections, before they will formulate a national development plan. At the handover/phase out there is the danger of everything stalling, losing momentum, because no one is willing to assume responsibility for the program. Those agencies that expect and depend on a handover may find themselves hostages to the absence of others.

2- A response to this dilemma of a lack of handover is to design whole and complete projects that do not require a handover and can be phased out as a job completed and well done. Another is to work with local actors and development-oriented international NGOs that are committed to the community and the development process and are not boxed in by administrative and funding categories.

USAID/EL SALVADOR

THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE PEACE AND NATIONAL RECOVERY PROJECT (519-0394):

LESSONS LEARNED

October 1994

17

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PREFACE

USAID/El Salvador has been engaged in the planning for and then implementing of a major post-civil war recovery project since 1991. While the end of the Cold War had a significant impact on reducing the resources available to fuel El Salvador's civil war and on bringing that war to an end, that same end of the Cold War has increased the probability for other small wars around the globe, some of which are already underway. A.I.D. may find that it will want to respond to other post-civil war situations similar to that of El Salvador in 1992.

The purpose of this paper is to present to USAID and other donors USAID/El Salvador's "lessons learned" from experience over the last three years in the design and implementation of a post-civil war project.

This paper is neither meant to be an evaluation nor to describe comprehensively the Peace and National Recovery Project (the relevant Project Paper and Amendment and a January 1994 formal evaluation are available at both USAID/Washington and USAID/El Salvador). The discussion of the Project is to provide context to the "lessons learned."

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and Regional Development
USAID/El Salvador

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ACRONYMS

DTF	Demobilization and Transition Fund
ESAF	El Salvador Armed Forces
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
GOES	Government of El Salvador
HCOLC	Host Country-Owned Local Currency
MEA	Municipalities in Action Program
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NP	National Police
NRP	USAID/El Salvador's Peace and National Recovery Project (519-0394)
PN	National Police
PRN	National Reconstruction Program
SRN	Secretariat for National Reconstruction
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission for El Salvador
USG	United States Government


EL SALVADOR
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30
LEGEND
National Capital
Capital of Department
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
PACIFIC OCEAN
SANTA ANA
CHALATENANGO
AHUA-CHAPAN
SONSONATE
LA LIBERTAD
SAN SALVADOR
CUSCATLAN
CABAÑAS
LA PAZ
SAN VICENTE
SAN MIGUEL
MORAZAN
LA UNIÓN
USULUTÁN
Metapán
Santa Ana
Chalchuapa
Ahuachapán
Sonsonate
Acajutla
San Salvador
Santa Tecla
La Libertad
Chalatenango
Suchitoto
Sensuntepeque
Ilobasco
Cojutepeque
Zacatecoluca
San Vicente
Santiago de María
Berlín
Usulután
San Miguel
Chinameca
San Francisco Gotera
Santa Rosa de Lima
San Alejo
La Unión
Santa Elena

I. PROJECT SETTING

El Salvador is one of Latin America's smallest countries, approximately the size of the State of Massachusetts, with a population of 5.3 million. Throughout El Salvador's history this densely populated, principally agricultural country has experienced social and political conflict, primarily stemming from the large concentrations of land and other wealth held by a small and closed elite. An uprising in 1932 resulted in extremely violent repression wherein the Army executed some 30,000 peasants, executions that continued after the uprising had ended as an effective warning to the peasants. Relative calm would reign for over four decades before the seeds of violent revolution would begin to grow again in earnest.

Army officers ran El Salvador from 1932 to 1980, and their election to the Presidency was seldom free or fair. A reformist non-military candidate for the Presidency was widely believed to have been denied electoral victory in 1977. Because of the accumulation of grievances and a loss of belief that reform could result working through the political system, groups capitalized on the discontent and began guerrilla warfare in 1979. The cycle of violence accelerated as rightist vigilante "death squads" killed thousands. The Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) also engaged in repression and indiscriminate killings.

In late 1979, reform-minded military officers joined with moderate civilian leaders to undertake a peaceful revolution. This led to a free election in March 1982 of deputies to a constituent assembly. The latter drafted the 1983 Constitution which: 1) strengthened individual rights; 2) established some safeguards against excessive provisional detention and unreasonable searches; 3) established a republican, pluralistic form of government; 4) strengthened the legislative branch; and 5) enhanced judicial independence. It also codified labor rights, particularly for agricultural workers.

During this period internal warfare was having a devastating effect on the economy. Between 1978-82 real Gross Domestic Product fell by 22 percent. Over 500,000 persons were displaced from their homes and hundreds of thousands more migrated to other countries. Schools, health facilities and municipal centers were destroyed. Dams, power lines, water supplies and railroads were attacked and damaged by the guerrillas. Over the course of the first four years of fighting, every major bridge in the country was sabotaged. Foreign investors left and some domestic businesses closed their doors. Massive capital flight took place.

Far-reaching reforms were begun in the area of land tenancy. By the mid-1980s almost 287,000 has. of El Salvador's farmland was redistributed to nearly 96,000 tenant farmers, share-croppers, and farm laborers.

The newly initiated reforms, however, did not satisfy the guerrilla movements, which had unified under the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), and the warfare continued. Thus, the FMLN did not participate in the presidential elections of 1984 and 1989 or the municipal and legislative elections of 1985 and 1989. The presidential elections were historic because that of 1984 was the first free and fair election in more than 50 years. The 1989 election was the first in decades in which power passed from one freely elected civilian leader to another.

In spite of these positive historic events, the civil war continued and human rights violations were rampant by both left and right-wing forces. As reported in the *Report of the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador* and other credible reports, there were incidents of political killings, torture of detainees, arbitrary arrest, and forced recruitment by the ESAF. There were also cases of killings, kidnapings, abuse of non-combatants, intimidations of civilians, and forced recruitment by the FMLN. Right-wing death squads took advantage of this chaotic environment to engage in political assassinations. Many individuals acted with virtual impunity; the judicial system was weak, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the bloodshed, and burdened with corruption.

In the period from 1979 until 1992, between 60,000 and 80,000 persons lost their lives as a result of the civil war; between 750,000 and a million persons emigrated to other countries, principally the United States; and the cost of replacing or repairing damaged infrastructure has been estimated at $1.3 billion.

In 1984 the first conversations between the GOES and the insurgents (FMLN) took place, but quickly failed. The next meetings took place in 1987 without significant results due to a wide gap in positions. The GOES argued that problems with free elections, human rights violations, the need for land reform, etc. were things of the past, therefore, hostilities should end. The FMLN argued that the GOES had become a U.S. puppet in the Cold War and that the peace negotiations should include the administration of justice, labor relations, the role of the armed forces in society and additional land reform. In 1989 then President Cristiani announced in favor of negotiations to include these and other agenda items and the negotiations began in earnest.

In early 1990, following a request from the Central American Presidents, the United Nations (UN) became involved in an effort to mediate direct talks between the two sides. An agreement was reached on the subjects of the negotiation in April 1990: a) the role of the armed forces; b) human rights; c) the judicial system; d) the electoral system; e) constitutional reforms; f) social and economic reforms and g) verification by the UN of compliance with the agreement. After numerous meetings, the Chapultepec Accords were signed in January 1992.

In brief, the Accords have the following seven chapters:

I. Armed Forces. Established the legitimate field of armed forces involvement, i.e., national defense, and required a reduction in the number of personnel and a purge of the officer corps.

II. Civilian National Police. Required the substitution of the National Police, which was under the ESAF, by a national civilian police and established minimum requirements for membership.

III. Judicial System. Required an increase in the independence of the judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court, and the establishment of the Office of Advocate for the Defense of Human Rights.

IV. Electoral System. Established a commission to modify the electoral code, which would present proposals to increase the openness and integrity of elections.

V. Economic and Social Subjects. Dealt with land tenure, particularly in the ex-conflictive zones, access to agricultural credit, a social compensation fund, a consumer protection agency, the implementation of a national reconstruction program and the establishment of a forum to reach economic and social agreements.

VI. Participation of the Insurgents in Politics. Legalized the FMLN as a political party.

VII. Ceasefire. Provided a detailed calendar for the reduction or demobilization of the belligerents under UN supervision.

As the peace process began to accelerate in early 1991, GOES President Cristiani designated the Minister of Planning to lead the effort to formulate a postwar recovery strategy. In July 1991 the Minister established, with funding from the UNDP, a National Reconstruction Committee to work with government agencies and private organizations in preparing a National Economic and Social Recovery Plan.

The USAID, which also had begun planning for the postwar period, contributed to the preparation of the GOES recovery plan. First, USAID contracted with Creative Associates International, Inc. to suggest program alternatives for reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian society from the ranks of the military and insurgents. This report included a review of post-conflictive reintegration programs in Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Colombia and the United States, as well as the assimilation of military personnel into the security forces of Panama.

Second, a team of consultants was contracted to assist the GOES to perform an infrastructure restoration/reconstruction assessment for the National Reconstruction Plan, based in part on the 1990 infrastructure damage assessment. Third, the U.S. Military Advisory Group and USAID collaborated on preparing an ex-

combatant assistance strategy to integrate soldiers from both sides back into Salvadoran society. The USAID also sponsored visits of Salvadorans and USAID personnel to Nicaragua and Colombia to observe the experience of these countries with reintegration programs.

The result of the GOES process was the elaboration of the Programa de Reconstrucción Nacional (PRN). A preliminary version of the Plan was completed immediately prior to President Cristiani's talks with the FMLN at the United Nations in September 1991. The Plan was subsequently revised and presented to an informal donors meeting in San Salvador on November 21.

In December 1991, the Central American Business Administration Institute (INCAE), with USAID funding, conducted a series of five inter-sectoral policy dialogue seminars on the PRN with participation by leaders from the business community, the armed forces, labor, government, the religious community, academia, and a cross-section of local and international NGOs. The purpose of the seminars was to inform the participants of the commitment of the GOES to peace and equity, to receive the participants' input, and to foster a national consensus.

The GOES completed the PRN and officially initiated it after the Peace Accords were signed in Mexico on January 16, 1992. The first action under the PRN was taken on January 28th by the Secretaría para la Reconstrucción Nacional (SRN); the SRN had been established by the GOES to coordinate the implementation of the PRN.

The general goal of the PRN was to support the process of peace and national reconciliation by helping to create the necessary conditions to reintegrate socially and economically those most affected by the conflict. The objectives of the PRN were to:

- facilitate the reintegration into civilian and productive life of the ex-combatants and of the population most severely affected by the conflict;
- improve the social, economic and environmental conditions of the areas most severely affected by the conflict;
- reconstruct the basic social and productive infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict; and
- promote the participation of all parts of society in the national reconstruction effort.

The principal components of the PRN, as set forth in the GOES presentation to the March 1992 meeting of a Consultative Group of donors, and the estimated funding requirements for the Program (in $ millions) were as follows:

Social Sector and Human Capital Needs	324.5
Infrastructure	268.1
Productive Sector	137.5
Environment	15.6
Total a/	745.7

a/ Excludes Programs of Technical Assistance and the Strengthening of Democratic Institutions which were presented separately.

The Social Sector and Human Capital Needs category included health and nutrition programs, education, housing and basic sanitation, all targeted to the most vulnerable groups located in the PRN target territory. Specific programs/projects included: 1) rehabilitation of physically disabled citizens; 2) rehabilitation and strengthening of health and education services with an emphasis on pre-school and primary levels; 3) community kindergartens; 4) vocational training and adult education; 5) special education development; 6) basic community infrastructure; 7) housing; 8) registry of the population; and 9) integrated support for returning families.

The Infrastructure component included the reconstruction and rehabilitation of public infrastructure in the following sectors: energy, telecommunications, roads (including rural roads and bridges), water and sanitation, and health and education buildings.

The Productive Sector component included projects to support the economic recovery of PRN target territory such as: 1) land acquisition; 2) productive credit; 3) technical assistance and extension services; 4) rehabilitation and development of small irrigation works; 5) rehabilitation and development of community based aquaculture; and 6) establishment of agro-forestry systems.

The Environment component included six programs: 1) protection and management of natural reserves; 2) establishment of community based nurseries; 3) a pilot reforestation program; 4) soil conservation; 5) flood control; and 6) environmental education and environmental impact analyses.

One final set of comments are needed to understand the Project Setting. When the civil war began in 1979, El Salvador found itself basically friendless due to its notorious human rights record (while the FMLN was able to call upon Cuba and its friends for support). Even many international PVOs rejected involvement in El Salvador for reasons of conscience. In the early 1980s the U.S. Executive Branch was able to convince the U.S. Congress to support El Salvador as the alternative was the collapse of the GOES and a second communist country (Nicaragua then being in Sandinista hands) in Central America. In time, little El Salvador would find that it was receiving very large per capita U.S. economic assistance levels (over $3.1 billion from

1980 through 1991). However, a number of U.S. groups and their friends in the U.S. Congress were uneasy to outright hostile to a USG partnership with the GOES to defeat what they saw as justifiably aggrieved insurgents. This placed the USAID program in El Salvador under a powerful spotlight, one that has dimmed considerably over time but even today shines. Moreover, El Salvador became very dependent financially, psychologically and politically on high levels of U.S. assistance and involvement. When the Peace Accords bill was presented there was a powerful GOES assumption that the U.S. would be very flexible and very generous in supporting GOES and FMLN agreements.

II. Summary Project Description

While negotiations brought an end to the war, many problems would need to be addressed if peace were to endure: security guarantees; social impediments to reintegrating ex-combatants and their families into society; access to land; lingering mistrust of official programs; a dysfunctional justice system; GOES institutional weaknesses; low incomes; lack of employment opportunities; and a deteriorating environment.

Economic reactivation and the renewal of basic social services in the postwar period was expected to be severely hampered by the lack of public infrastructure. Damage and losses to the electrical, roads, telephone, water and school systems occurred both directly through violence and indirectly from power outages, insufficient maintenance and replacement, and normal deterioration. Many repairs had been postponed and expenditures had been especially limited in the conflictive zones. The investment necessary to extend and upgrade the infrastructure had simply not been available. The backlog of reconstruction and new construction needs was enormous --one survey estimated the needs would cost $1.3 billion.

It was considered in the U.S. Government's interest to support a national reconstruction plan that would consolidate the peace negotiation process, help resolve societal unrest, and sow the seeds for future growth with equity within a stronger democracy. During the crisis years of the 1980s, much had been accomplished toward democracy and economic stabilization, but these thin foundations for progress needed to be made permanent by the continued nurturing of institutions of economic and political freedom. El Salvador needed to demonstrate that the expectations of democracy were well founded, and that an elected government, with market-based economic policies, could work for the benefit of all segments of society. If not, desperate people might again resort to violence.

As the peace process began to accelerate in early 1991, the USAID began to explore what it could do to support the national reconstruction program being elaborated by the GOES and the process of national reconciliation and economic stabilization that would need to follow the termination of the conflict.

This led to two actions: a) the pre-positioning of 100 million colones ($13.5 million equivalent at that time) of Host Country Owned Local Currency

(HCOLC) which would be available for immediate disbursement by the GOES upon signature of the Peace Accords; and b) the development of a Project Paper for the Peace and National Recovery (NRP) Project (519-0394).

The Project Agreement called for USAID dollar funding of $166 million, GOES concurrence in the use of HCOLC equivalent to $35 million (from ESF and P.L. 480, Title I generations) and contributions from existing USAID projects of $49 million. Thus, a total contribution of $250 million was anticipated.

The USAID strategy was to provide major support to the PRN, but to do it in such a way as to support the national reconciliation process and the economic stabilization of the country. The Project Goal statement in the NRP Project Paper read: "to support El Salvador's National Reconstruction Plan in consolidating the peace process, helping resolve societal unrest, and sowing the seeds for future growth with equity and strong democracy."

It was assumed that the most essential element would be the re-integration of the conflictive zones -- 115 of El Salvador's 262 municipalities -- into the economy and society and providing employment in those areas. Hence, the purpose statement read: "to promote the economic and social reactivation of the conflictive zones by restoring infrastructure and access to basic services, and assisting the democratic reintegration of their population." Some 63 percent of the $250 million budget was allocated for Social and Economic Reactivation of the Conflictive Zones; an additional 21 percent was allocated to infrastructure, an essential need for re-vitalizing the conflictive areas. The various Components of the NRP were designed to be an integrated whole; Sub-Components supporting other Sub-Components and Components. The integrated whole focus was not maintained, however, due to factors mentioned earlier.

As noted previously, the GOES had established the SRN in February 1992 to coordinate the PRN. The SRN was formed basically from a predecessor organization known as CONARA, which since 1986 had provided funds for small projects to municipalities under the HCOLC-funded Municipalities in Action Program (MEA). From 1986 through 1991 MEA had implemented 13,137 projects with a total cost of approximately $97.5 million equivalent. Although CONARA's origins were counterinsurgency, it had proven very capable not only administratively and technically in the funding of small infrastructure projects, but also at strengthening municipalities and fostering local democratic processes in all but 19 of the 115 municipalities in the conflictive zones where the municipalities could not function. Therefore, a decision was made that the SRN would implement all USG NRP funds except those obligated to the existing USAID projects that also would serve the NRP.

A significant portion of the USAID budget, particularly from the other projects cited in the Project Paper, was devoted to activities that would be of immediate

concern once the Peace Accords were signed; it was assumed that most other donors would not be in a position to respond as quickly to GOES needs for supporting the peace process as would the U.S., and the USAID knew that the GOES could not fund most of the needs without jeopardizing its economic stabilization efforts.

The USAID assumed that some immediate assistance would go to ex-combatants, but that the objective would be to integrate them as quickly as possible into the mainstream of society. Hence, a minimal amount of funds was initially allocated for ex-combatants; it was assumed that they would benefit primarily from the allocation for socio-economic reactivation of the ex-conflictive zones, along with displaced persons, a repatriated population and the inhabitants of the ex-conflictive zones.

Another part of the USAID strategy was to maximize the importance of the USAID contribution to the GOES reconstruction and reconciliation effort in order to set a standard for contributions by other donors. Thus, contributions of nine other USAID projects -- some of which received additional funds -- were included in the write-up for the NRP. Although it was anticipated that other donors could not move as quickly as the USG, it was hoped that they would come forth by 1993 with significant funding, particularly in support of socio-economic reactivation. The USAID contribution for infrastructure included funds for feasibility studies and support to the Directorate General for Reconstruction (DGR) (an organization which had successfully managed reconstruction after the October 1986 earthquake); these allocations were designed to facilitate other donor contributions to the rebuilding of infrastructure.

Approximately one year after the approval of the NRP, the Project Paper was amended to increase the funding by $50 million. This was justified primarily because the contributions of other donors had not been forthcoming as expected. The Project Goal statement did not change in substance but was recast slightly: "to support El Salvador's National Reconstruction Plan in consolidating the peace process, furthering national reconciliation, and sowing the seeds for future growth with equity and a stable democracy."

The USAID's assumption about the quick re-integration of ex-combatants turned out not to be valid. Both the ESAF and the FMLN insisted on controlling the process of providing benefits rather than letting the ex-combatants come forward on an individual basis. In addition, new demands were made on behalf of the ex-combatants; a new category of ex-combatants was added, the National Police, which are being de-mobilized during a 14-month period beginning November 1993; they are being replaced by the new National Civilian Police.

The result of the added emphasis on ex-combatant assistance was a re-writing of the Project Purpose and a revision of the project budget which, inter alia, increased the ex-combatant component by over tenfold. The revised Project Purpose statement

reads: "to support implementation of the Salvadoran Peace Accords and the National Reconstruction Program by assisting the reintegration of ex-combatants, the economic and social reactivation of the formerly conflictive zones, and the democratic reintegration of their population." The willingness of USAID/Washington to approve an additional $50 million for the project coincided with a special appropriation of Demobilization and Transition Funds.

The NRP project was approved by the Mission Director on January 17, 1992 and authorized by the Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean in USAID/Washington on March 25, 1992. The Grant Agreement was signed with the GOES on May 6, 1992. The first dollar-funded Action Plan was approved on August 20, 1992. The first HCOLC-funded Action Plan had been approved January 28th, i.e., NRP activities started within days of the signing of the Peace Accords.

The Project Paper was revised March 8, 1993 to increase the life of project USAID dollar contribution to the NRP project from $166,000 to $191,000, the contribution of HCOLC from $35 million to $48 million and the contribution of other USAID projects from $49 million to $61 million. Thus, the total funds available from the USAID program for assisting the GOES National Reconstruction Program was increased from $250 million to $300 million. Subsequently, the GOES added $9,815,000 equivalent in HCOLC (increasing HCOLC to $57,815,000) to provide additional funds for Land Transfers.

		NRP BUDGET*	
	COMPONENT	Original ($000)	Current ($000)
A.	Immediate Assistance	4,000	5,686
B.	Ex-Combatant Assistance **	8,000	96,703
C.	Social and Economic Reactivation	157,000	121,774
D.	Land Transfers to the General Populace	15,000	20,736
E.	Major Infrastructure Activities	56,000	51,114
F.	Program Audit and Management	10,000	13,802
		250,000	309,815

* A breakdown into the current 39 sub-component line items can be found in Appendix A.

** Includes $39.4 million for land transfers to ex-combatants

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS

The NRP, like most USAID Projects, required time for the USAID and counterpart organizations to organize, establish and/or become familiar with procedures and to begin an acceptable pace of implementation. However, the NRP was not an ordinary project; it would be viewed very much in the manner that projects responding to natural catastrophes are viewed. There were demands that it move quickly in meeting demobilization requirements and the expectations of the ex-combatants, the general population of the ex-conflictive municipalities, and US and El Salvador government and private officials and organizations. Initially, the USAID and the GOES bureaucracies were unable to respond to some of those demands.

The first programs under the NRP were funded by the SRN using HCOLC, which allowed the GOES to begin projects quickly because it had administered local currency over past years and the administrative processes were well established. The SRN approved about $23 million in HCOLC project proposals between February and December of 1992 and disbursed about $21 million for these projects through June 30, 1993.

In September 1992, NRP programs began to be funded with U.S. dollars, which are administered under different rules and procedures than the HCOLC; this slowed program implementation. Through June 30, 1993, the first 10 months of this phase, the SRN had planned to disburse about $18 million of the $75 million available but disbursed only about $11 million.

The implementation of the initial programs to be funded with U.S. dollars was delayed because AID was unable to disburse funds to the Salvadoran Government until it met certain administrative requirements. These requirements were not met until September 1992, four months after the Project Agreement was signed. Even after the requirements were met, additional delays occurred. Administrative processes within the Salvadoran Government delayed the first two AID disbursements from reaching the SRN by two months as Salvadoran procedures required several government agencies to review and approve the transfer of funds among government organizations.

Organizations receiving funds from the GOES are required to report on how funds previously received were spent before receiving additional funds, with the Salvadoran Government's audit agency reviewing and approving the report. However, the audit agency can disallow the entire report if any one expenditure is questioned, returning the report to the submitting organization for resolution and thereby delaying further disbursements for the organization's project. For example, early in project implementation the Salvadoran audit agency rejected approximately $1.7 million in expenditure reports submitted by three nongovernment organizations (NGOs) administering projects under the NRP even though only a small portion of each report

was being questioned. As a result, additional funding for the organizations' activities was delayed for several months.

Misunderstandings about AID regulations and processes also contributed to disbursement delays. For example, the SRN mistakenly believed that under AID rules it could not submit expenditure reports to AID until at least 70 percent of the funds already received had been spent. AID rules do not prescribe a percentage of expenditures that must be reported but encourage monthly reports of expenditures to facilitate disbursements.

The USAID, therefore, had to take action to address problems that impeded program implementation. Its staff worked with the GOES to improve administrative processes and clear misunderstandings of AID rules. The third transfer of AID funds in April 1993 was reviewed by GOES agencies and passed to the SRN in 13 days. In a June 1993 letter to the SRN, AID modified and amplified the procedures to disburse funds and report expenditures and required the SRN to process expenditure reports within 15 days so that the replenishment of advances was not delayed. The GOES also adopted a standard disallowance system so that entire expenditure reports were not rejected because of minor disallowances.

While the USAID officials underestimated the potential for administrative problems and technical difficulties that initially impeded the implementation of the NRP, competing demands for their time and resources were the biggest reason they could not respond immediately when problems surfaced. For the first year following the signing of the peace agreement, many of AID's efforts were directed towards resolving immediate crises and contentious issues arising from the ambiguities of the peace agreement. Furthermore, establishing new organizational structures within AID and the GOES to support the programs, as well as reviewing, approving, and monitoring initial projects funded with local currency, required considerable time and resources.

Another problem that impeded getting the NRP off the ground as quickly as planned was that USAID had assumed that its approval and monitoring responsibilities for the activities of the NRP could be handled primarily by its technical offices (Agriculture, Health, Education and Training, Private Enterprise, Infrastructure and Regional Development) with a small coordination unit. This assumption, however, turned out not to be valid. All of these offices had large portfolios of ongoing projects and could not devote the enormous amount of time that the NRP was demanding without neglecting those portfolios. By the end of 1992 it was clear that USAID collectively was not on top of the NRP and the National Reconstruction Division of the Office of Infrastructure and Regional Development was staffed up to deal with: a) the increasing number of activities to be approved; b) a backlog in monitoring activities in the field; and c) the need for better data on project progress. Given USAID recruitment procedures (position descriptions, pre-contract documents, competitive selection and contracts) this process took about six months, i.e., until mid 1993.

Although the Immediate Assistance Component and the MEA Subcomponent got off to quick starts, which were critical to "nailing down" the peace by showing positive GOES action and by providing the logistics required to demobilize the FMLN, very contentious issues quickly arose concerning the Ex-Combatant Assistance Component. The FMLN had not been included in any of the discussions leading up to the Project. It now made itself heard in both El Salvador and the U.S., in effect insisting that the Ex-Combatant Component become a much larger part of the NRP and that the ex-combatants be dealt with through the FMLN -- the ESAF would also make this demand. The over tenfold increase in the Ex-Combatant Assistance Component that resulted, along with a de facto requirement placed on the USAID and SRN that this Component receive priority treatment, divided the NRP into three implementation phases: Immediate Assistance, Ex-combatant Assistance and Social and Economic Reactivation, in that order, but with some overlap. The Land Transfers to the General Populace and Major Infrastructure Components, and the scholarships and land transfers under the Ex-Combatant Assistance Component, are outside of these implementation phases because they require so much time.

Win-lose style negotiations between the FMLN and the GOES, with the USAID and/or the UN also involved, would delay movements toward reconciliation on the part of the FMLN and GOES. It also affected the USAID's relationship with the SRN, to which USAID had delivered the management authority for the NRP. In effect, USAID/Washington, which had approved the Project Paper, now demanded certain actions which would require USAID/El Salvador to ignore some of the project management provisions of the Grant Agreement over the objections of the SRN. This subject will be discussed later in this paper; however, it requires mention here because it had an overarching effect on the entire implementation process during the first year of the NRP -- significantly delaying project implementation and reducing the quality of certain interventions.

The USAID entered into the GOES National Reconstruction Program as one of many donors to the reconstruction effort, albeit the largest, providing over 25% of the total pledged. The USAID expected that other donors --primarily the Inter-American Development Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the European Economic Community, Japan and Germany -- would be slower than the USAID in providing resources. In the event, the other donors were slower and they were restrictive in the use of their funds, e.g., funds totaling about $670 million are being provided only for roads or bridges or to be implemented by specific GOES ministries or NGOs, and critical Peace Accord activities such as public safety and land transfers generally have not received the level of other-donor attention desired. In fact, only the USG has provided a significant amount of funds to the SRN. This has meant that every time a new demand was placed on the SRN, USAID was asked funds for and NRP reprogramming. It would be difficult to exaggerate the work, e.g., meetings and preparation of documents, that this situation caused during the first year of the NRP or, in the opinion of some, the damage that satisfying these demands did to the

mutually reinforcing Components and Sub-Components of the original NRP design. Without question, these changes significantly slowed NRP implementation.

The following comments are divided into the NRP's six components.

1. Component A -- Immediate Assistance to the Zones Affected by the Conflict

Sub-Components	Life of Project Funding ($000) Original	Oct. '94
1. Land Mine Awareness Campaign	500	-0-
2. Food Distribution	500	47
3. Health Services	400	-0-
4. PVO Support	1,000	1,884
5. Socio-Demographic Studies	100	14
6. Documentation Certification	250	1,241
7. SRN Administrative Costs	700	1,000
8. UN Humanitarian Assistance *	-0-	500
9. UN Truth Commission **	-0-	1,000
10. Contingencies	550	-0-
Total	4,000	5,686

* Assistance for sustenance provided to FMLN combatants during the demobilization process and while they were in special encampments.

** The Commission produced a report on many of the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict.

All of the above now completed activities were funded under existing USAID/El Salvador projects or HCOLC, with the exception of the UN Humanitarian Assistance and Truth Commission activities (not originally included in the NRP) which were funded under the NRP, but by Grant Agreements entered into by USAID/Washington. Therefore, this component moved quickly and is generally recognized to have moved very satisfactorily (with the exception of the socio-demographic studies which were intended to provide information that would be useful for activity design, targeting, monitoring and evaluation. The results were not useful for that purpose). The Land Mine Awareness Campaign was dropped from the NRP when UNICEF funded it with other resources.

In general, this Component allowed NGOs, the GOES, UN and USAID to provide quickly i) food, health care, temporary shelter and other requirements for demobilizing FMLN ex-combatants and, in the case of health care, residents of the ex-conflictive zones; ii) support to the SRN in its new role; and iii) assistance in the documenting of ex-combatants and others in the ex-conflictive zones. This last requirement was especially important as many ex-conflictive zone residents had lost or never received their *cedulas,* (national identity cards issued by municipalities which are required for voting, obtaining a passport and accessing GOES services) during the conflict. Moreover, many municipal buildings had been destroyed by the insurgents which required reconstructing records. Some 260,000 *cedulas* were issued (371% of the originally estimated target).

2. Component B -- Ex-Combatant Assistance

Sub-Components	Life of Project Funding ($000) Original	Oct.'94
1. Social and Economic Re-integration Counseling	500	7,536 **
2. Local University Scholarships	7,500	9,155
3. Land Transfers *	-0-	39,351
4. Demobilization Packages *	-0-	6,816
5. Vocational Technical Training *	-0-	11,811
6. Agricultural Credit *	-0-	9,884
7. Micro-Enterprise Credit *	-0-	7,071
8. War-Wounded Assistance *	-0-	5,079
Total	8,000	96,703

* The Original Life of Project Budget made provision for this assistance to ex-combatants, but under the Social and Economic Reactivation Component, along with the civilian populace. War-Wounded Assistance for ex-combatants and Land Transfers for ex-combatants are discussed along with related activities in Components C and D, respectively, which follow.

** This figure is misleading as only $908,000 is for the counseling of ESAF and NP ex-combatants. The remaining $6,628,000 is for scholarships, vocational training, and agricultural and microenterprise credit for the NP. Because one NGO is handling the entire sub-component under one Agreement, the accounting is aggregated.

The USAID strategy for ex-combatants, which was reflected in the NRP Project Paper design and Grant Agreement, called for dealing with ex-combatants on an individual basis by giving them counseling and providing scholarships to a local

university for up to five years to ESAF and FMLN officers who could qualify for university acceptance. (Over 1,000 FMLN ex-combatants currently are enrolled in local high schools, technical schools or universities, more than two-thirds of whom are funded by the NRP.) Inter alia, the counseling was to advise the ex-combatants of the various benefits that they could access under Component C (see following section) which would be available to the general population of the ex-conflictive zones. The reasons for dealing with the ex-combatants in this manner were to accelerate their reintegration into the general population, to avoid the predictable resentment of assistance dedicated to ex-combatants on the part of the general population, which also had suffered during the conflict, and to impact in an equitable manner on the larger target group of poor peasants. This strategy -- based upon the assumption that design decisions would be driven primarily by technical developmental factors rather than political considerations -- collapsed almost immediately when it was rejected by the FMLN.

The Peace Accords required that the GOES provide the PRN to the FMLN within 30 days of the signature of the Accords. Although the FMLN would publicly accept the PRN at a donor's conference, in order not to block expected large pledges of assistance, it rejected the idea that it would not control assistance to it's constituency and that this assistance would not be delivered through NGOs sympathetic to the FMLN. On the other hand, the GOES was not happy at having to deal with a group which only very recently had concluded a 12-year period of armed insurrection. Moreover, the FMLN was now a political party gearing up for the March 1994 general elections which further heightened feelings. And the FMLN did not like dealing with the GOES in general or the SRN in particular, which was the outgrowth of a counterinsurgency institution (CONARA). The political agendas of both the FMLN and the GOES would hang over the NRP for two years, i.e., until the elections in March of 1994.

The FMLN proved especially successful at lobbying in the U.S. and the USAID was pressed to deal directly and often separately with the FMLN, which was contrary to the USAID policy of encouraging the FMLN to deal with the GOES in order to promote reconciliation. Moreover, the FMLN became adept at playing the GOES off against the USAID, e.g., telling the SRN that "the USAID has already approved our position." The GOES reacted predictably and relations between the USAID and the SRN, which had been excellent, deteriorated sharply. Fortunately, over time the situation cooled down and the relationship returned to its former excellent status. However, Action Plans had to be developed for 24 separate activities in order to implement this Component. (See Annex C for an annotated list of "NRP Activities Dedicated to Ex-Combatants.") And activity design was made even more difficult when the FMLN initially refused to deliver a list of its beneficiaries and permanently rejected counseling, claiming fears for the safety of its sympathizers if the GOES knew

their names. In time, as the FMLN developed confidence in the GOES and USAID, it would begin to develop lists and amended lists, each of which would increase the numbers of FMLN determined and UN sanctioned "eligible beneficiaries."

An issue which has plagued the NRP's acceptability to the FMLN and its supporters in the U.S. has been the role that FMLN NGOs (or NGOs sympathetic to the FMLN) would play in the NRP. During the long conflict a number of informal NGOs came into being which assisted the areas of insurgent influence with donations from foreign groups. Many of these had (and have) political agendas. These NGOs had never dealt either with the GOES or USAID. Institutionally they were weak, i.e., in their ability to develop, manage and evaluate projects and to maintain project accounting acceptable to donors such as USAID. The NRP was not intended to be an institutional strengthening project. The USAID had expected significant involvement in the NRP of a number of U.S. and local NGOs which it had developed during the 1980s and which would not need strengthening. However, the USAID found that the pressures to utilize these NGOs required both institutional development interventions and special arrangements such as U.S. umbrella PVOs, e.g., Catholic Relief Services, which have worked with and through 43 FMLN related NGOs. (A matter of concern is whether in a couple of years there will be a sufficient flow of donor funds into El Salvador to allow these NGOs to survive.)

What the FMLN demanded, the ESAF also demanded and received, with the exception of household starter packages and training and productive credit for political officers (urban FMLN non-combatants). The FMLN made demands for these benefits non-negotiable. A major distinction between these two organizations was that while neither had previously been seriously involved in development, the FMLN got seriously interested in what did and did not happen. On the other hand, the ESAF made demands, but institutionally did not establish effective mechanisms or procedures to support what it obtained, e.g., the ESAF accepted counseling, but the actions or lack thereof (e.g., abruptly demobilizing 15,000 troops with insufficient lead-time for counseling) made offering the counseling very difficult. Both organizations, unfortunately, often tended to name people for training courses without consulting the trainees. In most of the programs, the FMLN decided which of its personnel would be able to participate. The FMLN wanted to be able to provide something like mustering out pay, but such was not permitted under the terms of the USAID Project Agreement. Therefore, the FMLN insisted that their personnel participate in all kinds of training programs, because they would be guaranteed some income (living expenses) for at least four to six months, depending on the program. As a result, some of the ex-combatant training has not been as effective as it might have been when measured by graduates employed in the area in which they were trained -- 25% of the FMLN and 19% of the ESAF as of May 1994.

In 1993, the USAID took on the task of assisting in the demobilization of the National Police, which are being treated as ex-combatants. They are eligible for counseling, scholarships, training, credit and agricultural tool starter kits.

In late 1993 when the USAID evaluated this Component it found that although about 30 percent of the FMLN eligible beneficiaries were women, a significant percentage of them were not benefitting from the NRP due to child rearing responsibilities. The special needs of women had been overlooked in the rush to redesign Component B.

All activities under this Component are now completed or underway, allowing the USAID and the SRN to increase their attention to Components C, D and E which follow.

3. Component C -- Social and Economic Reactivation

Sub-Components	Life of Project Funding ($000) Original	Oct.'94
1. MEA	82,500	53,793
2. Equipping and Supplying Health Posts	8,000	5,000
3. Vaccinations	200	-0-
4. War-wounded	11;600	3,794
5. School Supplies, Equipment and Furniture	7,000	4,250
6. Hiring Teachers	1,200	420
7. PVO Support for Social Services	4,000	15,532
8. Micro-Enterprise Credit and T.A.	11,000	16,220
9. Agricultural Credit and T.A.	15,000	13,384
10. Support for Investment and Promotion	500	-0-
11. Agricultural/Household Starter Packages	2,000	-0-
12. Vocational/Technical Training	14,000	9,382
Total	157,000	121,774

This Component was to have received 52% of NRP funding. It will now receive 39%. However, some of the war-wounded, training and credit activities, and the entire Agricultural/Household Starter Packages activity that this Component was to have funded have been funded under the Ex-Combatant Assistance Component. The major loser in the budget battle that has diverted funds to ex-combatant and land transfer activities has been MEA, which has been reduced from $82.5 million to $53.8 million in order to meet these other demands. This has been unfortunate as the felt needs of the population of the ex-conflictive zone place very high priority on infrastructure improvements, especially roads, school-rooms and electrification projects. MEA also provides support to decentralization of government and to local reconciliation through

local government processes; e.g., MEA projects are identified in open town meetings by the general population and citizen groups of a municipality, who also get to question the municipal council on the prioritization of projects selected. Members of the community where projects are located are full members of the committee that selects and monitors the contractor who constructs the project, with locally hired labor. Nevertheless, MEA has completed 2,116 NRP small, basic infrastructure projects in the formerly conflictive zones since early 1992.

Here, as in Component C, an emphasis has been placed on using NGOs; a total of 122 NGOs have participated in NRP activities -- credit, training, infrastructure, war-wounded rehabilitation, etc. -- under all Components. Of the $300 million in project funded activities, slightly more than $100 million -- one third -- is being implemented, or is scheduled to be implemented, by NGOs. Clearly, dealing with this number of NGOs has been a challenge for both the SRN and USAID/El Salvador.

While the requirements of most of the activities in this Component, e.g., equipping health posts and schoolrooms, providing agricultural credit, etc. are well known to most USAID foreign service and other donor personnel, special mention should be made of war-wounded activities. Fortunately, these activities are less well known to most development practitioners. They will be requirements, however, of a post-war recovery effort.

Land mines are so cheap that they are used in great numbers by both sides in a long conflict. Of course, land mines can not distinguish between belligerents and the civilians, so both will be injured -- 75% of the civilian physically war-wounded were injured by land mines. Treating land mine victims probably will be a greater requirement than treating victims of other weapons. And there also will be civilian and ex-combatant victims of post-war traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) (psychosis, and acute and severe depression). The number of civil-war disabled Salvadorans (civilian and ex-combatant) exceeds 12,000. The PTSD affected population may exceed one million.

As early as 1986 the USG began to assist El Salvador to develop GOES (civilian and military) and private institutions to deal with the war-wounded. The institution building required was not easy and it took time. Fortunately, when the NRP arrived the USAID had experience in this area and there were institutions that the USAID could assist. ESAF war-wounded have been helped by the provision of raw materials for prosthetic and orthotic devices to an ESAF facility and by access to vocational training and assistance in seeking credit. The FMLN war-wounded have been helped by USAID funding of a) Ministry of Health surgical procedures and b) a large NGO that assists all disabled, including civilian war-wounded, and has facilities throughout the country. A separate NGO is working on PTSD with USAID funds.

Nevertheless, considerable USAID effort was necessary to gain the confidence of FMLN sympathizers in these institutions and, to some extent, in getting the institutions interested in dealing with the ex-insurgents. Interinstitutional cooperation also had been a problem. Developing a civilian war-wounded strategy acceptable to the local institutions, SRN and USAID took almost two years. The NRP war-wounded activities are now moving well. However, a lot of work was needed to get them to this point.

Overall outputs for this Component are in line with or ahead of the 50% percent of the elapsed Life of Project. (See Annex B for output information on this and other Components.)

4. Component D -- Land Transfers to the General Populace

	Life of Project Funding ($000)	
Sub-Components	Original	Oct.'94
1. Credit for Land Purchases	13,500	(not broken
2. Surveys and Administrative Salaries and Supplies	1,500	down)
Total	15,000	20,736

This discussion also covers the Ex-Combatant Assistance Land Transfer Sub-Component, which has an additional $39.4 million in Life of Project funding. In total, the amount of funds programmed for land transfers has risen from $15 million to over $60 million, which has the effect of reducing funds for other NRP objectives.

Land transfers, either on land where FMLN sympathizers were squatting or other purchased land was an important part of the Peace Accords. The GOES promised to finance land for squatters or relocate the occupants if landowners refused to sell. The FMLN promised to provide an inventory of lands its supporters claimed within 20 days of the signature of the Accords. In turn, the GOES promised to legalize the status of these lands within six months, including the provision of titles. Both of these timeframes were wildly optimistic. For example, previous Salvadoran experience with agrarian reform in the 1980s indicated that the process took 18 months when the beneficiary was known and if everything went smoothly -- which it rarely did.

The Project Paper talked of an estimated 8,000 squatters who might want land. In early 1992 the UN brokered an agreement wherein 22,500 ex-combatants (7,500 FMLN and 15,000 ESAF) and 25,000 squatters were the target. The UN agreement also called for land to be transferred to approximately 19,400 recipients by April 30, 1993, with transfers in process for the remaining recipients. However, as of that date only 4,589 recipients had received land. And by September 30, 1994 that number had only climbed to 13,516, 38% of the current Life of Project target (or estimate) of 36,000 beneficiaries.

A recently completed survey indicates that 53% of all arable land which has been transferred (11,251 has. out of a total of 21,166 has.) is currently in production, complemented by another 19,509 has. in pasture currently ranging more than 23,000 head of cattle. Of all beneficiaries who have recived land, 64% are currently working it. This is a significant increase over the 1993 survey figure of only 25%; however, there is concern that some recipients have taken advantage of a benefit and do not plan to seriously farm their land. A total of 43,121 has. have been transferred (41,510 under the NRP).

The process of verifying eligible recipients was very difficult for the FMLN, which agreed in September 1993 to a nationwide GOES campaign using newspaper notices. Even where the beneficiaries have been identified technical and procedural problems have delayed the process. Recently a new strategy for facilitating land transfer was adopted, by which beneficiaries are issued certificates worth up to ¢30,000 (approximately $3,480) from the Land Bank. These certificates can be used to negotiate land purchases. The Land Bank is available to assist the beneficiaries in negotiations and in the use of the certificates. While this new system has reduced delays in processing land transfers, a number of problems still remain in the following areas: locating the owners of some of the properties requested, liens on or disputes over titles, surveying difficulties, overly centralized decision making in GOES institutions and even getting the beneficiaries to property closing meetings. Government bureaucracies -- especially those in developing countries -- often move slowly. El Salvador's land transfer bureaucracies have not been an exception. Still, given the experience that El Salvador should have gained in land transfers during the 1980s, the GOES' performance in the NRP has been disheartening.

One final set of comments on land transfers. Simply placing beneficiaries on his or her land is not enough. They need shelter and a safe water supply immediately. Few have ever owned farms; generally they are not skilled farmers. They need technical assistance on how to grow crops and/or raise livestock and on farm management. They need credit for inputs. And the timing of the technical assistance and credit opportunities must relate to the growing season or it may be lost. In addition, the beneficiaries and their neighbors probably will require improvements on neglected farm-to-market roads. Provision has been made for these interventions in other NRP Components; albeit, in some cases belatedly.

5. Component E -- Major Infrastructure

Sub-Components	Life of Project Funding ($000) Original	Oct. '94
1. Feasibility Studies	10,000	4,238
2. Technical Assistance to the DGR	7,000	697
3. Emergency Repairs	10,000	-0-
4. Infrastructure Reconstruction and Repairs	29,000	46,179
Total	56,000	51,114

This Component has suffered from both non-valid assumptions and, initially, from neglect. The first assumption to fall was a need for a special fund for emergency repairs. In fact, the USAID for a decade had met (and would continue to meet) nationwide emergency major infrastructure needs from an existing war-related project, i.e., this sub-component was not needed in the NRP. The second assumption to fall was that the SRN and the DGR would be able to cooperate successfully and that other donors would seek their services in the design and implementation of infrastructure projects. The SRN insisted that DGR personnel be seconded; the DGR insisted on money and responsibility. Moreover, other donors showed no interest in either the SRN or the DGR. This sub-component was terminated. The third assumption to fall was that the GOES and other donors would want feasibility study funds to develop major infrastructure projects. To the extent that a need for such funds developed, other donors covered the costs, with the exception of an Intermodal Transportation Study which the USAID is funding at the request of the GOES and the Inter-American Development Bank. However, funds have been set aside recently to expand industrial production in the ex-conflictive zones through technical assistance and infrastructure improvements.

A significant amount of Existing Project dollars and HCOLC have been committed and disbursed for Major Infrastructure Reconstruction and Repairs, primarily potable water, rural roads and rural electrification. However, the ESF/DTF funded Infrastructure Restoration and Reconstruction sub-component activities languished as program managers focused elsewhere until mid-1994 when these funds began to move slowly for the Intermodal Transportation Study, shelter and latrines, rural electrification and flood control. A major project activity to rehabilitate or construct farm-to market access roads -- with a focus on newly transferred land parcels -- will begin after the rainy season that ends in November 1994.

6. Component F -- Program Audit and Management

Sub-Components	Life of Project Funding ($000) Original	Oct. '94
1. Audit	(not	2,274
2. Management	broken	6,335
3. SRN Administrative Costs	down)	5,193
Total	10,000	13,802

This Component was provided to finance: 1) contracts for personal services to support the National Reconstruction Division of the Office of Infrastructure and Regional Development (IRD) of USAID/El Salvador; 2) evaluations; 3) concurrent and post audits, pre-award surveys, technical assistance and other financial management activities; 4) short-term technical assistance and special studies to deal with issues of a technical, management, administrative or a policy nature; and 5) specialized support for the SRN and other GOES units.

The HCOLC for SRN Administrative Costs were added at the request of the GOES, which has yet to provide sufficient ordinary budget or other non-USG resources to support the SRN, which is needed to continue NRP implementation. The management costs rose when additional staff were added for the National Reconstruction Division of IRD. The audit costs rose as the number of administratively weak NGOs and/or NGOs which had no experience with USAID were added.

Concluding Comments on Implementation and Status

As of September 30, 1994, the accrued expenditures for the NRP totaled $165.6 million, or 53% of the total Life of Project (LOP) Budget; and a total of $218.6 million, or 71% of the Budget, had been committed. Moreover, a total of 72 Action Plans have been developed by the implementing agencies and approved by the GOES and USAID, and three major implementation agreements entered into by USAID/El Salvador with U.S. NGOs. The breakdown by funding source of accrued expenditures is as follows:

	Amount ($000)	Percent of LOP Budget Expended
ESF/DTF	87,426	46
HCOLC	40,695	70
Existing Projects	37,474	61

The USAID was forced to be more accommodating and flexible than was desirable from a purely developmental standpoint in redesigning and implementing the NRP. As a result, some of its activities have not been as effective as they might have been. And a few -- primarily related to land transfers -- are well behind schedule. There has been a trade-off between peace and recovery. However, the peace has held, free and fair elections have been held and respected, and reconstruction and reconciliation have taken hold, to which the NRP has made a critical contribution. Not a bad bottom line.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND RECOVERY PROJECTS

1. USAID Management and Staff Should Receive Special Training by an Expert in Conflict Resolution/Consensus Building Prior to Design of the Project.

A USAID probably will be faced with project counterparts and beneficiaries holding deep-seated emotions, and mutual distrust and animosities towards each other -- and perhaps toward the USAID if it is identified with one side of the conflict -- due to their recent belligerent status. And there may be a number of political agendas being pushed. There must be strong consideration of the political dimension of the project and a good understanding of the political forces at play.

This is far beyond the normal situations in which a USAID attempts to build consensus among a project's stakeholders. Reducing the conflicts and reaching consensus will be a tough job, one for which good preparation is needed. Success will not only result in a better project and faster implementation, but also serve the peace process.

2. The USAID's Project Itself Should Contain Activities and/or Processes for Promoting Reconciliation and Consensus.

As soon as possible the training recommended in 1 above should be given to host government personnel and the representatives of the insurgents who will deal with project design and implementation.

The expert brought in for 1. above or other qualified persons should be tasked with designing project interventions and/or processes for promoting reconciliation and consensus among the belligerants, host government personnel and donors. Consideration should be given to the origins of the conflict and to ways to strengthen a participatory civil society. Perhaps this would include governmental decentralization, including strengthening local governments and citizen groups.

One general design (see 3. below) and implementation principle should be that meetings are tripartite i.e., both belligerent sides -- depending on the situation in a country, one side may be both the government and its military -- and the USAID. They should be participatory and problem-solving in nature with the objective of reaching win-win situations. The USAID should make every effort to be -- and to be seen as -- an honest broker interested only in efficient and effective interventions.

3. Representatives of Beneficiaries Should Participate to the Maximum Extent Feasible in the Design and Implementation of Programs Designed for Their Benefit.

This, of course, is a cardinal rule for all assistance projects (albeit, in the past, often honored in the breach). It strengthens the feeling of ownership of, and interest in, the project on the part of the beneficiaries. It also helps to avoid false expectations, misunderstandings and rejection of what the donor plans to do. And it saves the time that may be needed to redesign a project to make it acceptable to the beneficiaries and/or the implementing institutions. As a USAID may find that meeting with insurgents before the signing of a peace agreement is impossible, there may be a need for two stages in the design process. The first stage would begin as soon as the need for the project is determined and would design the obvious and non-controversial humanitarian, infrastructure and government service requirements which would be needed immediately after the cessation of hostilities, and prepare a rough draft of a design for the remainder of the project. The second stage would begin as soon as the insurgents could be included in the design process.

The USAID should make a strong effort not to deliver a surprise package of assistance. If visits are made to countries which have implemented post-war recovery projects, representatives of the ex-belligerents should be included. (This may require a second round of visits if visits were made prior to the period when the insurgents could be included.) The input of the ex-combatants should be involved in the project design process, including disclosure of the number of ex-combatants which will be requesting assistance, broken down by types of assistance. After full exploration of what is acceptable to the ex-belligerents, the USAID may have to compromise from that which it sees as the best design choice.

Special ex-combatant assistance is not recommended, but if it is required then the representatives of the ex-belligerents should be required to present a registry of the ex-combatants during the design stage. This is to avoid the capricious addition of "eligible ex-combatants" over time, to prevent ex-combatants from trying to access the same benefits more than once and to assist in determining if the target group is being reached. Also, the USAID should insist on a counseling activity to help avoid providing benefits which do not meet the interest of beneficiaries.

One possibility is that a respected neutral party, perhaps the UN, could convoke a general meeting of donors, the host government and the ex-belligerents at which the plans of the donors are discussed, including their possibilities and limitations, and the expected logistical and procedural problems. Separate meetings for the donors that plan to make major contributions to complex projects should follow the general meeting.

4. There will be Pressures to Respond to Every Need, In a Very Large Universe of Needs. This Should be Avoided.

Limited management capabilities and limited funds will reduce the quality of interventions if the USAID allows itself to get into too many areas or works with too many implementing institutions. In the design process a strong attempt should be made to set a) priorities, *inter alia,* based upon what the USAID knows it can do well, b) the parameters of the USAID Program and c) terminal dates for applying for benefits under the several activities. Open-ended timeframes for activities become a drag on program implementors and tie up funds needed elsewhere.

5. A USAID Must Have Access to Resources for at Least Humanitarian Activities Almost Immediately After the Cessation of Hostilities.

These resources may be new USAID dollars, reprogrammed funds from existing projects, HCOLC, PL-480 Title II commodities or a combination of the preceeding. The requirements will be placed upon the mission quickly and it will be expected to respond. The source(s) of the resources should provide the flexibility required to respond to a variety of needs. If USAID is looked to as the major donor by the USG, the host government and/or the UN, it may come under pressure to fill gaps if other donors move slowly. Whatever USAID's role, USAID/Washington needs to be ready and able to respond rapidly to requests for flexible procurement procedures and to grant waivers as necessary and appropriate to avoid critical delays in implementation.

6. Adding Funds to Existing Projects which can Add Components to Meet Requirements and/or Utilizing Available HCOLC can be Very Effective Ways to Assure a Fast Start-Up of Implementation.

Normally the existing projects will have established management teams and processes which can be utilized. However, the office(s) managing the existing project(s) must understand the priority attached to the new component by mission management and be required by it to act accordingly. In some countries the procedures for utilizing HCOLC also may be established. Even if not all interventions can be handled with existing projects and HCOLC, specific activities or activity starts could be handled this way. Fast activity starts probably will be required.

7. The USAID should Maintain Implementation Flexibility.

The USAID should not lock itself into an implementation construct under which it does not have the ability to respond to USG instructions or its own best judgement without creating the ill will of it's counterpart institutions. The probability is strong that in this type of project USAID will decide that certain interventions or implementation arrangements are needed that may not be viewed positively by the host government for the use of funds which it believes it controls. Therefore, the USAID should

maintain some funds under its control either by obligating them directly to contractors or PVOs as funds are needed and available, or by setting aside some funds in the Project Agreement for direct USAID implementation.

8. The USAID should Adopt an Organizational Structure that will be Effective in the Management and Implementation of a Multisectoral Project.

Differences in the size and nature of projects that may be developed and the organization and staffing of missions preclude a hard and fast rule. Perhaps mission management will be able to provide overall project management with the various project sectors farmed out to existing mission technical offices. Perhaps a single existing or new office should manage the project. Perhaps a mixture is indicated. However it is done, overall and specific responsibilities and related authority should be clearly assigned; and any additional staff required should be recruited as quickly as possible. The implementing unit(s) should not be allowed to view the project's components as isolated interventions but rather as parts of a larger and mutually reinforcing effort. There will be a need for extensive communications between technical offices and between technical offices and Mission management as problems develop and priorities arise. Mission management should keep the structure and staffing under review to ensure that they are effective responses to the requirements. If not, historical and traditional approaches may have to be replaced with a more functional and responsive construct.

9. If There is Unusual Interest in the US -- The Congress, Special Interest Groups, the State Department, USAID/Washington -- in the USAID's Peace and Recovery Project, then a Sophisticated Project Data Base, Management Information System and Related Staff may be Needed to Respond -- Quickly and without Undue Disruption to Implementation -- to a Continuing and Large Number of Inquiries about the Project.

For purposes of project monitoring and evaluation, the USAID may determine that a large multisectoral project will require a sophisticated data base and MIS even if there is not unusual U.S. based interest.

10. An Assumption should Not be Made that Because an Institution Has Worked Well with USAID in a Previous Project that It will Work Well Initially -- or At All -- in a Different Type of Project.

The USAID should be careful to ensure that host government institutions and NGOs under consideration for an implementation role understand and support the objectives and design of the post-conflict project. If they do, the USAID should also make sure that they have the capability of implementing the project in what assuredly will be a period of considerable stress and pressure. If necessary, institutional

strengthening activities and training, which may include the documentation, procedures and other requirements of the USAID and/or host government, should be scheduled as soon as possible. Adaptations in USAID and/or host government procedures may be required in order to facilitate implementation.

11. War-Wounded Activities Normally will be a Requirement.

If the USAID does not have considerable experience in dealing with the very highly specialized activities (surgery, prosthetic and orthotic devices, integrated functional rehabilitation services and post-war traumatic stress disorders) that will be needed, an immediate requirement will be technical assistance to survey the magnitude of the problem, identify existing and needed institutional capabilities (including facilities located near the victims), determine institutions willing and able to cooperate in the activities and to design a strategy for the activities. A qualified, full-time mission advisor probably will be needed during activity design and implementation.

12. Many Ex-Combatants will have No Immediate Source of Income. Either the Host Government or a Donor(s) will have to Make Provisions to Support the Ex-Combatants, e.g., While They are in Training, Until the First Harvest or for a Set Period.

The willingness to provide a cash payment (conditioned on attendance in mustering out counseling) to ex-combatants immediately following cessation of hostilities and the signing of a Peace Accord may help to reduce the numbers of ex-combatants who enroll in training programs during the period immediately following demobilization only for the purpose of receiving a stipend, or entering into a life of crime utilizing the only skill they have -- how to fire weapons at people. The unwillingness to provide a stipend may *de facto* exclude potential beneficiaries from activities.

13. If a Project is Designed without Consideration of the Special Needs of Women, They may not be Able to Benefit Equitably from the Project. Peace and National Recovery Projects are not an Exception to this Rule.

In the rush to design activities and to provide assistance the fact that the target groups -- ex-combatant and general population -- both contain significant percentages of women, and that they may have special needs in order to access or otherwise benefit from assistance, may be overlooked. Consideration, for example, should be given to day-care centers for the children of ex-combatant mothers who desire training. A registry of ex-combatants would be helpful here both in design and implementation monitoring activities to help ensure that women benefit equitably from the project.

14. There may be a Need for New Sector Strategies for Areas in which the USAID has not Worked or for Modifications of Existing Strategies to Fit the Needs of the Peace and National Recovery Project.

A war-wounded strategy probably will be needed. Other areas will depend on the composition of the project and the amount of planning that has gone into the Project Paper. If objectives, input and output indicators, etc. are not well developed for a sector in the Project Paper, a sector strategy statement probably will be needed.

15. The Structure and Timing of Assistance in the Agricultural Sector are Critical to Avoiding Problems and to Sector Success.

The needs of new farmers, those receiving land transfers, are somewhat different from farmers returning to their land. The former may have been farm laborers or may never have worked on a farm as an adult. New farmers will need technical assistance on how to grow crops and/or raise livestock, and on farm management. Returning farmers probably also would benefit from such technical assistance. Both groups will need funds for farm inputs, but may not be able to service loans for the first year or longer due to insufficient land or the inability to put all of their land into immediate production. Grants or a mixture of loans and grants may be required if massive loan defaults are to be avoided. Both groups also probably will need assistance for shelter, potable water and improvements of neglected farm-to-market roads. Strong efforts must be made to provide needed assistance prior to the start of the first growing season following the beneficiaries settling or resettling on their land, otherwise a crop year will be lost.

16. NGOs Probably will be a Desireable and Necessary Resource for Participatory Project Design and Implementation.

Both local and locally long-standing U.S. NGOs probably will be needed for project implementation, *inter alia,* due to the normal weaknesses in developing country host governments, especially those just emerging from a civil-war. Moreover, these NGOs may be very much in touch with the needs of the target beneficiaries and have their trust. Therefore, these NGOs can make a valuable contribution to the design process. Having said that, it should be recognized that many of them will not be skilled in reconciliation and may be part of the original political polarization. (See number 2 above.)

Depending on the objectives of the project, a decision may be made to a) strengthen local NGOs as part of a building civil society and grass roots democratic initiatives objective, b) use only already capable NGOs in order to move faster and, at least initially, more effectively or c) adopt a mixture of a and b, depending upon the objectives and requirements. If any NGO strengthening is required it should be

undertaken as soon as possible.

One cautionary note. The USAID should be sensitive in its dealings with NGOs with predominately political as opposed to developmental agendas, the inclusion of which in a USAID-funded program could antagonize the host government and general populace and weaken the non-political image of the project.

17. Local Coordination with other Donors.

Most host governments do a poor job of donor coordination. USAIDs often do not do much better. Information on what this or that donor is doing must constantly be dug up, especially if it is to be timely and at a level of detail that is useful. In post-war projects where many donors are involved, this can be a larger problem than it normally is.

The host government should be pressed to improve its coordination, perhaps by co-chairing with the UN an informal donor coordination group. Still, there probably will be a need for USAID staff to do follow-up coordination with donors working in areas related to USAID-funded activities.

To a large extent other donors will have their own agendas and interests. Donor coordination primarily will be information sharing on what others are doing. Still, the USAID may be able to help some donors move more quickly and effectively given the information advantages of a resident USAID mission. And knowing what others are doing can assist the USAID in avoiding duplication of efforts.

APPENDIX A

USAID PEACE AND NATIONAL RECOVERY PROJECT BUDGET

(US DOLLARS)

As of September 30, 1994

COMPONENT / SUB-COMPONENT	CURRENT LIFE OF PROJECT FUNDING				REVISED LIFE OF PROJECT FUNDING ** (DRAFT)			
A. IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
1. Land Mine Awareness *				0	0			0
2. Food Distribution *			150,000	150,000	0		47,000	47,000
3. Health services			400,000	400,000	0			0
4. PVO Support *				0	0		1,884,073	1,884,073
5. Socio-Demog. Studies *		100,000		100,000	0	14,059		14,059
6. Documentation/Certification		1,400,000		1,400,000	0	1,240,992		1,240,992
7. SRN Admin. Costs		1,500,000	150,000	1,650,000	0	974,827	25,400	1,000,227
8. UN Humanitarian Asst. ***	500,000			500,000	500,000			500,000
9. UN Truth Commission ***	1,000,000			1,000,000	1,000,000			1,000,000
TOTALS	1,500,000	3,000,000	700,000	5,200,000	1,500,000	2,229,878	1,956,473	5,686,351

B. EX-COMBATANTS	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
1. Counselling, etc. *	2,500,000		1,000,000	3,500,000	7,536,296			7,536,296
2. Scholarships *	9,500,000			9,500,000	9,155,365			9,155,365
3. Land Transfer	20,000,000			20,000,000	22,244,525	17,106,103		39,350,628
4. Demobilization Packages *	2,900,000	5,600,000		8,500,000	2,601,395	4,215,190		6,816,585
5. Voc/Tech Training *	7,600,000	1,300,000		8,900,000	10,395,925	1,414,616		11,810,541
6. Agricultural Credit *	20,000,000	635,000		20,635,000	9,883,721			9,883,721
7. Micro-Enterprise Credit *	10,900,000			10,900,000	7,070,695			7,070,695
8. War-Wounded Assistance *	5,750,000	50,000		5,800,000	4,537,851	541,168		5,079,019
9. Contingencies	850,000	1,415,000		2,265,000	0			0
TOTALS	80,000,000	9,000,000	1,000,000	90,000,000	73,425,773	23,277,077	0	96,702,850

C. SOCIAL / ECONOMIC REACTIVATION	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
1. MEA	50,310,000	18,840,000	500,000	69,650,000	40,032,000	13,404,263	356,361	53,792,624
2. Health Posts			8,000,000	8,000,000	0		5,000,000	5,000,000
3. Vaccinations (MOH)			200,000	200,000	0			0
4. Civilian Wounded *	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5. School Supplies	-	375,000	7,000,000	7,375,000	0		4,250,000	4,250,000
6. Hiring Teachers		200,000		200,000	0	419,764		419,764
7. PVO Support *	2,700,000	875,000	5,700,000	9,275,000	8,702,274	830,079	6,000,000	15,532,353
8. Micro-Enterprise Credit & TA *	2,500,000	705,000	4,500,000	7,705,000	12,152,099	1,092,580	2,975,000	16,219,679
9. Ag. Credit & TA *	8,433,000	1,500,000	5,000,000	14,933,000	10,912,933	2,470,912		13,383,845
10. Support for investment and promotion *			500,000	500,000	0			0
11. Agricultural/Household Packages *				0	0			0
12. Voc/Tech Training *	3,473,000	39,000	7,500,000	11,012,000	2,772,055		6,610,000	9,382,055
13. Contingencies				0	0			0
TOTALS	68,700,000	24,000,000	39,300,000	132,000,000	77,323,660	18,809,411	25,641,361	121,774,432

D. LAND TRANSFER & ADMINISTRATION	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
1. Land Transfer (Civilian)	15,000,000	9,000,000		24,000,000	12,736,311	8,000,000		20,736,311
TOTALS	15,000,000	9,000,000	0	24,000,000	12,736,311	8,000,000	0	20,736,311

E. INFRASTRUCTURE	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
1. Feasibility Studies	2,800,000		1,000,000	3,800,000	1,100,000		3,137,651	4,237,651
2. TA for DGR	2,000,000			2,000,000	697,458			697,458
3. Emergency Repairs				0	0			0
4. Inf. Restoration/Reconstruction	11,000,000		19,000,000	30,000,000	15,913,988		30,264,515	46,178,503
TOTALS	15,800,000	0	20,000,000	35,800,000	17,711,446	0	33,402,166	51,113,612

F. PROGRAM AUDIT / MANAGEMENT	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
1. Audit	2,000,000			2,000,000	1,967,990	305,882		2,273,872
2. Management	8,000,000			8,000,000	6,334,820			6,334,820
3. SRN Admin. Costs		3,000,000		3,000,000	0	5,193,215		5,193,215
TOTALS	10,000,000	3,000,000	0	13,000,000	8,302,810	5,499,097		13,801,907

	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL	0394	HCOLC	Ex. Projects	TOTAL
GRAND TOTALS	191,000,000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

* Principally through PVO's

** Final decisions pending.

*** Grant Agreements signed by AID/Washington.

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PROJECT STATUS (As of September 30, 1994)

A. Planned EOPS

1. Increase voter registration in the ex-conflictive zones.
2. Decrease percentage of people living in poverty in the ex-conflictive zones.
3. Decrease percentage of people living in extreme poverty in the ex-conflictive zones.
4. Increase employment in NRP areas.
5. Increase income of project beneficiaries.
6. Reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life.

B. Major Outputs

COMPONENT I: Immediate Conflictive Zone Relief	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
No. of new personal ID cards (cédulas) issued	70,000	17,500	52,500	n/a	192,500	260,000	371%
Increase in registered voters SO	(Baseline 1991 - 591,496 / Registered 1994 - 634,227)						

COMPONENT II: Assistance to Ex-Combatants	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
No. receiving demobilization packages	22,900	500	22,900	0	0	17,548	76%
a) FMLN	11,200	0	11,200	0	0	10,740	96%
b) ESAF	11,200	0	11,200	0	0	6,800	61%
c) PN	500	500	500	0	1	1	0%
No. of FMLN disabled receiving medical/surgical attention SO	2,600	230	2,600	0	124	2,494	95%
No. of disabled receiving rehabilitation assistance SO	5,000	950	2,000	700	268	898	17%
a) FMLN	4,400	700	1,400	700	27	517	11%
b) ESAF	600	250	600	0	241	381	63%
No. of ex-combatants receiving training SO							
1) 2-5 yr. academic schol.	1,650	450	1,650	0	1,166	1,166	71%
a) FMLN	600	0	600	0	690	690	115%
b) ESAF	600	0	600	0	416	416	69%
c) PN	450	450	450	0	60	60	13%
2) 6-month voc./ag. trng.	17,800	2,600	14,800	800	1,490	15,729	88%
a) FMLN	7,500	0	7,500	0	219	7,870	105%
b) ESAF	6,500	1,800	6,500	0	1,217	7,805	120%
c) PN	3,800	800	800	800	54	54	1%
No. receiving shelter materials	3,000	0	3,000	0	1,252	1,252	42%
a) FMLN	1,500	0	1,500	0	571	571	38%
b) ESAF	1,500	0	1,500	0	681	681	45%

COMPONENT II (Continued): Assistance to Ex-Combatants	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
No. of ex-combatants receiving credit SO	15,000	3,400	9,000	2,000	4,182	8,987	60%
No. of ex-combatants and tenedores receiving land (See Component IV)							
No. receiving reintegration counseling	40,300	3,000	40,300	0	3,346	33,462	83%
a) FMLN 1/	7,500	0	7,500	0	0	0	0%
b) ESAF 2/	28,500	0	28,500	0	0	29,316	103%
c) PN	4,300	3,000	4,300	0	3,346	4,146	96%

COMPONENT III: Social and Economic Reactivation 3/	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
No. of people trained SO 4/	54,115	9,415	37,880	9,415	16,830	41,806	77%
a) men	43,392	7,756	31,312	7,756	11,905	n/a	n/a
b) women	10,723	1,659	6,568	1,659	4,925	n/a	n/a
No. of credit beneficiaries SO 5/							
a) agriculture	63,000	15,000	19,900	3,600	11,044	47,286	75%
b) micro-enterprise	5,000	1,000	3,000	2,090	2,425	3,509	70%
c) village banks	12,000	5,000	7,000	293	330	8,697	72%
Percent of clients receiving credit and training with increased income SO	This is a new indicator. Data will be available next semester.						
No. of NGOs participating in reconstruction activities (cum.) SO	80	9	49	9	6	122	153%
No. of civilian war-wounded receiving physical rehabilitation assistance	2,500	300	1,200	300	543	1,234	49%
No. of disabled civilians receiving physical rehabilitation assistance in NRP facilities	3,000	480	1,600	480	1,203	4,164	139%

SO Strategic Indicator

1/ The FMLN declined counseling on behalf of their members after LOP goal was set; PN LOP established this period.

2/ 7,329 ESAF trainees were trained, who counselled approximately 4 people each.

3/ The beneficiaries in this category are both civilians and ex-combatants.

4/ Cumulative gender breakdowns are not available because no gender information was taken at beginning of project. Total gender for the semester based on formula of 40% women civilians and 14% women ex-combatants trained.

5/ Planned figures have been revised to reflect greater-than-expected agricultural credit needs, and lower-than-expected village bank needs.

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Appendix

COMPONENT III (Continued): Social and Economic Reactivation	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
Primary health facilities with adequate water and sanitation	73	10	71	10	16	56	77%
No. of MEA basic infrastructure projects 1/ 3/	4,700	875	3,595	875	350	2,116	45%
a) roads	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	173	610	n/a
b) school rooms	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	510	n/a
c) community buildings	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5	81	n/a
d) electric projects	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	73	394	n/a
e) health posts	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	26	83	n/a
f) potable water projects	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	10	102	n/a
g) municipal buildings	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	25	269	n/a
h) other projects	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5	71	n/a
Percent of NRP population served by MEA infrastructure projects 3/ 4/							
Percentage of cantons participating in MEA open town meetings 3/	90%	80%	n/a	80%	74%	n/a	n/a
No. of open town meetings held 3/ 5/	230	230	230	230	246	n/a	106%

COMPONENT IV: Legally Transferred Land	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
No. of ex-combatants and tenedores receiving land 3/	36,000	4,000	12,000	8,500	2,882	13,516	38%
No. of acres transferred 6/	250,000	20,000	88,000	58,000	52,901	91,348	37%
Percent of Land Bank clients with land in production 3/ 7/	75%	60%	n/a	n/a	53%	n/a	n/a

1/ Because MEA-funded activities are demand-driven by the communities, planned outputs under this category cannot be calculated at the sub-component level. Planning is based on average number of projects which can be accomplished with a given amount of funding. Activities funded by SAHE and built by MEA are included in the "Accomplished" column.

2/ Planned target for semester was not reached due to start up delays for newly-elected municipal governments.

3/ New Strategic Indicator

4/ Percentages are now based a percentage of cantons served; a more precise database will be implemented by next reporting period.

5/ Number of meetings held per semester based on a total of four meetings held in each of the 115 municipalities per year.

6/ Because numbers being submitted regularly to Washington aggregate beneficiaries of the whole Land Transfer Program, which is funded from USAID, EEC, and GOES sources, data have been revised upward.

7/ This indicator will be reported only annually in September due to crop cycles. Target has been revised downward this period. Former number reflected United Nations estimates, not those of USAID. Accomplished percentages are based on surveys; hence, cumulative figures do not apply.

8/ Target has been revised downward this period, due to shortage of funding.

9/ Planning numbers rounded.

COMPONENT V: Infrastructure	PLANNED LOP	PLANNED THIS SEM.	PLANNED CUM.	PLANNED NEXT SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED THIS SEM.	ACCOMPLISHED CUM.	% OF LOP
No. of physical rehabilitation facilities opened in NRP areas	16	3	13	0	2	15	94%
No. of:							
a) km./roads rehabilitated 8/	3,600	100	600	600	142	899	24%
b) km./railways rehabilitated	78	13	78	0	13	77.5	99%
c) km./electric transmission and distribution lines rehabilitated 9/	600	400	400	200	194	256	42%
d) additional beneficiaries w/ access to potable water	34,500	10,000	20,000	7,200	12,807	27,307	79%
Cumulative percent of NRP population benefitting from rural road improvement/expansion activities 3/	(The SAR will report on this new indicator as of next semester.)						

C.1. Other Accomplishments and Overall Status

Since the NRP began almost three years ago (52% of the LOP period), almost $216 million has been committed (amount represents approximately 69% of the present $310 million LOP funding) to implement more than 72 project activities. The majority of the Action Plans approved during the semester were in the Social and Economic Reactivation, Land Transfer, and Infrastructure Components. No new activities have been approved under the Ex-Combatants Component; however, additional funding was allocated to two ongoing ex-combatant activities: FUSADES (FMLN 600) and the National Police. It is expected that funding priorities and trends established during the past semester will continue through FY95.

With reference to Major Outputs, accomplishments remain in line with "cumulative planned" targets. In the Ex-Combatant Component, major design and implementation difficulties with the "FMLN 600" program were resolved, and training activities for the demobilizing National Police began. In the Social and Economic Reactivation Component, NGO institutional strengthening activities continue; global strategies for agricultural and micro-enterprise credit, civilian war-wounded, and vocational training were approved, and related activities begun. Under the Land Transfer Component, new procedures for distributing land titles were devised which will accelerate project implementation. In the Infrastructure Component, the "caminos vecinales" (rural roads) program and the Intermodal Transportation study were approved, among others.

Specific Accomplishments - Regular 0394:

Program Activities: 1) Provision of 260,000 new personal ID cards (*cédulas*) to NRP ex-combatants and civilians helped increase the number of registered voters in the 115 target municipalities from 591,496 (1991) to 634,227 (1994). 2) 16,895 ex-combatants have received some form of training since the project began. 3) 59,492 small farmers and micro-enterprise owners have received credit from the Agricultural Development Bank and from 39 NGOs. 4) 122 NGOs have received NRP support, amounting to 40% of the funds committed (excluding land transfers and credit, which are executed by GOES agencies). 5) The Municipalities in Action (MEA) activity added 350 basic infrastructure interventions during the semester, for a cumulative total of 2,116 activities. The Land Bank transferred an additional 22,331 acres to more than 3,300 ex-combatants during the reporting period.

NRP ACTIVITIES DEDICATED TO EX-COMBATANTS

ESAF and FMLN Activities (The following activities are ongoing or have been completed.)

1. Scholarships for Ex-Combatants. The original Project Paper contemplated providing scholarships to 900 ex-combatants. The current program has 690 FMLN, 416 ESAF and 60 National Police (PN) enrolled in two, three and five year programs. Preliminary estimates indicate that an additional 550 ex-PN agents may apply for one of the scholarship options.

2. Agricultural and Vocational Training. For the FMLN and ESAF, enrollment in this activity initiated in March of 1993 and closed, in some cases as late as August of 1994. At first, the SRN contracted directly with a myriad of training institutions, each providing training services based on geographic presence or technical expertise. In order to ease the management burden by lowering the SRN's number of implementation units, it selected an agricultural training NGO specialist and an NGO with a specialty in providing training in industrial and service skills. These "umbrella" NGOs were made responsible for directly training ex-combatants or sub-granting and monitoring regional or local training institutions. 7,870 FMLN and 7,805 ESAF received this benefit and there could be a demand by as many as 3,800 NP for six months of agricultural or vocational training.

3. Livestock and Agricultural Technical Assistance for Ex-Combatants. Additional technical assistance was provided to ex-combatants concentrated in geographic areas of El Salvador. Some 6,000 FMLN and 2,000 ESAF that received agricultural courses received additional orientation in appropriate technology and farm management, and credit application assistance. This one year activity, overseen by the UNDP, was conducted by local NGOs and ended in April of 1994.

4. Agricultural Credit and Technical Assistance for Farmers. Credit subsidized by the GOES has been received by a total of 7,098 ex-combatants from both sides (1,625 ESAF, 5,473 FMLN).

5. Micro-Enterprise Development for Ex-Combatants. Funds for the development of some 1,600 small businesses for the FMLN and the same amount for the ESAF have been made available. Thus far, 1,156 FMLN and 740 ESAF have received micro-enterprise credits.

6. Land Transfer for the Ex-Combatants. Originally the best estimate of the number of families wishing to purchase land was 8,000 (civilians and ex-combatants). As of September 30, 1994, USAID has financed land purchases for 2,712 FMLN and 2,184 ESAF ex-combatants and 6,157 FMLN squatters.

7. Emergency Shelter for the Ex-Combatants. Since October, 1993, emergency shelter materials have been provided for 571 FMLN and 681 ESAF ex-combatant recipients of land transfers in isolated areas. To the extent possible, USAID also is providing basic infrastructure projects such as water and access road improvements to these sites.

8. Agricultural Tool Starter Kits. An assorted tool package consisting of three hoes, a pike, a shovel, a pick, an axe, six assorted machetes, a hammer, a drying cloth and an agricultural sprayer were provided to almost 8,800 FMLN and 6,800 ESAF ex-combatants.

NOTE. It was necessary to provide a subsistence allowance to ex-combatants of roughly $100 per month during their training period. This benefit still applies for those ex-combatants enrolled in the academic scholarship program.

Special Programs Exclusively for the FMLN

1. Household Furnishings. The U.N. and the FMLN approached USAID in July 1992 for support in providing a household starter package for 8,500 FMLN ex-combatants. The FMLN leadership convincingly explained that the symbolic gesture of the GOES helping the ex-combatant masses to re-establish homes was very important and that the Peace Agreement would break down if the GOES did not manage to provide the FMLN with basic items such as beds, bed linen, a table, chairs, a cooking stove, etc. The U.N. appealed to the donor community for funding pledges but less than sufficient funds were received to buy the household items. Under great pressure from the U.S. Congress and the GOES, USAID agreed to finance the procurement using a U.S. contractor. (Interviews during the distribution indicated that many ex-combatants were storing the goods with relatives because they had no homes. However, there were only a limited number of reports of attempts to re-sell the items.) In the end, nearly 10,747 members of the FMLN received household furnishings.

2. Agricultural Tool Starter Kits: A total of 1,600 sets were called for in the initial plans. However, that number increased to nearly 8,800.

3. Academic Refresher Course. The FMLN requested a special academic refresher course for those ex-combatants who were going to apply for scholarships. 415 beneficiaries received a three month course along with a modest stipend of approximately $100 and payment of school supplies.

4. FMLN 600 Leader Micro-Enterprise Training and Credit. The FMLN convinced the State Department and the U.S. Congress that a special program for the leaders of the FMLN was necessary and

important to allow full reintegration by the ex-combatants and political officers of the FMLN. The GOES made provisions for demobilizing ESAF officers utilizing NRP funds and the FMLN wanted a similar program. A program was agreed upon that will provide orientation counselling and vocational skills training to 200, and business management training to 392 former FMLN leaders. A credit line to implement business plans is available to 592 former FMLN leaders. The UNDP and a local NGO are implementing the activity which is scheduled to end in December 1994, but the credit activity may be extended into early 1995.

5. Assistance to War-Wounded. Medical and rehabilitation treatment has been provided to approximately 2,500. Activities covered under this activity include diagnose, referral, surgery, rehabilitation and purchase of equipment. This activity started in January 1993 and ended in June 1994.

Special Programs Exclusively for the ESAF Ex-Combatants

1. Counselling Services. The ESAF troops to be demobilized initially were counselled on military bases situated around El Salvador. Nearly 38,500 ESAF were potential beneficiaries of this activity, 7,400 were actually counselled due to a lack of support from the ESAF high command.

2. Assistance to the ESAF War-Wounded. Assistance is being provided to 350 ESAF disabled ex-combatants in the form of training, professional rehabilitation and micro-enterprise credit through a local NGO. This 19 month activity is scheduled to end in May 1995.

Special Program Exclusively for the demobilizing PN

1. Demobilization: A U.S. contractor is working under an USAID Cooperative Agreement to provide assistance to the demobilizing PN. There are six regional centers where PN members can receive counselling services in preparation for accessing training and credit benefits. As of September 1994, 4,146 PN members have received counselling.

Ex-combatant Reintegration Program in El Salvador

Agricultural Track



ESAF and FMLN Agricultural Technical Assistance Program

T.A. for One Planting Cycle
Appropriate Technology-Farm Management-Credit Application Assistance

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Micro-enterprise Track



Academic Scholarship Track



FMLN Mid-Level Officers Program



PROFILE OF FMLN, ESAF AND THE PN EX-COMBATANTS RECEIVING OR EXPECTED TO RECEIVE NRP BENEFITS

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)	El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF)	National Police (PN)
10,740 Ex-Combatants	14,000 Ex-Combatants	4,000 Ex-Agents
-During the conflict they lived within 115 Municipalities of the conflictive zones	-Come from predominantly rural areas	-Come from predominantly urban areas
-Average age: 20 to 22 years	-Average age: 24 years	-Average age: 26 years
-Average length of service: 4 to 5 years	-Average length of service: 2 years	-25% annual turnover
-Average years of education: 6 years	-Average years of education: 4.8 years	-Average years of education: 9 years

Comparison of Areas Selected by Ex-Combatants for Training



*Scholarships are for high school, technical specialty or university.

IRD/NRD - SEPT. '94: HG "PROFILE"

APPENDIX E

METHODOLOGY

The preparation of this final report was requested by, and drafted in close collaboration with, USAID/ES staff of the Office of Infrastructure and Regional Development (IRD) by a retired USAID Senior Foreign Service Officer who worked in El Salvador before the civil war from 1968 to 1971, during the civil war from 1984 to 1989 and after the civil war part-time from 1992 until 1994. In addition to his personal knowledge of El Salvador and the Peace and National Recovery Project, he had readily available extensive project documentation (e.g., the Project Paper and Amendment, USAID project status and special reports, a January 1994 Project Evaluation and reports on the Project by the GAO and interested private and international organizations) and access to many individuals familiar with the Project both within and outside USAID/El Salvador who were interviewed. Various drafts of the report were circulated for comment. This final report represents the views of the USAID/El Salvador Mission.

Marc Scott
Director, Office of Infrastructure
and Regional Development
USAID/El Salvador

Henry Reynolds
Acting Mission Director
USAID/El Salvador

IRDPUB\DOCS\LESSONS.NRP
R.Witherell

Appendix IV

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT WORKSHOP JUNE 15-16, 1995

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